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ABSTRACT
There are likely more than 45 million slaves in the world today. Economist Kevin
Bales defines slaves as people whose freedom and autonomy have been denied, who are
paid nothing above subsistence, and who are maintained in these conditions through
violence or the threat of violence. I am especially concerned with exploring the nature of
the various relationships that everyday citizens share with these modern slaves, and
establishing what, if any, obligations such citizens have to act on behalf of modern
slaves.
Contemporary philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre asserts that humans are
storytelling beings caught up in real stories (i.e. narrative quests) that involve both
ourselves and numerous others. As such, our lives are inextricably intertwined with the
lives of these others. Therefore, we cannot go about our lives with little or no thought
toward how our actions and decisions impact the lives of others.
Consequently, living in shared communities requires that we consider and care
about justice within those communities. Another contemporary philosopher, John Finnis,
distinguishes two specific types of justice: distributive and commutative. Distributive
justice deals with distributing resources, opportunities, profits, advantages, and
responsibilities to individuals, with the ultimate purpose of benefiting the common good.
Commutative justice considers what is required for individual wellbeing in communities
where individuals and groups must live and work alongside one another, and establishes
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standards for such relationships. It also helps to determine what should be done when one
person or group of people has been mistreated by another person or group. This can
include, but is not limited to, ides of correction, restitution, or restoration.
The ultimate goal of discussing distributive and commutative justice is to argue
that the narrative quests of individual global citizens are intertwined with the stories of
countless slaves across the globe. Some slaves may be our immediate neighbors, and
some slaves may be distant others. Yet we still find ourselves linked by numerous threads
that tie our stories together. Our duties in justice, both distributive and commutative,
demand that we work on behalf of those who are enslaved. But what does justice require
that we practically do to help such people? In the end, I make several suggestions that
will help us work toward achieving greater justice for the world’s slaves.
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PREFACE
In the winter of 2008, I participated in a conference organized by the North
American Association of Christians in Social Work (NACSW). I also signed up for a preconference workshop led by Anna Rodriguez, the founder of the Florida Coalition
Against Human Trafficking. At that point I was vaguely aware of the existence of slavery
in our modern world, but I was still under the false assumption that slavery was only a
problem in far-away places, like Southeast Asia, India, and Africa. I believed that the
workshop was going to teach me more about slavery “over there.” Instead, I was rocked
to my core to learn of the reality of slavery all around me, in my own country, and in my
own backyard. That experience left a mark on me. I went about my own work at a group
home for adolescents who were in state custody in South Carolina, but I never forgot the
stories I heard from Ms. Rodriguez. When I decided to pursue a Ph.D. in philosophy and
ethics several years later, I was initially unsure what I would care enough about to spend
years researching for a dissertation. And then it hit me – modern slavery is very much a
contemporary ethical issue. Perhaps I could write something philosophical that would
also speak into one of the biggest human rights crises of our time. This is the culmination
of that work. The kind of philosophy I care about intersects and informs the real world. I
hope that the words here will make a difference for those currently enslaved, both close
to home and far away. And I hope that those of us who are free will cry out “Abolition!”
as we fight for freedom for the world’s modern slaves.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"You may choose to look the other way
but you can never say again that you did not know."
- William Wilberforce
In 1833 the British Parliament passed the Slave Emancipation Act, voting to
abolish slavery throughout the British Empire.1 On December 6, 1865, the United States
of America ratified the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, which reads, "Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction."2 On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.3 Article four of this declaration
establishes, “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall
be prohibited in all their forms.”4 One might think that these resolutions are evidence that
slavery has finally been relegated to the history books. Unfortunately, this could not be

1

“Emancipation,” The National Archives, accessed May 29, 2018,
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/blackhistory/rights/emancipation.htm.
2
“13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Abolition of Slavery,”1865, accessed May 29, 2018,
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=40.
3
“History of the Document,” United Nations, accessed May 30, 2018,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/index.html.
4
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, 1948, accessed March 9, 2016,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
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further from the truth. In fact, there are more slaves in the world today than at any
previous point in human history.5
This realization has shaken me to the core, and it has impacted my life in
numerous ways – some small and some large. And while I have spent the past ten years
of my life caring and learning about this devastating reality, I have spent the past three
years especially consumed with several questions I believe to be of utmost importance:
“How is modern slavery our problem?” and “What are we obligated to do to help modern
slaves?” I am especially concerned with exploring the nature of the relationships that
everyday citizens share with modern slaves, and establishing what, if any, responsibilities
and obligations such citizens have to act on behalf of modern slaves.
A logical first step in any such project is to define terms and explain key concepts.
To this end, I begin Chapter Two by laying out the current status of slavery today,
establishing just how massive and widespread the problem of slavery actually is. I then
work out a definition of slavery that depends not on legal ownership of one person by
another, but rather on functional control. Because slavery is illegal everywhere, there is
often no paperwork declaring that one person legally owns another.6 Therefore, it is
important to establish what criteria must be met for a person to be considered a slave in
our modern context. Economist and influential modern abolitionist Kevin Bales has
developed a relatively narrow definition of slavery. Bales insists that in order for
someone to be considered a slave, three core factors must be met, including: (1) the use
of violence (or its threat) to control the slave, (2) the loss of free will (which is further

5

Melissa Hogenboom, “A tipping point in the fight against slavery,” BBC News, October 19, 2012,
accessed May 30, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19831913.
6
Kevin Bales, Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005),
40, 114.
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defined as the loss of freedom of movement or the freedom of autonomy to guide one’s
own life decisions, etc.), and (3) economic exploitation (to the point that the slave often
receives no compensation for his or her work, and definitely receives no compensation
above mere subsistence).7 Even given a strict definition of slavery, one anti-slavery
organization estimates that there are more than 45 million slaves in the world today.8
After explaining the scope of the problem and defining slavery in our modern
context, I then introduce and explain the four main types of modern slavery, which
include chattel slavery, debt bondage/bonded labor, contract slavery, and forced labor.9 I
adopt the understanding that ‘human trafficking’, a term which is often used
interchangeably with ‘modern slavery’, is in fact a method or conduit that is used to bring
people into slavery. It is true that many people become slaves after being trafficked (i.e.
moved) throughout the globe. But it is also true that there are millions of people who
languish in slavery having never been trafficked.10 Also, ‘sex slavery’ or ‘sex trafficking’
are not additional types of slavery. Rather, many people are enslaved through chattel
slavery, debt bondage, contract slavery, and forced labor for the purpose of sexual
exploitation.11 After dealing with a few potential criticisms regarding the definition and
explanation of modern slavery, especially surrounding modern slavery statistics, I close
Chapter Two by explaining that in order to fully understand why the battle against

7

Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 91. (Elsewhere, the “economic exploitation” category is also
described as an “appropriation of labor power.” See page 57).
8
“Modern Day Slavery: The Facts,” International Justice Mission, accessed March 2, 2017,
https://www.ijm.org/slavery.
9
Kevin Bales, Zoe Trodd, and Alex Kent Williamson, Modern Slavery: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford:
Oneworld Publications, 2009/2011), 33-35.
10
Jean Allain and Kevin Bales, “Slavery and Its Definition,” Global Dialogue 14, no.2 (August 3, 2012): 2,
accessed on November 10, 2017, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2123155.
11
Kevin Bales and Zoe Trodd, To Plead Our Own Cause (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
2008), 91-97. (This recounts the story of a survivor who was forced to be a sex slave through both contract
slavery and debt bondage).
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slavery is still raging, and what we are required to do about it, we must first lay some
foundational building blocks.
Chapter Three begins this foundational work by introducing three key concepts,
ultimately leading to a discussion of two general types of justice. These three concepts
include John Finnis’s “practically reasonable people,” Finnis’s “common good,” and
Alasdair MacIntyre’s “narrative quest.” Practically reasonable people will accept certain
responsibilities and commitments, including the responsibility to “favour and foster the
common good of one’s communities.”12 This then leads to MacIntyre’s understanding of
communities as places where community members share a future with others in which
their own stories, or “narrative quests,” impact and affect the stories of numerous
others.13 Therefore, we cannot live our own lives in isolation, but rather we must
understand that our stories are intertwined with the stories of others, and we must ensure
that our shared world is one in which justice is pursued for all.
The remainder of Chapter Three is focused on explaining the first general type of
justice – distributive justice. According to Finnis, distributive justice addresses problems
that arise regarding “distributing resources, opportunities, profits and advantages, roles
and offices, responsibilities, taxes and burdens – in general, the common stock and the
incidents of communal enterprise, which do not serve the common good unless and until
they are appropriated to particular individuals.”14 This obviously leads to questions
regarding how to determine what constitutes a just distribution of resources,
opportunities, and advantages. Multiple theories of distributive justice answer these

12

John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 161,
165.
13
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 215-216.
14
Finnis, 166.
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questions in very different ways. I explore several such theories, including theories which
appeal primarily to general welfare, freedom and rights, needs, and virtue. Ultimately, I
adopt Finnis’s view, which privileges needs over other possible criteria for distribution,15
while also stressing the importance of developing integrity and virtue. I also find merit in
the Kantian concept of human dignity, and the modern concept of universal human rights,
as values we should privilege. Finnis believes that it is important to value the right things,
which in this case means that we value providing for the basic needs of those in our
communities, and their inherent dignity as human beings, above other less pressing things
that we could value.
I close Chapter Three with a discussion of what boundaries matter when it comes
to seeking distributive justice for those in our various communities. I especially consider
questions regarding proximity – namely should we devote more time and energy and
resources toward our neighbors who are closer to us (considering both location and
strength of relationships), or should proximity not matter seeing as how we live in an
ever-widening global community, and some global needs are incredibly dire? These are
highly debated questions in the conversation between cosmopolitans and patriots. My
ultimate conclusion is that, while particularist relationships are real, and there is good
reason to believe that under most circumstances I have a greater obligation toward people
with whom I have special relationships (e.g. family members), there are some instances
where injustices committed against global citizens are so egregious (e.g. enslavement and
starvation) that our attention and response to them should be privileged. I assert that in
such instances, where the demands of universal morality are gravely violated, we should
become ‘conditional cosmopolitans’, acting and reacting from a position of privileging
15

Finnis, 174.
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and valuing the fundamental rights and needs of global citizens above particularist
relationships.
In Chapter Four, I explain the second general type of justice – commutative
justice. According to Finnis, commutative justice deals not with distributing common
resources and privileges among individuals in communities, but rather with assuring that
people treat those with whom they have relationships in ways that are fitting and fair.16
This includes consideration of corrective justice, which is concerned with how to ensure
remedy and restoration when people have been treated unjustly. But commutative justice
is much wider in scope than corrective justice, because it includes consideration of proper
interactions between people before any injustice has been committed, with the goal of
preventing future injustices.17
Of specific interest in this chapter is the question regarding to whom we share
relationships, and what our responsibilities are toward those with whom we share various
relationships, especially when we have participated in some way in harming them (or
failing to help them).

I draw distinctions between being guilty/culpable/at-fault-for

committing injustice(s), and being responsible (but not guilty) of contributing toward
injustice(s). I am most interested in this second category, because it seems that there are
instances in which individuals or groups of people may not intend or wish to harm other
individuals or groups, but nevertheless their actions (or their failures to act), either alone
or in concert with the actions or failures of others, do harm those with whom they have
various relationships.18 Often such instances result in responsibility without moral blame,

16

Finnis, 178.
Ibid., 180.
18
Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1976), 113.
17
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and they also often carry expectations of remedy or restoration despite their moral
blamelessness.19
Of course, if commutative justice is about treating those with whom we have
relationships in ways that are fitting, fair, and just, we must consider who these “others”
are with whom we share such relevant relationships and responsibilities. As MacIntyre
reminds us, we play parts in the stories or countless others, and we should “understand an
action as something for which someone is accountable, about which it is always
appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible account.”20 But again, who are these others
to whom we are accountable? Finnis points out that our ‘neighbors’ include individual
people we know, multiple people (or groups of people) that we know, and many
individual people that we do not know (but who are nevertheless members in our own
various communities).21 Many people in this latter category may be impacted by
structural injustices that govern our shared communities and systematically disadvantage
some while simultaneously advantaging others.22 Furthermore, in our modern global
community, we share these various relationships with individuals and groups both near
and far. When we can be shown to be guilty of injustice toward our neighbors, we are
assuredly obligated to provide restitution, remedy, and restoration for them. But even
when we are morally blameless, yet responsible for contributing to injustice, we are often
obligated to provide restoration for victims of injustice as well. But the nature of these

19

Finnis, 183.
MacIntyre, 209.
21
Finnis, 183-184.
22
Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 52.
20
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obligations is generally broad and indeterminate, leaving multiple possibilities open to
those who would uphold these duties and obligations.23
The purpose of carefully defining modern slavery, and of providing detailed
discussions of distributive and commutative justice, brings us to Chapter Five, the
penultimate chapter, and the pinnacle of the argument of this project. Chapter Five
explains how the existence of modern slavery violates the requirements of both
distributive and commutative justice, and it answers the question “How is modern slavery
our problem?” I recognize and admit that I spend a great deal of time setting up the
framework for this argument in Chapters 2-4, but I believe this is necessary in order to
show the multiple ways in which modern slavery does, in fact, violate justice.24
In order to understand one of the primary ways that injustice in distribution leads
to slavery, I examine the link between distributive injustice and poverty, and in turn the
link between poverty and slavery. In the words of modern abolitionist David Batstone,
“…denying the central role of poverty in modern-day slavery is like denying the central
role of gravity in rainfall.”25 I argue that the monetary cost of eradicating poverty from
the globe is relatively small if resources were more justly distributed, and the cost of
eradicating slavery from the globe is even smaller. As Finnis believes, common stock
resources are allocated to individuals for the purpose of using those resources for the
greater good of one’s communities, and not for hoarding excesses for oneself. When
individuals refuse to put these resources to work for the good of their communities, they
23

Elizabeth Ashford, “The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception of the Duties Imposed by Human
Rights,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 19, no.2 (July 2006), 232.
24
I also admit that this work by no means deals exhaustively with the connection between violations of
justice and modern slavery. Rather, it is intended to be an introduction to these ideas, as my research
indicates that the specific argument herein is a novel one (at least in the philosophical literature). I
undoubtedly leave much room for future exploration of many of the ideas introduced in this present work.
25
David Batstone, Not for Sale: The Return of the Global Slave Trade – And How We Can Fight It (New
York: HarperCollins, 2010), 290.
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are no longer fit to be entrusted with them.26 If such resources were distributed justly,
slavery would likely be non-existent. Modern slavery is our problem because we benefit
from unjust distributions, and we can and should use our excesses to benefit the common
good.
In order to understand the primary ways in which commutative injustice leads to
slavery, I focus on the ways that consumer habits, especially among citizens of the
developed West, contribute to the slavery of millions. As one modern anti-slavery
organization explains, “Many everyday products are made by slaves, or with slaverytainted parts or raw materials -- such as cars, computers, chocolate, cell phones and
clothing.”27 I provide extensive data and resources to build the case that modern
consumers are unavoidably linked to slave labor as a result of our purchasing habits.
Furthermore, a great number of individuals are also linked to slavery through their
involvement in the commercial sex industry, including those who participate in sex
tourism, those who purchase sex from prostitutes, and those who view pornography.
Many of the “sex workers” in the multi-billion dollar commercial sex industry are, in
fact, slaves.28 Therefore, those who support this industry are linked in multiple ways to
ensuring the continued existence and profitability of modern slavery.
Modern slavery is our problem because some of us are guilty of committing
commutative injustices against our neighbors who are slaves. Some of us have knowingly
taken advantage of our positions of privilege and power to oppress those with whom we
have varied relationships. This is especially true in the case of involvement with the
26

Finnis, 172.
“Trafficking and Slavery Fact Sheet,” Free the Slaves, accessed May 4, 2015,
https://www.freetheslaves.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/FTS_factsheet-Nov17.21.pdf.
28
Siddharth Kara, Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009), 15.
27

9

commercial sex industry. And even for those of us who are not guilty of commutative
injustice(s), many (if not most or all) of us are responsible for contributing to injustice(s)
against numerous neighbors who are slaves. We may hate the idea of supporting systems
that rely on slave labor. Yet, our inherited world is one that includes such systems, and
we use them and benefit from them. We may not all be guilty, but we are responsible, and
in many instances this responsibility carries certain obligations for us to act on behalf of
these neighbors, the world’s modern slaves.
This leads to Chapter Six, the final chapter, which attempts to answer the vitally
important question, “What are we obligated to do to help modern slaves?” In light of all
of the preceding work, many will be left wondering, “What practical steps can and should
we take to work toward restoration for these oppressed neighbors?” In reality, there is not
a list of definitive “dos and don’ts” when it comes to satisfying the demands justice
places on us in regards to our neighbors who are slaves. Our duties in distributive and
commutative justice are “wide duties,” allowing for multiple and varied responses from
those of us who are obligated to take corrective and restorative measures.29
Still, I make suggestions of several different ways that global citizens can fight for
justice for modern slaves. One category of suggestions involves collective efforts and
institutional reforms. These are things we can do together in concert with others, raising a
collective voice and wielding collective power to advocate for changes in social and

29

Finnis, 173; Sarah Clark Miller, The Ethics of Need: Agency, Dignity, and Obligation (New York:
Routledge, 2012), 61.
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political policies and structures.30 We can support Non-Governmental Organizations who
are already situated to fight slavery throughout the world.31
A second category of suggestions involves individual efforts we can make toward
fighting slavery. We can educate ourselves and others regarding the presence of slavery
in our world. Many global citizens are completely ignorant to slavery’s continued
existence and it’s modern manifestations.32 We can change some of our purchasing
habits, and we can demand more options that are sourced by free workers.33 We can give
money to organizations that already have boots on the ground ready to fight, but are
waiting for resources to fund their efforts.34 And these are only a few suggestions of
things individuals can do to fight slavery.
The ultimate point I hope to convey is that slavery exists on a massive scale. The
demands of justice – both distributive and commutative – show that slavery is very much
not permissible. It is a moral blight on humanity. Furthermore, even in instances where
we are not guilty of causing these injustices, we are often responsible for them, and we
are likely obligated to do things to answer the demands of justice on behalf of our
brothers and sisters around the world who are still, in the twenty-first century, slaves.
And as the quote from William Wilberforce at the beginning of this chapter proclaims,
"You may choose to look the other way but you can never say again that you did not
know."35

30

Thomas Pogge, “Reply to the Critics: Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties,” Ethics and
International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005), 80.
31
Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 78, 81.
32
Ibid., 4.
33
Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide, 156.
34
Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 81.
35
William Wilberforce, “William Wilberforce’s 1789 Abolition Speech,” The Abolition Project, accessed
May 29, 2018, https://www.st-andrews-anglican-calgary.ca/downloads/WilberforceSpeech1789.pdf.
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CHAPTER 2
MODERN SLAVERY: DEFINITIONS AND DETAILS
I. Does ‘Slavery’ Really Exist Today?
One current estimate suggests that there are more than 45 million slaves in the
world today.1 Another recent estimate suggests that there are between 21 and 36 million
modern slaves.2 The slave industry generates roughly $150 billion annually.3 Seventyeight percent of modern day slavery is constituted by labor slavery, while the remaining
twenty-two percent is constituted by sex slavery.4 Fifty-five percent of current slaves are
women and girls, forty-five percent are men and boys, and children constitute twenty-six
percent of all slaves worldwide.5
Now let us pause for a minute before proceeding. When we claim that slavery
exists in our modern world, what do we mean? As one modern anti-slavery work states,
our “fascination with the particular from of nineteenth-century chattel slavery hides the

1

“Modern Day Slavery: The Facts,” International Justice Mission, accessed March 2, 2017,
https://www.ijm.org/slavery.
2
“ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labor 2012: Results and Methodology,” United Nations International
Labour Office, June 1, 2012, http://www.ilo.org/washington/WCMS_182004/lang--en/index.htm; “The
Global Slavery Index,” Walk Free Foundation, 2014, http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/findings/;
“Trafficking and Slavery Fact Sheet,” Free the Slaves, accessed May 4, 2015,
https://www.freetheslaves.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/FTS_factsheet-Nov17.21.pdf.
3
“Profits and Poverty, The Economics of Forced Labor,” United Nations International Labour Office,
2014, accessed May 4, 2015, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--declaration/documents/publication/wcms_243391.pdf.; “Trafficking and Slavery Fact Sheet.”
4
“ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labor 2012”; “Trafficking and Slavery Fact Sheet.”
5
Ibid.
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larger story of human bondage…”6 Many Americans and Europeans are extremely
familiar with the slavery of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries within
our own borders and amongst our trading partners. However, we are also keenly aware,
as we were taught in our history classes since childhood, that slavery and the slave trade
were “prohibited in all their forms” long ago.7 This lures us into a false sense of progress,
often times wholeheartedly believing that slavery is, in fact, a relic of history. If only this
were the case. Investigative reporter Benjamin Skinner expertly documents the ease in
which one can leave New York City, fly to Port Au Prince Haiti, and purchase a child to
serve as a domestic slave in the span of about five hours.8 And one does not need to
travel by plane at all in order to find sex slaves through online ads and websites, or at
massage parlors or truck stops in our own developed cities. But alas, this still does not
answer the burning question regarding how to define slavery in a modern context. What
do we mean when we use the term ‘slavery’, or when we refer to some grossly exploited
people as ‘slaves’? It is to this question I now turn.
II. How Do We Define Modern Slavery?
It is vitally important that we define what we mean by ‘slavery’ in a modern
context. This proves to be more difficult than one might imagine. At the turn of the new
millennium, even getting those in power to use the term ‘slavery’ was a battle. In the first
ever Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, which was released by Colin Powell and the
US State Department in 2001 and detailed the reality of modern slavery worldwide,
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Secretary Powell never actually used the word ‘slavery’.9 The term seems to have such
deep historical connotations, especially in the United States, that many modern
bureaucrats believe that applying the term ‘slavery’ in the modern context “would
trivialize the suffering of African Americans…”10 Ironically, refusing to apply the term in
the modern context seems to trivialize the suffering of millions of the world’s
contemporary citizens, some of whom are, and some of whom are not “AfricanAmerican” but yet languish underneath severe oppression and exploitation.
Two scholars working in the field state: “…we seem to have lost sight of what the
term ‘slavery’ means…despite the fact that for more than eighty-five years there has been
a consensus in international law as to the legal definition of slavery.”11 This consensus
comes from an international definition of slavery that was established in 1926,12
confirmed in 1956,13 and replicated in substance in the 1998 Statue of the International
Criminal Court. The 1926 definition reads as follows: “Slavery is the status or condition
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are
exercised.”14
At first glance this definition may seem vague, and is itself the reason that many
have more recently attempted to define slavery in different ways. The use of the
terminology “attaching to the right of ownership” seems to make this definition less
9
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applicable to most instances of modern slavery, because legal ownership is not how most
modern slavery operates. Because slavery today is illegal almost everywhere, it has
become hidden from view. There are often no legal papers declaring that one person is
the owner of another, as was the case in antebellum chattel slavery.15 Modern slavery is
not about legal ownership, but rather about functional control (or functional ownership).
However, keeping this in mind, an Australian equivalent of the United States Supreme
Court determined the following:
…while the 1926 definition applied in de jure situations – that is: where a person
legally owns another – it also applied in de facto situations where a person
exercised the powers attaching to the right of ownership instead of exercising the
right of ownership over a person. In other words, that a person could be in a
condition of slavery without legal ownership, if it could be shown that they were
treated like a slave in fact, if not in law.16
By allowing de facto application of this definition, it covers many instances of modern
slavery in which a person is not legally owned by another, but is practically and
functionally owned by another. In the words of Allain and Bales, “…we are currently
living through a ‘neo-abolition era,’ one that goes beyond its historical predecessor which
focused on ending legal slavery; to a contemporary movement meant to end slavery in
fact.”17 In what follows I will discuss precisely how to identify instances of slavery that
include functional ownership.
Even despite this ruling which deems the 1926 definition largely applicable today,
Allain and Bales point out, “The definition [of slavery] has been often bogged down,
since at least the 1930s, by individuals and organisations trying to expand the notion of
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slavery to fit their agenda and thus benefit from the visceral power of a claim that what
they were railing against is ‘slavery’.”18
Thus we are still left needing a clear, succinct definition of what would constitute
an instance of modern slavery. Economist and sociologist Kevin Bales, who has devoted
his life’s work to impacting the blight of modern slavery, has done extensive work to
arrive at a fairly narrow definition of what constitutes slavery. He establishes three core
factors which must be present for an instance of exploitation19 to be counted as slavery.
These factors include: (1) the use of violence, the threat of violence, or psychological
coercion to control the slave,20 (2) the loss of free will (which is further defined as the
loss of freedom of movement or the freedom of autonomy to guide one’s own life
decisions, etc.), and (3) economic exploitation (to the point that the slave often receives
no compensation for his or her work, and definitely receives no compensation above
mere subsistence). This is also sometimes explained as the appropriation of labor powers,
because victims’ ability to use their own labor for their own gain is stolen, or
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appropriated, from them.21 There are many forms of exploitation that would not meet all
three of these criteria, and in those cases Bales would say that slavery is not present.
We can see here that by defining slavery rather narrowly, it becomes difficult to
overgeneralize and to call things ‘slavery’ that, while exploitative and perhaps immoral,
should not be classified as such.22 Many of those who estimate the number of modern
slaves are using fairly stringent criteria to determine this number, which means that when
we talk about there being thirty-six or even forty-five million modern slaves (give or
take) we are referring to people who are controlled by another through violence for no
economic compensation above subsistence. We are not talking about people who are
“enslaved” to addictions, or “enslaved” to consumerism, or even those “enslaved” by
miserly wages that are lower than they perhaps should be, but nevertheless provide for a
standard of living above subsistence. Many such people may experience exploitation, but
they are not slaves.
This does bring up some questions regarding exploitation more broadly, and why
slavery always exemplifies exploitation whereas exploitation does not always constitute
slavery. Furthermore, we should ask the question, “What is wrong with exploitation
anyway?” In its simplest conception, “To exploit someone is to take unfair advantage of
them…to use another person’s vulnerability for one’s own benefit.”23 Of chief concern
for our purposes here is exploitation in its normative sense, which involves unfair
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advantage taking that is seen as clearly wrong.24 Exploitation can be transactional – “a
discrete transaction between two or more individuals” – or it can be structural – “ a
property of institutions or systems in which the ‘rules of the game’ unfairly benefit one
group of people to the detriment of another.”25
But now we must also consider what it means to “benefit unfairly.” One
possibility is that this unfairness involves benefitting one person at the expense of another
(i.e. “benefitting A at B’s expense”).26 But it seems to be the case that some instances of
exploitation are mutually advantageous to both parties.27 Consider a sweatshop worker
who is a day away from starving to death. If she accepts a job in a factory where she
works sixteen-hour days in exchange for one meal a day, this still seems to be an
advantage over imminent death. In this instance the worker benefits (by receiving enough
food to prolong her life), and the factory owner benefits (by receiving extremely cheap
labor). If we want to still claim that this is exploitation, how can we side-step the problem
that mutual advantage might impose? Zwolinski and Wertheimer offer one solution,
claiming the following: “Relative to a baseline of no transaction at all, exploitation often
makes its victim better off. But relative to a baseline of a fair transaction, exploitation
leaves its victims worse off…the victim of exploitation gains less than she
should…[exploitation] makes its victim worse off than she should have been, had she
been treated fairly.”28 While this seems to make sense, some feel that accounts of
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exploitation based on fairness are unsatisfactory, and therefore they turn to another
explanation.
Many contemporary scholars working in the space of exploitation have moved
away from defining exploitation on the basis of fairness, and instead have turned toward
more Kantian ideas based on respect for persons.29 Ruth J. Sample defines exploitation as
“interacting with another being for the sake of advantage in a way that fails to respect the
inherent value in that being.”30 In such accounts the focus is shifted away from fairness,
and toward ensuring that people are treated with dignity and respect. As Zwolinski and
Wertheimer state, “When we encounter others whose basic needs are unmet, we should
help them because of the inherent value they possess as a human being. But the exploiter
sees in the unmet basic needs of others not a cry for help but as an opportunity to
profit.”31 Jeremy Snyder affirms this view, but also adds that duties to meet the basic
needs of others are contingent upon those who would help having the ability to do so
without jeopardizing their own flourishing. So a factory owner must pay a living wage to
her employees as long as she can do so without consequently removing herself from the
competitive marketplace. A situation becomes exploitative when such an employer lives
in excess or luxury or opulence while her employees live in deficiency or poverty. For
such a person to avoid exploiting others she must live between poverty and luxury, while
looking toward meeting the basic needs of those who fall below the poverty threshold.32
Doing this exhibits respect for human beings and their basic needs qua human being(s).
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We still must ask, though, how we can determine when an existence of
exploitation crosses the threshold into slavery. Perhaps the key lies in understanding
another concept, that of coercion. Zwolinski and Wertheimer assert, “Coercion
characteristically involves threats by which the coercer proposes to make her victim
worse off unless she does as the coercer demands.”33 This is essentially summed up in
Bales’ first criterion for an instance of slavery: the use of violence (or its threat) to
control.34 Coercion often leads victims to believe that if they do not do as they are told,
they will be harmed or killed, or someone they love will be harmed or killed. But whereas
coercion promises harm, exploitation “often involves offers by which the exploiter
proposes to make her victim better off if she does as the exploiter proposes.”35 Consider
again our example above of the sweatshop owner. If she threatens a victim by saying, “If
you do not work for me for sixteen hours each day in exchange for one meal, I will kill
your daughter,” this is best understood as an instance of coercion. On the other hand, if
she makes an offer to a starving adolescent, “Come work for me sixteen hours each day
in exchange for one meal, and you will prolong your life,” this is an instance of
exploitation because the victim gains something, albeit something that is less than fair
and/or does not exhibit dignity and respect toward the victim as a human being.
A relevant difference between exploitation and coercion seems to be that
exploitation involves taking unfair advantage of an existing defect, while coercion
involves creating a defect from which some benefit can then be derived.36 Perhaps this
then answers our question regarding why we might label some injustices as “exploitative”
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and yet not classify them as slavery. Slavery, under the definition we have adopted,
involves both exploitation (using another’s existing vulnerabilities to gain an unfair
advantage) and coercion (threatening to make a victim’s situation worse and/or creating
an unfair advantage for oneself).37
III. Types of Modern Slavery
A. Chattel Slavery
There are four prevalent forms that today’s slavery takes.38 The first is chattel
slavery. This is the type of slavery many people instinctively think of when they hear the
term “slavery,” because it most closely approximates old slavery. In chattel slavery, “…a
person is captured, born, or sold into permanent servitude, and ownership is often
asserted.”39 Because slavery is illegal almost everywhere, this is the least prevalent form
of modern slavery, and is found mostly in Northern and Western Africa.
This is, of course, a radical departure from most historical manifestations of
slavery. The practice of slavery is “as old as human history and predates both laws and
money.”40 The ancient Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, which dates to about 1790 BC,
lays out the oldest recorded legal system. In this system, the legal status of slaves was
detailed, and the thirty-five laws in the code regarding slavery made clear that slaves
were not considered to be real human beings.41 The practice of laying out legal codes,
guidelines, and laws governing the ownership of slaves and their status as property
continued through history. Only recently has it been the case that legal ownership of
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slaves has been prohibited, causing this shift away from chattel slavery and toward other,
often more covert forms of slavery.
B. Debt Bondage/ Bonded Labor
The second form is debt bondage slavery, which is also known as bonded labor.
This is the most common and extensive form of slavery today.42 By the end of 2011 there
were eighteen to 20.5 million bonded laborers in the world, with 84 percent to 88 percent
of them living in South Asia.43 Bonded laborers pledge themselves against a loan of
money, “but the length and nature of the service is not defined, and their labor does not
diminish the original debt…the debtor can never earn enough to repay the debt by his/her
own labor…if families try to leave, the slaveholder’s men retaliate with beatings, rape,
and forced eviction.”44 Debts are fraudulently maintained and increased, so that the
bonded laborer becomes more indebted instead of less so. Often times these debts pass
from father to son to grandson.45 In his book dealing exclusively with bonded labor in
South Asia, Siddharth Kara details this exploitative and coercive system:
In its most essential form, bonded labor involves the exploitative interlinking of
labor and credit agreements between parties. On one side of the agreement, a
party possessing an abundance of assets and capital provides credit to the other
party, who, because he lacks almost any assets or capital, pledges his labor to
work off the loan. Given the severe power imbalances between the parties, the
laborer is often severely exploited. Bonded labor occurs when the exploitation
ascends to the level of slavelike abuse. In these cases, once the capital is
borrowed, numerous tactics are used by the lender to extract slave labor. The
borrower is often coerced to work at paltry wage levels to repay the debt.
Exorbitant interest rates are charged…and money lent for future medicine,
clothes, or basic subsistence is added to the debt. In most cases of bonded labor,
up to half or more of the day’s wage is deducted for debt repayment, and further
deductions are often made as penalties for breaking rules or poor work
42
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performance. The laborer uses what paltry income remains to buy food and
supplies from the lender, at heavily inflated prices. The bonded laborers rarely
have enough money to meet their subsistence needs, so they are forced to borrow
more money to survive.46
Now, for those of us who do not live in extreme poverty, when we need money
we can often take out a legitimate loan from a legitimate credit lender at a specified and
reasonable interest rate. The terms of the loan are fairly agreed upon by both parties. Our
assets are offered as collateral against the loan, and if we fail to uphold the loan
agreement the collateral can be collected from us. So if I wish to buy a car, I take out a
loan for said car. If I then fail to make payments on the car, it can be confiscated from
me because it is the collateral against the loan for which I agreed.
For millions of incredibly impoverished people who find themselves in desperate
need of money, these legitimate lending options are not available to them for at least two
reasons. First, there are no legitimate, credible lenders available to them. Many
impoverished people live in distant, rural locations and are removed from institutions
such as banks and credit unions. If they need loans, their only options are those who live
in their immediate vicinity and who are wealthy enough to provide loans. Kara states,
“Bonded laborers are almost always socially isolated, and they tend to be located a great
distance from markets, which renders them reliant on lender-slaveowners to monetize the
output of their labor…”47
Second, these desperate people do not have any collateral against which they can
borrow money. They have no assets except for their own labor. Therefore, when they
seek out loans, the only collateral they can place against the loans are themselves and
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their labor.48 This is how the cycle that Kara detailed above begins. Once individuals take
out these informal, exploitative loans, their lender-slaveowners monetize their labor
inequitably in order to extend their bondage.49 It becomes nearly impossible to pay back
debts when illegitimate deductions are constantly made from wages, and when laborers
are forced to purchase goods from company stores at inflated prices. It is not uncommon
for bonded laborers to be charged annual interest rates of between fifty to one hundred
percent.50 Exacerbating this problem is the reality that many bonded laborers are
uneducated and illiterate,51 which means they cannot keep track of their own debts and
credits, and they cannot prove that documents detailing their agreements with lenders (if
these ever existed at all) were fraudulent or have not been upheld with the agreed upon
terms. Kara points out that when these agreements are written out, “the illiterate bonded
laborer signs the agreement with a thumbprint, relying solely on the lender to describe the
terms of the agreement.”52
Why do people agree to these exploitative loans? Common reasons include
consumption needs (e.g. food, clothing, etc.), income-generating activity (e.g. business
loans, loans for farm equipment, loans for building/crafting projects, etc.), repayment of a
previous loan, funding a wedding (i.e. to pay a dowry or other required fee in order to
marry), purchasing medicine or paying for other illness-related costs, and for funding
funerals.53
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Kara anticipates that some might question the legitimacy of debt bondage/bonded
labor as a form of real slavery because it may appear that the bonded laborer enters into
the agreement voluntarily. But Kara points out that a well-established tenet of contract
law provides that duress to a person nullifies any resulting contract. Furthermore, Kara
states that the only reason a person ever enters into debt bondage is due to a lack of any
reasonable alternative, which he believes satisfies the condition of duress. Those who fall
victim to debt bondage usually experience duress to their person (personal safety), duress
to goods (threat to seize property or evict), and/or economic duress. Kara points out that
“consent is vitiated in the presence of any of these forms of duress…”54 The United
Nations provides that “consent of the victim is irrelevant where illicit means are
established…”55 meaning that even if victims give some sort of initial consent, or make
some agreement with their slaveholders, if illegal or illicit means are used to gain their
consent, or once they are exploited beyond the terms of their agreement, their consent is
irrelevant and they are considered victims. The idea that duress or fraud or any other
illegal method used to enslave vulnerable people renders them victims (as opposed to
willing and complicit parties in their own exploitation) is a well-established and widely
accepted international understanding.
Why are bonded laborers so prevalent? In simplest terms, they are maximally
profitable. Globalization has encouraged transnational competition to decrease
production costs and increase profit margins. One of the easiest ways to do this is by
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decreasing operating expenses, namely labor costs. As Kara states, “Thus throughout
history, producers have tried to find ways to minimize labor costs. Slavery is the extreme
outcome of this impetus. Slaves afford a virtually nil cost of labor, which in turn reduces
total operating costs substantially, allowing the slaveowner to maximize profit.”56
In his book, Kara recounts the story of a slave he met in India named Ajay. I will
include Ajay’s story here, because he helps to paint the picture for us of what many
bonded laborers endure.
I took the loan of Rs. 800 ($18) for my marriage to Sarika. My father and mother
died when I was young, so it was up to me to arrange our wedding. I promised
Sarika after we finished our pheras [ceremony and vows] that I would make her a
happy life. I felt so proud. I was only seventeen at that time. What did I know?
Since the time of our wedding, we worked in these fields for the landowner, who
loaned me the money. When he died, we worked for his son. From the beginning,
we were promised wages each day of a few rupees. I felt my debt would be repaid
in two years at most, but the landowner made so many deductions from our
wages, and each year we had to take more loans for food or tenancy. Sometimes,
the landowner would tell me at the end of the season that I owe him this amount
or that amount, but I could never know what the real amount was. He did not
allow us to leave this place for other work, even when there was no work here to
do. My brothers and I have worked in this area all our lives. My two sons will
inherit my debt when I am gone. When Sarika became very ill three years ago, the
landowner refused to give me a loan for medicines. There was no doctor here, and
he would not send us to a medical clinic. He said my debts were too high and I
was too old to repay this expense. I pleaded with him to save Sarika, but he told
me only God can determine her fate. I was desperate, but I did not know what to
do. Sarika did not want our sons to take more debts for her medicine, so she
forbade me from telling them when she was ill. How could I deny her wish? Our
lives are filled with so much pain. I did not give Sarika a good life. For many
years, I wanted to take my life. I told Sarika I had cursed us, but she said that the
suffering in our lives was not so great as others. I told her she should have
married a rich man and been happy. Maybe then she would still be alive. I am old
now, and I can no longer work. The landowner has little use for me. My life is
almost over. I wait only for the end. No one in this country cares about people like
us. We live and die, and no one but ourselves knows we have drawn breath.57
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C. Contract Slavery
The third form of modern slavery is contract slavery. This form of slavery is
growing rapidly, and is the second most common form of slavery today. Contract slavery
“hides behind modern labor relations: contracts guarantee employment…but when
workers arrive, they are enslaved.”58 Recruiters target vulnerable populations of people
with promises of good jobs or educational opportunities. They convince those desperate
to improve their lives to leave the safety and familiarity of home with promises of
legitimate economic opportunities elsewhere. Once victims are vulnerable and powerless,
their travel and identity documents are confiscated. Without legal paperwork, and far
from home, they are treated violently and are convinced that they must accept their new
lives as slaves.59 Any contracts signed at the beginning of the process are discarded, lost,
or changed, and the victims in this scheme are powerless to resist.
Of course there are instances where legitimate debts are incurred and are paid off
within a reasonable amount of time, and under fair and agreed upon terms. These are not
instances of slavery. Both debt bondage and contract slavery are marked by fraud,
deception, physical force, psychological coercion, and general illegality of methods and
actions.
Kevin Bales and Zoe Trodd lay out a classic example of contract slavery in their
book To Plead Our Own Cause, which includes slave narratives from some of today’s
modern slaves. They recount the story of a Vietnamese woman named Vi, who was
enslaved in American Samoa after agreeing to a seemingly legitimate labor contract.
In 1999 Vi was one of about 250 workers brought from Vietnam on a labor
contract. A South Korean businessman named Kil Soo Lee had bought a garment
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factory called Daewoosa…and required sewing machine operators. Vi was
recruited by a Vietnamese government-owned enterprise called Tourism
Company 12 and was told she was heading for the United States. Like the other
recruits, she paid $5,000 to cover the cost of airfare and work permits and signed
a three-year contract in exchange for monthly paychecks of $400, plus free meals
and housing and return airfare. But on arrival in American Samoa, the recruits
were forced to work to pay off smuggling fees. Lee confiscated their passports to
prevent them from escaping, and he quickly stopped paying them altogether,
though he kept charging them for room and board. He withheld food, ordered
beatings, and forced them to work fourteen to eighteen hours per day. Female
employees were sexually assaulted, and those who became pregnant were forced
to have abortions or return to Vietnam.60
Vi further recounts her own story by explaining that she had to borrow the money
to pay Tour Company 12 and the official in charge of recruitment. She worked nineteenhour days for no pay, and did not have money for food, amenities, or soap. She was so
malnourished that she lost thirty-five pounds in a year and weighed only seventy-eight
pounds. Thirty-six people shared a room, and she had to share a tiny bed with another
worker. Mr. Lee would lay with whomever he wanted, and he would take women into his
office to have sex with them. He consistently groped and kissed female workers in front
of everyone. Movement at Daewoosa was restricted, and American Samoan guards
searched (and groped and strip-searched) workers if they left and returned to the
compound. Beatings and threats were used to intimidate and keep workers from
revolting. Two workers who became involved in lawsuits against Mr. Lee disappeared
and were never found. Even after being rescued, moving to the United States, and herself
becoming involved in helping to prosecute Mr. Lee, Vi was indebted to her exploiters and
sent money back to Vietnam to pay off her fraudulent debts. She reported, “Since my
arrival in the United States, I have sent every dollar earned back to Vietnam to pay my
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debt. However, this has barely made a dent because the interest rate is so high, 50
percent.”61
Vi’s story teaches us several things. First, many people who fall victim to contract
slavery are recruited by seemingly legitimate labor recruiters or agencies. In Vi’s case,
she was recruited by a government-owned enterprise. Many of these people believe they
are traveling abroad legally and have secured gainful employment at their destination.
They are not aware that many of their documents (which they paid for, or are indebted
for) are fraudulent. And regardless of the legal status of their documents (sometimes they
are legitimate and legal), whatever documents they do have are confiscated and withheld.
Second, we can see that in many cases of contract slavery, an element of debt
bondage is intertwined. In the midst of Vi being recruited, transported across the world,
having her documents confiscated, having the fruits of her labor appropriated, and being
exploited for sexual services, fraudulent debts were also maintained on her behalf,
amassing exponential interest, and demanding her attention even after she was freed from
American Samoa. So why did she continue to pay these debts? Most likely the reason is
that she left her parents and her daughter back in Vietnam, and since the company who
recruited her was protected by the government, it is highly possible that if Vi did not
satisfy her debts then her family would pay the price.
Contract slavery, or a contract slavery/debt bondage hybrid, is a prevalent form
of slavery in the United States. My own first introduction to modern day slavery in my
own country took place at a workshop in Orlando, Florida in 2008. Anna Rodriguez, the
founder of the Florida Coalition Against Human Trafficking, explained to attendees that
numerous slaves are brought into Florida from around the world. Florida’s proximity to
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Central and South America and the Caribbean islands, and its geographical feature of
being a peninsula, make it an easy entry point for slave traffickers. Many workers are
brought into Florida, believing that they have legitimate work lined up. But once they
arrive, their documents are confiscated, and their “contracts” are ignored. They are told
that they owe a debt for their transportation. Some of these victims stay in Florida and
work as domestic laborers in businesses and homes. Ms. Rodriguez told us of a woman
who worked twenty-hours a day as a domestic house slave for three years, being forced to
sleep on a concrete slab in the back yard, all the while being eaten alive by the abundant
Florida insects.
Many other workers do not stay in Florida, but are brought up through Atlanta,
Georgia, and accrue a second debt for this leg of transportation. If they are not kept in
Atlanta, they can be sent anywhere in the country, accruing yet another debt. They are
placed in restaurants and hotels and salons and massage parlors and homes and numerous
other placements, being told they must work off their debts. Often times their debts are
fraudulently maintained, and if they do manage to pay off their debts, they are fired from
their jobs. They can then be transported elsewhere with the promise of another job, but in
the process they accrue additional debts. This cycle can continue for long periods of time,
extracting weeks or months or years of work for no pay. Victims often have language
barriers and/or a fear of law enforcement officers, which keeps them from seeking help if
they ever have an opportunity to do so.62

62

Anna Rodriguez, “Human Trafficking” (pre-conference workshop, North American Association of
Christians in Social Work, Orlando, February 6, 2008).

30

D. Forced Labor
The forth form of slavery is forced labor. This refers specifically to “slavery that
is practiced not by a person, but by a government or some other ‘official’ group.”63 Some
governments enslave people who have not been given due process and who have not been
convicted of a legitimate crime, and then force these people to work in labor camps
against their will. China’s “laogai” (reform-through-labor) camps are an example of
forced labor. These camps were created by the Chinese Communist Party and are used to
produce major consumer goods. Those who work in these camps are mostly from
minority religious and ethnic groups, and they are paid no wages.64
One such former prisoner is Sam, who was once a graduate student at Georgia
State University (in Atlanta, Georgia). He worked as a tax auditor in China for nine years.
He was arrested and jailed in China for handing a letter to the State Appeal Bureau in
Beijing to express his opinion about Falun Gong (a Chinese spiritual practice which is
persecuted). In a testimony he provided, he explained,
Here I will not mention how the Chinese government persecuted family church
members, Tibetan monks, and Falun Gong practitioners. I only want to let you
know how some products from China are made and why they are so cheap. In
prison I was forced to work on export products such as toys and shopping bags
without pay…The cell was only about three hundred square feet in size, with
twenty prisoners and one toilet inside…Now the same kind of tragedy is
happening to my wife. She was sentenced to forced-labor camp for three years
without any trial and without a lawyer only because she handed out flyers in the
street to clarify the truth about Falun Gong…she mentioned that she was forced to
do embroidery work for export. The hard work, malnutrition, and torture made
my wife almost lose her eyesight.65
Another former prisoner, Ying, reported that during her time in two different
Chinese labor camps she was forced to produce large quantities of disposable chopsticks,
63

Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide, 34.
Bales and Trodd, Own Cause, 19-20.
65
Ibid., 21-22.
64

31

cosmetic products, knitted sweaters, knitted woolen gloves for European export,
crocheted cushions and hats, large quantities of slippers, and stuffed animals such as
rabbits, bears, dolphins, and penguins. She was imprisoned for being a Falun Gong
practitioner.
Despite outright denial from the totalitarian North Korean government regime, the
existence of numerous prison labor camps in North Korea is confirmed by satellite
imagery and vast human testimony. A combination of starvation, rape, torture, and harsh
working conditions in these camps make long-term survival difficult.66 A UN Special
Commission has reported that hundreds of thousands of political prisoners have perished
in these camps over the past five decades.67 These are just a few examples of forced labor
that satisfy our definition of slavery in a modern context.
E. What About Human Trafficking?
Under the conception of slavery I have put forward thus far, the practice of human
trafficking, or trafficking in persons, is not itself a separate type of slavery. Furthermore,
it is not another term that can be used interchangeably with modern slavery. Rather,
human trafficking is merely a process through which some people come to be enslaved.
As Bales and Alain state: “…it should be made plain that trafficking is not slavery, but a
process by which slavery can be achieved.”68 As such, human trafficking refers to the
movement of people for the purpose of enslaving them. It is a method, or conduit, that
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brings some people into slavery. At the turn of the new millennium, the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime developed the “Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children” which is
more commonly referred to as the “Palermo Protocol.” The Palermo Protocol provides
the definition of human trafficking, or trafficking in persons, that is most widely used
today. Article 3(a) reads:
"Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs;69
This clearly specifies human trafficking as “a crime related to a chain of
movement of a person into situations of ‘exploitation’, as a result of violence or other
means.”70 When we recognize human trafficking as an activity specifically involving the
movement of people, we realize that only about 2.5 million people today are enslaved
after being trafficked. Rather, the vast majority of today’s slaves are sedentary, meaning
that they have not been moved. Instead they are enslaved in their own villages, towns,
territories, and countries.71
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Although Bales, his collaborators and co-authors, and some other researchers in
this space72 are very careful to make the point that ‘human trafficking’ and ‘modern
slavery’ are not merely two different terms with synonymous meanings, others are not so
careful. There seems to be fairly widespread conflation of these two terms, especially in
the United States. For example, the US Department of State webpage says, “’Modern
slavery,’ ‘trafficking in persons,’ and ‘human trafficking’ have been used as umbrella
terms for the act of recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining a person
for compelled labor or commercial sex acts through the use of force, fraud, or
coercion.”73 Furthermore, each year since 2001 the State Department of the United
States of America has released a Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report.74 On numerous
occasions, the introductory material of these reports has used the terms ‘human
trafficking’ and ‘modern slavery’ interchangeably.75 The state department further claims
that “Human trafficking can include, but does not require, movement.”76
The conflation of these terms in such a globally influential document, as well as
the disagreement amongst various parties regarding whether or not trafficking must
involve movement, serve to confuse the relevant differences between ‘slavery’ and
‘trafficking’. Consequently we must figure out how to deal with this disagreement. My
solution is to hold to this distinction between ‘modern slavery’ and ‘human trafficking’,
and to operate from an understanding that ‘modern slavery’ is the umbrella term that
72
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includes all forms of slavery as defined at the outset of this chapter, and to use the term
‘human trafficking’ as Bales and his co-authors do to refer to the literal movement of
people for purposes of exploiting them for labor or sex. In my interactions with several
lawyers working on slavery issues in the international community, they have affirmed
that this is a helpful and important distinction to make. However, I also recognize that a
great number of people working in the modern anti-slavery movement do not make this
distinction, and as I continue to work in this space I must proceed in light of this
knowledge. In my own work, I preserve this distinction and use ‘modern slavery’
broadly, and ‘human trafficking’ more narrowly.
F. And What About Sex Slavery?
The forms of slavery mentioned above also do not specifically single out sex
slavery, or trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation, as a separate type
of slavery. This is not because this type of slavery does not exist. As was previously
mentioned, sexual slavery constitutes approximately 22 percent of all slavery
worldwide.77 The reason this type of slavery is not listed as a fifth form of slavery is that
it usually falls within one of the four established categories. For instance, much sex
slavery is seen as a form of debt bondage, where victims accrue fraudulent debts which
they are forced to work off, but are never freed even after “paying back” their debts many
times over. Or sometimes sex slavery falls within the parameters of contract slavery,
where women and children are offered supposedly legitimate jobs only to later find out
that they were tricked and are now powerless to free themselves from forced sexual
exploitation. Often times an instance of sex slavery might involve both debt bondage and
contract slavery. Consider the story of Nu, a Thai woman who was enslaved in Japan. In
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her story you will find classic evidences of contract slavery (e.g. making an agreement
with an agent to secure legal documents and legitimate work, passport/document
withholding, changing agreement upon arrival) as well as debt bondage slavery (e.g.
being told upon arrival that she owed massive debts, having more fraudulent debts
constantly added, being forced upon threat of injury or death to repay her debts).
Furthermore, in Nu’s story we see evidences of the three necessary criteria established
above for something to be classified as ‘slavery’ – violence or its threat, appropriation of
labor power/economic exploitation, and loss of free will.
When I reached puberty the son of the family I lived with…raped me several
times and began sending me out occasionally with clients…I came to Bangkok at
the age of fifteen…A hairdresser friend suggested that I find a well-paying job
outside the country that also took care of my food and accommodation…She said
that if I didn’t know how to go about things, she would introduce me to an agent
who would help me secure work in Japan…The agent interviewed me…I told him
that I had no relatives…He asked me to undress…[he] examined my body for
“damage,” and internally probed me with his bare hands…I was told that I would
be working as a waitress in a bar earning approximately $200 per month and that I
was not bound to go out with clients but could if I chose to earn more. Agent’s
fees and other expenses were to be paid after I received my first wage. From the
time the agent began working on my travel documents to the time of my departure
– which was a little over two weeks – I was kept in a small hotel room…I learned
later that I traveled to Japan on a tourist visa and someone else’s passport affixed
with my photograph…I was told that I would be escorted from Bangkok airport
by a Thai family…My “father” kept my passport with him…At Narita airport in
Japan, my “father” took care of the immigration procedures…we were met by a
Japanese man with three young Thai women in his charge…We were brought by
taxi to a karaoke bar…the owner was a Japanese, married to a Thai mama-san
[Madame]…I was asked to undress and the owner began pressing and massaging
various parts of my body…the owner even slept with me before hiring me. I
really felt horrible – like a piece of flesh, being inspected, bought, and sold…As
soon as the others left, the mama-san told me that I had to pay off a debt of over
one million yen [$8,000]. My food, rent, and other expenses would be added to
this amount…Clients paid the mama-san directly for taking the women out during
the debt repayment period. The mama-san warned me not to try to run away, as
should would be very tough…I was shocked and realized that the only way for me
to pay off my debt was to go out with as many clients as possible…Our living
quarters housed thirty girls between the ages of fourteen and thirty…Most were
already in prostitution in Thailand before they came to Japan, but like me did not
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know they would have to go out with clients, pay off a huge debt, and live in total
confinement…Most of us consumed drugs or gulped down alcohol before leaving
for work…We often got sadistic and kinky clients…They would beat us before
intercourse with sticks, belts, or chains till we bled…If girls came back
traumatized after going out with a sadistic client…they would be beaten…That is
why we routinely used drugs before sex, because then we didn’t feel the pain that
much…When debts were paid off, the mama-san returned our passports, and we
were free to either leave or stay for a month or two and earn something…I
finished repaying my debt in ten months. I had some money from tips, but not at
all enough to buy my return ticket. I worked for two months more in the bar…I
then began to solicit in front of one of the motels…One day I happened to walk
into a Thai restaurant and found a pamphlet…I rang the number and found myself
talking to a Japanese nun…She made the necessary arrangements and sent me to
an NGO in Thailand. I returned with savings of 30,000 baht [$685] after five
years of struggle. No one in the world can get over sleeping with one man after
another who does not love you.78
IV. Criticisms and Questions
One obvious question that merits attention regards the range of estimated numbers
of modern slaves. One of the primary awareness campaigns leading the charge for the
abolition of modern slavery, EndIt Movement, claims that an estimated 20 million to 45.8
million people are trapped in slavery today.79 This is a pretty large range. Why are these
estimates so inexact? There is a simple answer to this question, which we glossed over
earlier. Remember that the illegality of modern slavery has not resulted in its
disappearance, but only in its covertness. Much modern slavery is conducted in the
shadows, through underground channels, and is hidden from view. Many victims of
modern slavery are threatened and are terrified of coming forward. As was mentioned in
the story of Vi above, sometimes victims who speak out against their abusers go missing.
In reality, these estimates, as horrific as they may seem, are likely very conservative. The
probability that many are languishing in slavery whom we do not know about and never
will know about is high. Slaves today are cheap and numerous, which makes them easily
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disposable.80 When they are no longer profitable, or when they rebel, or when they
become physically or mentally broken down, they can easily disappear into oblivion.
Also keep in mind that when we refer to ‘slaves’, we are referring to people who
satisfy a fairly strict list of criteria. Combining this recognition with the reality of the
hiddenness of modern slavery should go a long way to alleviate our skepticism and
increase our understanding regarding the uncertain range of data involved in numbering
today’s slaves.
Another pushback that may arise hinges on the fact that in many instances of
modern slavery, there is at least some element of initial consent on the part of the victim.
We have already dealt with this criticism in our discussion of debt bondage/bonded labor.
However, it does not hurt to point out that these same arguments stand for victims of
other forms of slavery as well. Regardless of the methods used to trick victims, any
potential consent is irrelevant when duress, force, fraud, coercion, or other illegal means
are used to obtain that consent or are used once the victims are powerless to resist.
V. Conclusion
More information about and better understanding of modern slavery emerges
daily. Those who enslave are creative and savvy. But modern abolitionists are tireless.
They strive to learn and to fight. The battle to make slavery illegal has already been
fought and won. But the battle to eradicate slavery from the face of the earth is very much
in process. In due time we will return to this battle in an effort to better understand why it
is still raging, and to discuss what we are obligated to do about it. But in order to get
there, we need to lay some groundwork. We will now turn toward laying our first
foundational brick, which is the concept of distributive justice.
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CHAPTER 3
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
I. Introduction
Thus far I have painted a picture of the present status of modern slavery across the
globe. Moving forward, my ultimate goal in the rest of this work is to explore the nature
of the relationships that everyday citizens share with these modern slaves, and to
establish what, if any, responsibilities such citizens have to act on behalf of modern
slaves. I wish to address several broad questions, including: “How is modern slavery our
problem?” and “What are we obligated to do to help modern slaves?” But first, I must
establish some foundations.
My strategy for answering these questions is to appeal to two different categories
of justice – distributive justice (this chapter) and commutative justice (Chapter Four).
Then I will apply these categories of justice to the issue of modern slavery (Chapter
Five). John Finnis provides an exemplary framework for such a discussion of distributive
and commutative justice in chapter seven of his book Natural Law and Natural Rights,1
and so I will use his concepts as the foundation of these two chapters.
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II. Life in Communities:
Practically Reasonable People, The Common Good, and the Narrative Quest
A. Practically Reasonable People
Before we can fully delve into Finnis’s ideas regarding justice, we must
understand a crucial concept in his work. This important concept is Finnis’s idea of
‘practically reasonable’ people. He explains that such people are “consistent; attentive to
all aspects of human opportunity and flourishing, and aware of their limited
commensurability; concerned to remedy deficiencies and breakdowns, and aware of their
roots in the various aspects of human personality and in the economic and other material
conditions of social interaction.”2
The idea is that anyone who is a practically reasonable person will accept certain
responsibilities and commitments. They will care about consistency, both in themselves
and others. Practically reasonable people will place value on human flourishing, and will
take steps to encourage flourishing within themselves and others. They will work to fix
breakdowns and to improve deficient and defective systems. Furthermore, practically
reasonable people recognize that they should be and are members of communities3
(however that might be construed), and thus should be concerned with the execution of
justice within those communities. Practically reasonable people are not islands to
themselves, but rather they are aware of the deep roots they share with others, including
their shared economies, material conditions, and social interactions.
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B. The Common Good
Another crucial concept in Finnis’s work, and an important foundational building
block for our discussion of justice, is that of the ‘common good’. Finnis rightly points out
that justice is relational. He identifies the three elements of the complex concept of
justice as other-directedness, duty, and equality.4 These three elements, per Finnis, are
“necessary and sufficient for an assessment to be an assessment of justice.”5 As regards
“other-directedness,” justice necessarily entails a plurality of individuals, and deals with
their interactions with one another. It makes no sense to speak of justice in the absence of
human relationships.6 If one person can demand justice, it is of or from or pertaining to
another person (or people) that such a demand is made.
Similarly, the element of “duty” is also relational. It deals with “what is owed…or
due to another, and correspondingly what that other person has a right to.”7 However,
justice does not pertain to all dealings or relationships between people, but rather “only
those relations and dealings which are necessary or appropriate for the avoiding of a
wrong.”8 There are certain things that must not be done (to people), and justice has the
duty of upholding these individual rights.
The third element of justice is “equality,” but this does not necessarily mean
numerical equality. Proportionality, equilibrium, and balance are better exemplars of this
idea.9 Feeding a toddler and a grown man “equally” might not mean giving each of them
three pieces of pizza. Feeding them equally might mean feeding them proportionally, or
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helping them to each gain equilibrium in regards to their hunger. This might involve
feeding the toddler one piece and the grown man three pieces of pizza.
The point here is that ultimately, relational justice is concerned with how
communities can work together to achieve the common good. Talk of justice necessarily
involves consideration of communities, relational duties within those communities, and
the striving for equality amongst members of those communities. According to Finnis,
“Justice, as a quality of character, is in its general sense always a practical willingness to
favour and foster the common good of one’s communities, and the theory of justice is, in
all its parts, the theory of what in outline is required for that common good.”10
Talk of a ‘common good’ may sound disturbingly utilitarian or Marxist or
Communist to some. But rest assured that Finnis’s concept of the ‘common good’ is not
at all utilitarian (i.e. demanding that individuals must be sacrificed at times in order to
achieve the greatest good for the greatest number). Neither is it Marxist, at least in the
sense that it advocates the opposite of depriving individuals of private ownership.11
Finnis reminds us that “the common good is fundamentally the good of individuals.”12
The common good values individuals, and it concerns the good of individuals living in
communities with countless other individuals.
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C. The Narrative Quest
So if it is the case that practically reasonable people recognize their memberships
in various communities, and they understand the responsibilities these memberships
entail to favor and foster the common good, a third concept can help to tie these ideas
together and to give us a coherent picture of the relational nature of justice. In chapter
fifteen of his book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre introduces the concept of the
narrative quest. MacIntyre spends a great deal of time in this chapter explaining that the
unity of a human life should be viewed as a narrative – a story with a beginning, middle,
and end.13 I have written elsewhere that when MacIntyre speaks of a unity of life, I
envision the existence of a consistency throughout a person’s life that results in some
type of theoretical thread being woven throughout that life, from beginning to end, in a
way that simply makes sense and is coherent.14 MacIntyre argues that human
communication is incoherent when abstracted from its place in a narrative, and that
human action is made intelligible only when situated within a narrative.15 MacIntyre
states, “It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our
own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is
appropriate for understanding the actions of others. Stories are lived before they are
told…”16
And this leads us to the crux of our discussion of living in communities. The view
of the narrative quest for MacIntyre is not one that involves individuals pursuing their
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own narrative quests parallel to one another, but rather a view that involves the
overlapping and intersecting of many narrative quests. He therefore states:
Someone may discover (or not discover) that he or she is a character in a number
of narratives at the same time, some of them embedded in others…Each of us
being a main character in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas of
others, and each drama constrains the others.17
As a practically reasonable person, not only must I be concerned with living my
own life in a consistent and coherent manner, but I must also consider when, where, and
how my narrative story intersects with the narrative stories of others. To the extent that I
have some control over the unfolding of my own story, I must be mindful of how my own
actions may affect, both positively and negatively, the stories of others. People are not
islands, and their actions produce ripple effects that move their own lives and that touch
and move the lives of those around them. We often don’t know how things will turn out
because stories are unpredictable, but we can know that in some way we share a future
with others.18 The way we interact with one other in our communities is a determining
factor of what kinds of communities we build. The way we live amongst our neighbors
matters! Again, appealing to MacIntyre,
We live out our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other,
in the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future, a future in which
certain possibilities beckon us forward and others repel us, some seem already
foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable…I can only answer the question ‘What
am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find
myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed
characters – roles into which we have been drafted – and we have to learn what
they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our
responses to them are apt to be construed.19

17

MacIntyre, 213.
Ibid., 215.
19
Ibid., 215-216.
18

44

I cannot determine what I am supposed to do in a given situation without
considering what role I play in my own story and the stories of those around me. The
narrative quest is not just the quest of individuals, but of communities of people living
out their stories and playing roles in the stories of each other. As such we must consider
one another as we work and play and learn and live in a shared world. And this brings us
to the importance of ensuring that our shared world is one in which justice is pursued for
the sake of us all.
III. Distributive Justice
A. Introduction to Distributive Justice
Thus far I have established that practically reasonable people accept certain
responsibilities and commitments, and among these are specific commitments to foster
the common good of all people within a shared community. Furthermore, we all live out
narrative stories, and our stories touch and are touched by the stories of others. How I live
my life has implications for others, because I am a part of their stories, and they are a part
of mine. Taking these points into consideration, we can now examine what is needed in
our communities if they are to be considered just.
In an effort to show how communities can work toward their common good,
Finnis distinguishes between two broad classes of problems. In chapter 3, I will discuss
the first class of problems, which deal with “distributing resources, opportunities, profits
and advantages, roles and offices, responsibilities, taxes and burdens – in general, the
common stock and the incidents of communal enterprise, which do not serve the common
good unless and until they are appropriated to particular individuals.”20 These problems
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require a theory of distributive justice to help determine how such ‘common stock’
resources should be allocated and distributed so as to work toward the common good.
B. Common Stock and Incidents of Communal Enterprise
So what exactly are ‘common’ resources? Finnis describes two different sorts of
‘common’ subject matter. First, a subject-matter is ‘common’ if it is not a part of an
individual person, or has not been made by anybody. Such resources are available for the
benefit of anyone or everyone. Examples Finnis gives of these ‘common’ resources
include: “solar energy and light, the sea, its bed and its contents, land and its contents,
rivers, air and airspace, the moon…”21 These types of resource are considered common
stock resources.
Second, a subject-matter is ‘common’ if it is the result of people working together
and collaborating to improve their position. This could involve several neighboring tribes
banding together to ward off an attack from a mutual enemy, or several countries
working together to survive a famine. In such instances, multiple parties must collaborate
in order to decide what to do, how to do it, how to fund the joint enterprise, and other
numerous relevant details.22 Furthermore, often times such collaboration yields tangible
products, such as “a city wall and stock of weapons; a sea wall or dyke; a drainage
system and hospitals; a harvest in communal granaries, etc.”23 Finnis refers to these
types of collaborative effort as incidents of communal enterprise, and the tangible
products they yield can also be considered a type of common stock.
Natural resources and products that compose the common stock, as well as
collaborative efforts that result in incidents of communal enterprise, are essentially
21
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‘common’. Yet they provide no benefit to anyone if they are not appropriated by or
allocated to specific individuals or groups.24 A plot of fertile soil is of no benefit to
anyone if it just lies fallow because no one has been granted the right to plant in it. A
joint famine relief plan is futile if the fruits of the enterprise are not distributed to
individuals who need them. And this leads us to the problem of distributive justice: “to
whom and on what conditions to make this necessary appropriation.”25 Who gets what
when it comes time to divvy up the elements of the common stock and the results of
communal enterprises?
IV. What Do We Owe to Others? [What is a Just Distribution?]
To ask whether a society is just is to ask how it distributes the things we
prize – income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities,
offices and honors. A just society distributes these goods in the right way;
it gives each person his or her due. The hard questions begin when we ask
what people are due, and why.
-

Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?

A. Introductory Remarks
In the above quote, Harvard professor and political philosopher Michael J. Sandel
articulates the difficult task ahead when it comes to deciding how we should divide up
what is owed to different people. What method(s) should we use to determine who should
get what and why? How one answers this question is largely dependent on which
theoretical framework one adopts. Is it most important to consider the general welfare of
groups or societies? Or should we give priority to rights, freedom, and autonomy? Should
fairness be our chief consideration, and if so how do we figure out which arrangement(s)
are most fair? Should our actions be primarily guided by needs? And to what extent is
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justice bound up with ideas of virtue, values, and the good life?26 I will consider many of
these options, and ultimately I will conclude that while several of these theories provide
helpful components, the view that combines some element of needs with virtues and
values is most helpful, and this is the kind of view that Finnis himself endorses.
B. Appeals to Welfare (Utilitarianism)
One philosophical camp advocates that when determining how to distribute
goods, services, experiences, et cetera, the main consideration should be the welfare of
the aggregate group. This utilitarian camp argues that the most just arrangement is that
which produces the greatest amount of utility. This ideology was first articulated in the
mid-eighteenth century by Jeremy Bentham, who believed that “the highest principle of
morality is to maximize happiness, the overall balance of pleasure over pain.”27 The
principle of utility, according to Bentham, rests on doing whatever produces pleasure or
happiness and avoiding whatever results in pain or suffering.28 So on the utilitarian view,
the arrangement that produces the most just distribution is that which results in the
greatest utility, which is further defined as that which produces the greatest overall
amount of happiness/pleasure and avoids the greatest amount of pain. According to
Bentham, “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to
determine what we shall do.”29
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Sandel points out that one obvious weakness of Bentham’s version of
utilitarianism is that it seems to discount individual rights. Utilitarianism is very willing
to sacrifice the happiness of a few in order to attain greater happiness or satisfaction for a
greater number. Individual preferences and needs are considered, but if an individual’s
preferences or needs conflict with the overall utility or happiness of the larger group, they
are discounted. As Sandel remarks, “…this means that the utilitarian logic, if consistently
applied, could sanction ways of treating persons that violate what we think of as
fundamental norms of decency and respect…”

30

He gives as one example the ancient

Roman practice of throwing Christians to the lions in the Coliseum. Sandel questions
whether such a practice could be condemned if enough Romans derived enough pleasure
from the violent spectacle.31
Another weakness of Bentham’s utilitarianism is that it presumes that one can
measure all values on a single currency of value. But it is not clear that this is possible.
Many would argue that values cannot be compared in a cost-benefit analysis, which
attempts to translate all costs and benefits into monetary terms in order to compare
them.32 It seems difficult at best, and unequivocally wrong at worst, to put a price on
people’s lives and experiences.
The nineteenth century thinker John Stuart Mill set out to answer these criticisms
and to rescue utilitarianism from its seeming inhumanity. In his book On Liberty, Mill
defends individual freedom by claiming that “people should be free to do whatever they
want, provided they do no harm to others.”33 He believes that this claim can still rest on
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the utilitarian calculus because he is concerned with maximizing utility in the long term,
and he believes that preserving individual liberty will lead to the greatest happiness over
time.34 But Sandel points out that this “leaves rights hostage to contingency,” because it
is always possible that a society could arise which could achieve “long-term happiness by
despotic means.” If such a situation arose, Mill would not have grounds to condemn such
a society from a strictly utilitarian framework.35
Furthermore, the utilitarian framework does not have a basis to condemn the
violation of a person’s rights based on that person’s individual standing as a human
being. Violations of rights can only be condemned if they have negative effects on the
general welfare,36 so it seems as if Mill hasn’t actually rescued utilitarianism from its
heartlessness, or afforded individuals intrinsic worth.

Mill attempts to avert this

conclusion by also arguing that an individual’s character matters, and that exhibiting
good moral character is desirable. But again, nobleness of character seems to be
important because of its positive effects on the general welfare. Mill states the following:
…and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the
happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier,
and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore,
could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even
if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so
far as happiness in concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit.37
So it seems that noble moral character either needs to be desirable and valuable in
and of itself, which precludes it from being a utilitarian tenet, or it is only a tool to be
used in the pursuit of the general welfare. But if this is the case, character is subject to
contingency just as individual rights are.
34
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In response to the criticism against utilitarianism that it attempts to measure and
compare values in a cost-benefit analysis, and this is not possible, Mill outright denies
this impossibility. He argues that not all pleasures are equal, and that some kinds of
pleasures are more valuable than others. He states, “It is quite compatible with the
principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable
and more valuable than others.”38 But it seems as if the valuing of some pleasures over
others is not at all compatible with the principle of utility. It is incompatible to claim that
“…pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends…all desirable
things…are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the
promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain,”39 and yet to also place a higher value
on some kinds of pleasure over others. At the point that such distinctions are made
between so-called higher and lower pleasures, one is making value judgments that do not
rest on a theory of pure utility. If one is to be a consistent utilitarian, Bentham’s
observation that a child’s game is as good as poetry40 is the most consistent stance to
take.
Determining what we owe to others, or what a just distribution of goods and
services would be from a utilitarian perspective, leaves us with little option for preserving
individual liberty and freedom. To be consistently utilitarian, decisions of distribution
must be based purely on the general welfare, and on what will bring about the greatest
general happiness for the greatest number. Our twenty-first century conception of
intrinsic, undisputed human rights (such as those identified in the United Nations
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Declaration of Human Rights41) cannot stand under the utilitarian calculus. Therefore, if
appeals to freedom and rights are important, perhaps the next several theoretical
approaches will seem more attractive.
C. Appeals to Freedom and Rights
1. Kant’s categorical imperative. Immanuel Kant believed very strongly that
people should not be seen as mere means to an end. In his work Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals he set out to establish quite the antitheses of the utilitarian
calculation. Whereas utilitarians view individuals as means to the end of the greatest
overall happiness, Kant argues that people are not means to an end, but on the contrary
individuals are ends in themselves.42 As such, individuals have inherent value that
supersedes their utility. Furthermore, all of these individuals who are “ends in
themselves” make up a “kingdom of ends,”43 a community of people with value and
dignity who are afforded consideration and respect not based on their utility, but based on
their rationality.44 Kant believes that humanity, because of its capacity for morality, “does
not merely have a relative worth, i.e. a price, but an inner worth, i.e. dignity.”45
Even in this extremely brief appeal to Kant, we can see how subsequent thinkers
are given a foundation to build an idea of individual rights and human dignity. Individual
persons are more than mere tools to be used and disregarded if/when such disregard
might serve the ‘greater good’. Individual persons are ends in themselves, and they
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constitute communities of individuals who become kingdoms filled with people who are
ends in themselves.
2. Libertarianism (laissez-faire camp). Whereas utilitarians might favor
redistribution on the grounds of maximizing utility or happiness, libertarians argue that
taking from some and giving to others, even for good cause, is coercive. Libertarians
believe that such redistribution violates individual rights that people should have “to do
with their money whatever they please.”46

Attempting to force equality actually

conflicts with liberty. The central libertarian claim “is that each of us has a fundamental
right to liberty – the right to do whatever we want with the things we own, provided we
respect other people’s rights to do the same.”47
Economists Milton and Rose Friedman point out that when we talk about
‘equality’, we must specify precisely what we mean. They indicate that at the inception of
the United States of America, “equality meant equality before God; liberty meant the
liberty to shape one’s own life.”48 Following the civil war, the conception of equality
shifted to mean “equality of opportunity,” meaning that people should not be prevented
“by arbitrary obstacles” from using their own gifts and talents to pursue their own ends.49
Under both of these conceptions, equality and liberty are compatible with one another.
All people possess equal standing under God as precious individuals with unalienable
rights. No one is arbitrarily kept from being given equal opportunities to succeed because
of birth, nationality, race, religion, or any other characteristic apart form ability.50 People
are seen as autonomous beings, capable of determining their own life paths. They are not
46
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mere instruments to promote the purposes of others,51 but rather they are ends in
themselves.
The Friedmans point out that in our modern era, a very different meaning of
equality has emerged. When some people speak of equality now, they mean “equality of
outcome.”52 This concept does not argue that everyone should be identical, but it does
argue that fairness is the goal, and carries the mantra “Fair shares for all.”53 The
Friedmans argue that this type of mindset reduces liberty because it inevitably requires
taking from some who have more than their “fair” share and redistributing those shares to
those who have less. Furthermore, they argue that there is no objective standard for
determining what precisely is “fair,” and therefore there is no good way to determine
when some might have too much and others not enough. Who decides such matters, and
how should they be decided?54 Philosopher Robert Nozick, a staunch libertarian, echoes
this concern when he states, “There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled
to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.”55
Nozick’s view, which is labeled “entitlement theory,” states that there are only
three ways that money/objects/property/possessions/etcetera can come to be justly held.
First, something can come to be justly held through original acquisition, meaning that the
holder is the first to possess something that was previously unpossessed or unheld.
Nozick calls this the “principle of justice in acquisition.”56 Second, a person who justly
holds something is free to transfer that possession to another. This usually happens
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through voluntary exchange, or through the giving of gifts, and is called “the principle of
justice in transfer.”57 Third, nothing can be justly held (i.e. no one is entitled to a holding)
except through repeated applications of these first two principles of justice in acquisition
and justice in transfer.58
Nozick is extremely critical of what he refers to as patterned principles of
distribution. A patterned principle of distribution is expressed in any system that singles
out a natural characteristic and advocates for distributing based on that factor. So some
might argue that distributive shares should be allocated based on merit, or I.Q., or effort,
or need. But Nozick believes that redistribution according to certain patterns, whatever
they may be, is unjust. If we take from people things which they hold justly either
through acquisition or transfer, we are stealing from people who have done no wrong. He
states the following:
Whoever makes something, having bought or contracted for all other held
resources used in the process (transferring some of his holdings for these
cooperating factors), is entitled to it. The situation is not one of something’s
getting made, and there being an open question of who is to get it. Things come
into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them.59
One potential problem for Nozick, which he acknowledges but then does not
adequately answer, deals with the historical aspect of justice in holdings (comprised of
justice in acquisition and justice in transfer). He admits that not all situations are
generated according to these principles, and therefore the resulting holdings are not justly
held. Nozick states, “Some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them,
seizing their product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude
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others from competing in exchanges.”60 To be fair, Nozick does believe that in some
instances rectification should be made for past injustices. However, he does not attempt
to determine when such rectification should take place, or what such rectification should
entail.61
It is common knowledge to many Americans that the land we now call ours was
once not ours at all, but belonged to numerous tribes of Native Americans. We were not
the original acquirers of the land, nor did we pay these tribes through fair contracts and
agreements in order to acquire the land through just transfers. When Nozick points out
that justice in holdings is historical, he also points out that whether or not something is
justly held “depends upon what actually has happened.”62
It is not as if each of us comes into the world today devoid of attachments. Rather
we come into the world as members of already established groups who live in certain
places under certain types of government or rule. We are benefited by or harmed by the
actions and decisions, acquisitions and transfers of those before us. It is not so easy to
say, “I am entitled to this land,” or “I am entitled to this fortune” because, if we trace
back the justice of those acquisitions and transfers, I wager that many of us would not be
excited with the results we would find. MacIntyre gets at this idea when he states:
But it is not just that different individuals live in different social circumstances; it
is also that we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social
identity….Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits
these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my
nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations.
These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.63
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Furthermore, we can appeal here to Finnis’s view of common stock resources and
products. Finnis points out that original acquisition of common stock resources – things
that do not really belong to anyone, but are not useful unless and until they are allocated
to individuals – are ultimately meant to benefit the common good of the community.
Acquisitions are made, and private holdings are encouraged, not for the purpose of
hoarding for oneself, but for the purpose of increasing value and productivity for the
benefit of the common good of the members of one’s community.64
MacIntyre and Finnis are examples of those who would challenge the libertarian
notion that we can do whatever we want with the money (and other possessions) we have.
After all, perhaps we do not have tight-fisted entitlements to nearly as many things as we
would like to think. If much of what I have either isn’t rightly mine, or was allotted to me
with the purpose of my using it to benefit both myself and others, then perhaps the
libertarian calculation falls short of what would be required by distributive justice.
3. Egalitarianism (fairness camp). Another group of thinkers, known as
egalitarians, would agree with libertarians that we should not necessarily be striving for
equality. However, the conclusions of these two groups are drastically different. Whereas
libertarians advocate for unencumbered liberty (which they argue requires minimal
government and the belief that most motivations and methods of redistributing resources
are tantamount to theft65), egalitarians are concerned with what a fair distribution of
resources and goods should entail. Egalitarians might argue that libertarians spend so
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much time worrying about property rights that they neglect numerous other human
rights66 that should be afforded consideration.
But how might we go about determining what a fair distribution of goods and
resources might be? Twentieth century philosopher John Rawls developed a now famous
thought experiment in his book A Theory of Justice (1971). In this book he points out
that attempting to come up with a fair distribution of goods is not possible if people come
to the table with different advantages and bargaining positions.67 Therefore, he theorizes
that in order to come up with a truly fair and unbiased system, the principles that would
govern such a society would have to be “chosen behind a veil of ignorance” in which “no
one knows his place in society.”68 Rawls refers to this as the “original position of
equality.”69 The idea is that if a group of people determined the principles of their society
not knowing if they would be high-ranking officials or garbage collectors in that society,
they would arrive at principles that would be advantageous to themselves regardless of
their actual position in that society. Rawls states, “Since all are similarly situated and no
one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice
are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.”70
Sandel points out that in such an experiment it is clear that rational, self-interested
persons would not choose utilitarianism. For behind the veil of ignorance, they would not
know if they would end up being a part of the happy majority or an oppressed minority.71
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Furthermore, they would not choose laissez-faire libertarian principles either, for they
might end up being wealthy with many entitlements, but they might end up being
homeless and destitute with no hope for relief.72 Instead, Rawls identifies two principles
he believes individuals in the original position would choose:
[T]he first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the
second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of
wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.73
The first principle provides equal basic liberties for all citizens.74 This is
somewhat equivalent to the idea of equality under God, or the equality of dignity and
value that Kant believes all rational persons should be afforded. The second principle
deals with social and economic equality.75 But this principle does not advocate for
equality of outcome. Rawls’s conception of equality is undoubtedly one of equality of
opportunity. He believes that privileged positions and offices should be available to all.
In support of this idea he states, “While the distribution of wealth and income need not be
equal, it must be to everyone’s advantage, and at the same time, positions of authority
and offices of command must be accessible to all.”76
Of course, it is a reality that people experience different levels of privilege and
want, of talents and abilities.77 If one person is born into a wealthy family and given the
best possible education, while another person is born into poverty and struggles to read, it
is very unlikely that they will have equal opportunity to apply for the same jobs or run for
the same privileged offices. Therefore, if individuals are to be afforded true equality of
72
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opportunity, inequalities must be compensated for.78 Now it may be the case that one
person’s natural advantages can be put to good use for the betterment of the least
advantage in the society. When this is the case, those inequalities are deemed
acceptable.79 But it may also be the case that sometimes, in order to preserve true equality
of opportunity, “society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to
those born into the less favorable social positions.”80 To help walk the tension between
these two possibilities (i.e. the privileged maintaining their advantages in order to benefit
the least well-off, versus the underprivileged receiving a greater share of assets in order
to offset their disadvantages), Rawls develops a principle he calls “the difference
principle.”81 This principle encourages the gifted and talented “to develop and exercise
their talents, but with the understanding that the rewards these talents reap in the market
belong to the community as a whole.”82 Of course, this is an argument for the necessity of
redistribution in some instances.
If it is the case that the advantaged in a society should use what they have to
benefit those who have little, then perhaps a fairly radical redistribution of goods and
services is what distributive justice requires. In recent years, numerous modern ethicists
have advocated for just such a radical redistribution of wealth in order to combat abject
poverty. But many of these philosophers and ethicists, while they do care about rights and
liberty and fairness, also care about something else – needs.
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D. Appeals to Need
Philosopher Sarah Clark (S.C.) Miller points out, “In the contemporary theoretical
terrain, preferences, interests, desires, and especially rights have preempted needs.”83 In
2008 the World Bank set the international poverty line at $1.25 per day. In 2009 at least
1.4 billion people lived in extreme poverty, below this meager line. In the poorest
countries, one in five children dies before the age of five (contrasted with fewer than one
in a hundred deaths in rich countries).84 These are just two examples meant to illustrate
the vast needs caused by global poverty. If need is truly a primary criterion for
distributive justice, it seems as if there are plenty of people who warrant our attention and
consideration.
Before proceeding further, it will be beneficial to establish what we mean when
we refer to needs. S.C. Miller explains that not all needs have moral significance. For
instance, a proper cake needs sugar. But this need for sugar is not morally significant or
normative. And no one is obligated to provide sugar for the cake. (It will just be a lousy
cake sans sugar, which in the scheme of things is no big deal). But not all needs are like
this. Some needs are vitally important, and if they are not met, serious harm will befall
those who experience this failure. S.C. Miller calls these morally significant needs
fundamental needs.85
…it is both important and necessary for fundamental needs to be met, because if
they are not met, agency is compromised and serious harm ensues. Fundamental
needs carry with them a feeling of urgency, which contributes to the sense that
they must be met…
At the core of compromised agency is, of course, the notion of agency
itself. I understand agency as the ability to achieve some manner of results in the
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world, to affect change in accordance with one’s volition, and to maintain the
ability to carry out projects (often self-determined) in a surrounding
environment.86
Failure to meet fundamental needs compromises rational autonomy, and it also
results in emotional and relational impediments. Agents have emotions, and consequently
agency also involves a caring component. Furthermore, human agents are finite. The
existence of fundamental needs highlights two consequences of our finitude: vulnerability
and dependency.87 As agents who are fragile and subject to physical, emotional, and
psychological harms, we cannot deny the fact that “others must [sometimes] meet our
fundamental needs and aid us in evading harm. In this sense, our fundamental needs leave
us profoundly dependent on other people…sometimes they must support us by
developing, maintaining, or restoring our agency.”88
Before proceeding, I should at least mention S.C. Miller’s list of fundamental
needs. She includes eleven fundamental needs in two loose categories: (a) needs relating
to physical necessity, and (b) needs of psychological and/or social necessity. These are
universal needs, meaning that all humans experience them throughout their lives,89 and
these needs must be met in order to “cultivate, maintain, or restore agency.”90 The eleven
fundamental needs include (1) nutrition and water, (2) rest, (3) shelter (including
clothing), (4) healthy environment (hygienic, non-toxic, etc.), (5) bodily integrity
(freedom from physical and sexual abuse, freedom to control matters affecting their
bodies, etc.), (6) healing (access to some medical attention), (7) education,
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(8) attachments (positive emotional attachments), (9) social inclusion, participation, and
recognition, (10) play (pleasurable recreational experiences which foster humor and
creativity), and (11) security (freedom from coercive, threatening environments).91
But if it is the case that certain needs – fundamental needs – require a moral
response, why is this the case? We undoubtedly do have some intuitions that “others’
needs affect what we ought, morally, to do.”92 More specifically, S.C. Miller asserts:
“Some needs have undeniable normative force. The hunger of the starving stranger, the
homelessness of the refugee, and the loneliness of the widower call for a response from
those who encounter them.”93 But it isn’t enough to merely assert that such needs have
normative force – we need to give a reason why we are morally obligated to act in order
to help meet the fundamental needs of others.94 Furthermore, if a genuine obligation to
help the needy exists, how many people must I care for? How much must I give of myself
and my resources, and for how long?95
In order to provide a justification for the belief that fundamental needs require a
response, S.C. Miller develops an idea she calls “the duty to care,” in which she argues
that “certain needs require a moral response of care.”96 She further explains that if
someone has a need, the required response is that someone else give care. This is an
interactive process, and although it involves two people (the “caregiver” and the “care
receiver”), the perspective of the one needing care is privileged.97 She develops the duty
to care by meshing feminist care ethics with Kant’s idea of beneficence. S.C. Miller
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believes that “the Kantian duty of beneficence provides the foundation for the duty to
care, one that explains why we are obligated to respond to certain needs found in
others.”98
In The Doctrine of Virtue,99 Kant contrasts the duty of benevolence (which is
simply wishing others well, and costs us nothing), with the duty of beneficence, which
requires that those who have the means to respond to the real needs of others (such as
S.C. Miller’s fundamental needs) are required to do so.100 But again, why is this the case?
In short, Kant’s justification goes back to his categorical imperative in its first
formulation: “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time
will that it become a universal law.”101
Kant points out that rational beings cannot help but to hope for their own
continued existence and wellbeing. But rational beings also must admit their own
finitude. Finite rational beings, then, recognize that their own existence requires the help
of others throughout their lives. In a society of finite people who are interdependent upon
one another, it is necessary then for a principle of beneficence to become a universal
maxim, obligating me to help others who are in need, and obligating others to help me
when I am in need. My continued agency requires that my fundamental needs are met,
and this requires that if I find myself in need the possibility that others will respond to my
need beneficently must remain open.102 S.C. Miller explains why this is the case:
It is in light of this finitude and interdependence, and because rational beings, as
rational, will their own continued existence, that finite rational beings must help
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one another in cases of need as they practice the duty to care…[A] principle of
non-beneficence or mutual indifference – that one never helps another in need and
therefore never receives the help of others when in need – could, without
inconsistency, serve as a universal law…Finite rational beings, however, cannot
will that this be so, as doing so would destroy the conditions of willing their own
continued existence. As finite, they will necessarily experience needs that they
cannot themselves meet and will then require the help of others. Under a universal
principle of non-beneficence, such help would not be available to them…In
willing that this maxim become a universal law of nature, the will of such a man
would contradict itself because situations will inevitably arise in which the man of
mutual indifference must call for others’ help to meet his own needs. He is
inevitably dependent on others…It is not enough that individuals not interfere in
one another’s lives. Well-being for finite rational beings can only come about in a
world involving beneficence.103
Lest some criticize Kant here for turning the duty to care into a selfish agreement
to help others only for the benefit you will yourself eventually reap, Kant does not
believe that beneficence is the result of such a cool calculation. He merely points out that
“the possibilities of requiring aid and of experiencing need are inescapable for finite
rational beings.”104 Furthermore, his position is one of humility in admitting the
interconnectedness and dependence of finite rational agents. The duty to care naturally
arises out of this state of weak, dependent commonality, and anyone who believes he or
she is above this reality is simply arrogant.105 In Miller’s words, “Obligations arise in the
face of human imperfection…One feature of the human condition that Kant cannot ignore
is dependency, represented most clearly by the persistent and vast nature of human need,
and the resultant requirement of care.”106
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This interdependence of finite rational agents “reveals the relational normativity
that connects finite human beings in a common moral community.”107 Here we can refer
back to MacIntyre’s belief that the narrative quests of a community full of people interact
with one another. I must be concerned not only with my own story, but with the part I
play in the stories of many others. Many of our narratives are “embedded in [the
narratives of] others” and “each drama constrains the others.”108 I believe MacIntrye
would agree with S.C. Miller and Kant. Because people are dependent upon one another,
living in humble community requires caring for the needs of those whose narrative quests
intersect with our own, and accepting care when we find ourselves in need of help.
If we do have a genuine duty of care, what should this practically entail? A more
detailed discussion on this matter will be included in Chapter Six, but I will mention a
few words here. For her part, S.C. Miller advocates that the duty to care is a “wide duty,”
allowing for variety in the caring responses of moral agents who assume the caregiver
role. The general duty of care involves responding to the fundamental needs of others,
but it does not prescribe specific ways in which agents are to respond in order to fulfill
their obligations.109 The one criterion of acceptable response that S.C. Miller imposes
requires that caregivers meet the fundamental needs of others in ways that preserve the
dignity and agency of those in need.110 Aside from that, there is much freedom in how
caregivers administer care to those who are in need.
While S.C. Miller does not give a definitive response to the questions regarding
how much care an agent should be obligated to provide and for how long, others have
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made more rigorous attempts to do so. One such moral philosopher, Peter Singer, argues
for an extremely comprehensive and demanding response to the vast needs in the world.
In his seminal 1971 paper Famine, Affluence, and Morality,111 Singer uses the
East Bengali crisis (in which East Bengali people were dying from a lack of food, water,
and medical care while much of the developed world gave little or no aid) as the
backdrop for his argument that something has gone horribly wrong in the way affluent
global citizens go about their lives with little or no thought of or action toward alleviating
gross socioeconomic injustices around the globe. Singer argues that the way in which
people in relatively affluent countries act (or rather fail to act) is inexcusable.
Consequently, he claims that our “moral conceptual scheme” needs to be altered, along
with “the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society.”112
In order to accomplish this shift in the moral conceptual scheme of his readers,
Singer states that he will lay out several assumptions that he believes will be easily (and
virtually universally) accepted. He will then argue that if his assumptions are accepted
(which he believes they will be), then his conclusion must be accepted as well. His first
assumption is that “the suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care
are bad.”113 He claims that this assumption is by-and-large universally unquestioned.
Singer’s second assumption is that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad
from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance,
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we ought, morally, to do it.”114 Singer argues that this is also relatively uncontroversial,
and does not ask much of people. It carries a negative requirement to prevent what is bad,
but no positive requirement to do what is good; also the negative requirement only stands
when it can be accomplished without the sacrifice of something else that is equally
morally important. Singer offers his classic example of a child drowning in a shallow
pond. If I can save the child and the only cost to me is that my clothes will get muddy,
this is not a morally significant consequence, and thus I am obligated to save the child.115
This sets up a very weak version of Singer’s argument, because what is required
does not involve any great amount of sacrifice. Elsewhere, however, Singer argues more
strongly that because we know that many people will not contribute their fair share
toward meeting the basic needs of others, those of us who can do more should do
more.116 Not only should we give to others in need when it will not require us sacrificing
anything morally significant, but we should give to others in need “as much as possible,
that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious
suffering for oneself and one’s dependents…”117
Because our traditional moral categories are now upset, we must reevaluate the
traditional distinction between duty and charity.118 When giving to alleviate the suffering
of others is viewed as charity, there is no condemnation for those who do not give, and
often times praise is offered for those who do give. But when giving to alleviate suffering
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is considered to be a duty, there is condemnation for those who do not give, and giving is
no longer praiseworthy but rather is expected. Giving is no longer supererogatory.119
So what should we give then? How much aid are we required to give to those who
experience real, fundamental needs? Elsewhere Singer argues that everything we make
above and beyond what we need for our own bare necessities should be given away. In a
1999 New York Times article, Singer argues that an American household should give
away all of their income over $30,000.120 Of course we can adjust this number for
inflation, but this still leaves us with a massive amount of money that needs
redistribution. As Singer states:
I can see no escape from the conclusion that each one of us with wealth surplus to
his or her essential needs should be giving most of it to help people suffering from
poverty so dire as to be life-threatening. That’s right: I’m saying that you
shouldn’t buy that new car, take that cruise, redecorate the house or get that pricey
new suit…the formula is simple: whatever money you’re spending on luxuries not
necessities, should be given away.121
When some have the ability to provide care for the fundamental needs of others who
desperately need care, those with this ability are obligated to give (according to Singer)
until they have given all of the surplus that is not necessary to their our own fundamental
needs. We can clearly see on such a view how need is the primary criterion given
consideration when questions of distributive justice arise. All other considerations are
deemed trivial in the face of unmet fundamental needs, and those with the ability to
alleviate such needs are required to do so, often at considerable cost to themselves.
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While I tend to agree more with S.C. Miller in that the duty to care and to meet
the fundamental needs of others is wide, leaving multiple actions and responses open for
potential caregivers, I do believe that Singer’s view is at least beneficial in that it
encourages us to really examine our own lives and the luxuries many of us enjoy. While I
do not believe we can so easily place a dollar amount on how much some should be
required to give to others, the posture of giving to meet fundamental needs that Singer
encourages is, I believe, a beneficial one to consider. Perhaps it should become more
natural for us to question our so-called entitlements and to consider the needs of others
more than we currently do, even if our responses to these needs are varied and diverse.
And again, we will cover some potential practical responses in Chapter Six.
E. Appeals to Virtue
Thus far I have discussed several views of distributive justice: appeals to welfare
(i.e. utility), appeals to rights (i.e. freedom, liberty, and fairness), and appeals to needs. A
fourth option proposes that distributive justice primarily involves “cultivating virtue and
reasoning about the common good.”122 Historically, this idea comes from Aristotle, who
believed that the telos (the purpose, end, or essential value) of a practice was essential in
determining its justice. Furthermore, Aristotle believed that debates about justice were
much more than debates about right and wrong – they were debates about “honor, virtue,
and the nature of the good life.” 123
To determine how a good should be distributed, we must first determine the
purpose of that good. A person who will use a good most excellently for its intended
purpose should be allotted that good. This points to the main criterion of just distribution
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being that of desert or merit.124 But on Aristotle’s conception desert or merit is based on
excellence of character, not on wealth or birth or numerous other factors.125 Those who
are deserving of honors and rewards are those who have worked toward promoting a
good quality of life for those in their community. Aristotle states:
True justice means that those who have contributed to the end of the city should
have privileges in proportion to their contribution to that end. The end of the city
is not mere life, nor an alliance for mutual defense; it is the common promotion of
a good quality of life…the operative aim is always the promotion of a good
quality of life. Those who contribute most to the realization of that aim should in
justice have the largest share of office and honour.126
Aristotle goes on to argue that the end (telos) of the city (or for our purposes we
could talk about the end of the communities for which we are a part) is not only to
provide an alliance for defense or a means for commercial exchange. Rather, the end of
the city should concern itself with ensuring a good quality of character among the
members of that society. It should not be enough for the city to ensure mere life, but
rather its aim should be a good quality of life for all of its inhabitants.127 Aristotle’s view
proposes shortcomings in the other views presented in this chapter, for as Sandel
summarizes Aristote:
…political community isn’t only about protecting property or promoting
economic prosperity…political community isn’t only about giving the majority its
way…the highest end of political association…for Aristotle is to cultivate the
virtue of citizens…It’s about learning how to live a good life.128
This should remind us of Finnis’s view of the ‘common good’. Remember that on
Finnis’s view the ‘common good’ still places high value on the good of individuals, but
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also stresses the importance of individuals working together in community. Finnis’s
concept of the ‘common good’ is built on Aristotle’s notion of the good life. But how can
individuals achieve the good life? In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle explains that we can
cultivate virtue through practice.129 We deliberate with others regarding right and wrong,
good and evil, justice and injustice, and over time we become habituated toward the right
things.130 It does take practice to know when to do the right thing “to the right person, to
the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way.”131
Aristotle’s appeal to virtue does not prescribe for us precisely what to do in
certain situations. It does not tell us how to go about actually distributing resources. But it
does assure us that when we cultivate good habits, these habits develop into good
character. Good character results in civic virtue. Those who possess such virtue are able
to deliberate using practical wisdom132 – a type of wisdom that enables those who possess
it to make decisions about particular situations in a manner that benefits humanity. As we
engage in life together we practice what it means to be citizens imbued with character,
legislating for the good of those around us.133
F. Toward A Theoretical Resolution
1. John Finnis’s view of distributive justice. And this brings us ultimately back
to John Finnis. In Section II, I laid the foundation for our discussion of distributive justice
by explaining Finnis’s belief that practically reasonable people recognize that they are
and should be participants in various communities, and also that justice requires such
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people to seek after the common good of those in their communities. In Section III, I
articulated that one of Finnis’s main concerns regarding distributive justice deals with
how to divide up the elements of the common stock and the results of communal
enterprises. Finnis does not at all advocate for a Marxist system in which private
ownership is denied. Rather, he feels strongly that objects of common stock and
communal enterprise should be allocated and distributed to individuals, because doing so
ultimately increases the common good. He also believes that, to some extent, private
individuals should have a great deal of freedom to use the resources they have been given
in the ways they see fit. For instance, Finnis states the following:
And in all those fields of activity, including economic activity, where individuals,
or families, or other relatively small groups, can help themselves by their own
private efforts and initiatives without thereby injuring (either by act or omission)
the common good, they are entitled in justice to be allowed to do so, and it is
unjust to require them to sacrifice their private initiative by demanding that they
participate instead in a public enterprise…The good of personal autonomy in
community…suggests that the opportunity of exercising some form of private
ownership, including of means of production, is in most times and places a
requirement of justice.134
…individuals, singly or in combination, should have access either directly or (as,
for example, in the case of a share-holder in a joint stock company) indirectly to
natural resources, capital goods, and/or consumer durables, such access being
more or less exclusive (in that he or they are entitled to exclude other individuals
from access), more or less immune from divestment by or at the instance of other
individuals, and more or less transmissible by him at his choice. The purpose of
these rights of exclusion and transmission and immunity from divestment is to
give private owners freedom to expend their own creativity, inventiveness, and
undeflected care and attention upon the thing(s) in question, to give them security
in enjoying the thing(s) or investing or developing them, and to afford the owners
the opportunity of exchanging their thing(s) for some alternative item(s) of
property seeming to them more suitable to their life-plans.135
Finnis points out that such goods, in order for them to be of any benefit at all,
must be distributed to someone. But the goal in distributing such goods to some is not so
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that they can hoard an excess of goods for themselves (as is often allowed by
libertarians), but so that they can use the excess of those goods to benefit the
community.136 If private ownership is to be distributively just, owners must conform to
certain conditions, including an understanding that private owners of natural resources or
capital goods have duties to put those resources or goods to productive use, or to give
those goods over to others who can put them to productive use for the good of the
community. Thus, Finnis states, “…speculative acquisition and disposition of property,
for the purposes of merely financial gain uncorrelated with any economically productive
development or use, is contrary to distributive justice.”137 Acquiring and hoarding
property for one’s own excessive gain is not acceptable, and is a violation of distributive
justice. Finnis goes on to explain that a person’s holdings beyond what one reasonably
needs for himself, his dependents, and co-owners are actually part of the common stock.
He explicates the following:
In other words, beyond a certain point, what was commonly available but was
justly made private, for the common good, becomes again, in justice, part of the
common stock; although appropriated to management and control by an owner or
owners, items of private property (‘things’) are now not for the owners’ private
benefit but are held by them immediately for common benefit…From this point,
owners have, in justice, duties not altogether unlike those of a trustee in English
law.138
When it comes to distributive justice, Finnis does not advocate for a distribution
(or redistribution) of goods that is numerically equal. All members of a community
should be equally considered in matters of distribution, but this should not mean that
everyone is given the exact same things. In Finnis’s words, “The objective of justice is
not equality but the common good, the flourishing of all members of the community, and
136
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there is no reason to suppose that this flourishing of all is enhanced by treating everyone
identically when distributing roles, opportunities, and resources.”139 Finnis points out that
if the goal of redistribution is to take away fine wine from a few to distribute cheap beer
to the masses, this is hardly an example of the demands of distributive justice. But if
taking fine wine away from a few can help to provide health, autonomy and selfdirection, defense against injustice, and other basic human rights to others, then such a
redistribution is exactly what justice requires.140
If our goal is to promote the good and flourishing of our communities, then it is
important to discuss how we should go about resolving the question of distribution.
Finnis lays out five criteria for a just distribution of goods. His first (and primary)
criterion is need. Setting aside situations in which people may be in need because of their
own poor choices and decisions, there remain numerous situations of emergency, when
people find themselves in grave need due to no fault of their own. Finnis believes that
when such emergencies arise, “…a few or even many may rightly be deprived of much
in order that those who can defend the whole community against its dangers may be
enabled and encouraged to do so.”141 If I myself am a victim of such an emergency, I can
only hope that my community will rally around me and pick me up in my distress. A
society where this is a common occurrence benefits everyone, because members of such a
community can have confidence that their tribe will catch them when calamity strikes.
Finnis focuses specifically on needs that arise due to emergencies, but I believe we can
extend this to include the needs of those who are in a state of chronic/consistent need due

139

Finnis, 174.
Ibid.
141
Ibid.
140

75

to systemic and structural factors. These types of situations are more in line with how
S.C. Miller construes needs and the duty to care for others’ needs.
Finnis’s second criterion of distributive justice is function. As he understands
things, function describes a need that is relative to roles and responsibilities in the
community.142 If someone functions as a doctor within her community, she should be
allocated the tools and provided with the support needed to fulfill her role. Equipping
doctors appropriately provides an obvious benefit to the communities in which they live
and work.
Finnis’s third criterion of distributive justice is capacity. This deals not only with
the roles individuals play in communal enterprises, but also to individuals’ opportunities
for advancement.143 It is not unjust to admit that some people will themselves benefit
from higher education (and then could subsequently benefit their communities), while
other people would not benefit greatly from higher education, but would benefit from
apprenticing as carpenters or agricultural workers. People are built and wired differently,
with different gifts and talents and skills. Thus, goods should be distributed accordingly.
Hammers are useless in the hands of academics, and flutes are useless when given to
(non-musical) politicians.
Finnis’s fourth criterion of distributive justice deals with desert and contributions.
Some people engage in actions that deserve recognition. Sometimes people engage in
acts of self-sacrifice, and other times they meritoriously use their efforts and abilities for
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the good of others.144 In such instances, it may be appropriate to recognize their
contributions to society through distribution of goods.
Finnis’s fifth criterion of distributive justice involves foresight and forethought
regarding risks. He points out that sometimes individuals create certain risks, or they
have foresight regarding potential risks and yet proceed anyway.145 In such cases, if a
person has taken unwarranted liberty in risking common stock assets, what he or she is
due in regards to distribution may be impacted. In other words, the community as a whole
should not be expected to pay for those who unwisely risk common stock assets and lose.
In considering distributive justice, and in trying to assess when and how to
distribute common stock goods and the incidents of communal enterprise so that the good
of the community is realized, we must consider what “practical reasonableness requires
of particular people (in their dealings with other people).”146 And this ultimately depends
on what responsibilities different people have, what commitments they have made (and
roles they have assumed) within their societies, what past and present benefits they have
received, who is dependent upon them, and what kinds of relationships people have with
one another. To some extent, this involves taking into account the interrelationships and
interdependencies between the communities “that together make up the whole
community of mankind.”147 We cannot fail to consider how our narrative stories intersect
and intertwine.
2. Combining needs and virtues. Perhaps it was made clear in the preceding
discussion, but for the sake of clarity, I reject the utilitarian view of distributive justice.
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Individual people are far too valuable to be reduced to mere means for the end of
collective happiness or pleasure. I also reject the libertarian notion of liberty. As was
argued in the discussion of communities, common good, and narrative quests people are
not islands of entitlements with no responsibilities to one another other than preserving
property. And while the egalitarians move in the right direction in trying to establish the
concept of rights, and in trying to determine what distributions are most fair, I believe
that sometimes the monumental fundamental needs of others may supersede even
rights.148 Furthermore, it is often the case that rights and needs converge. Comparing the
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights with something like S.C. Miller’s list of
fundamental needs will show numerous such instances of overlap. And in all of this,
encouraging the development of virtuous citizens who will shoulder the shared
responsibility of pursuing the common good can not be underestimated.
Under Finnis’s framework of distributive justice – of discussing how certain
resources should be allocated and distributed amongst people – we can appeal to the idea
of positive duties, which are duties to provide aid to those who are in need. Positive
duties “require that we render assistance to those in distress.”149 If Finnis is right, and
those who have been given a greater allocation of the common stock have been given
those resources in order to work toward the common good and to benefit more than just
themselves, then we can rightly question a world in which some live in opulence while
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many live in abject poverty, while nevertheless the resources exist to adequately feed and
clothe and heal and free those who have been deprived of such provisions.
Distributive justice demands that we fulfill our positive duties to aid the
disadvantaged through pursuit of the common good. Fair distribution of common stock
products and incidents of communal enterprise include the allocation of adequate goods
and services for those who are in need, and we have positive duties to provide for such
people out of the common stock and the fruits of our communal enterprises.
Furthermore, working toward this type of just distribution inevitably requires a
kind of integrity or virtue. In his support of the Aristotelian stance of the importance of
virtues in deliberations of justice, Sandel admits that it is exactly the concept of the good
– of placing value judgments on certain actions – that philosophers such as Kant and
Rawls hope to avoid. For them, “the right is prior to the good,”150 and before we engage
in moral deliberation we should extract ourselves from any prior attachments,
commitments, beliefs, or values. But Sandel believes that this is often not possible, and
even if it is possible it is perhaps not desirable.151 He points out that many of the moral
debates we care about the most are, at the heart, debates over values and our conceptions
of the good life. At the heart of the abortion debate stands the moral and religious
controversy concerning when personhood begins. This is a debate over values. At the
heart of the debate over same-sex marriage lies the question of the telos, or purpose of
marriage. This is not fundamentally a debate about rights, but rather a debate about
honors, rewards, and recognition.152
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It seems counterintuitive to consider what justice should look like when it comes
to distribution, and to be barred from considering that perhaps the distribution that is
right is just so because it is a distribution that is good. After all, most people can agree
that forcing adolescents into sexual servitude is objectively bad, and providing meals for
starving children is objectively good. We don’t seem to have a problem making value
judgments such as these. Furthermore, these value judgments likely help to inform our
opinions regarding what acceptable responses might be when we encounter such
situations. Should we really be forced to check our values at the door before we begin
moral deliberations?
What we value can have a major impact on how we view the distribution of
common stock goods and enterprises. If we value the happiness of the majority, we will
distribute accordingly. If we value individual rights above all else, we will distribute in a
way that protects such rights. If we value fairness and equality, we will devise policies
that champion these values and perhaps overlook others. If we value the fulfillment of
fundamental needs, we will distribute resources with the goal of satisfying such needs for
all. And if we value character, we will work toward structures that reward character
development heavily.
Nevertheless, values are not such that we can only hold one value at a time. In
reality, we value multiple things at one time, and our values can also change over time.
However, of all the views we have discussed thus far, two views (and their accompanying
values) seem to me to stand out: appeals to need and appeals to virtue. If we truly wish to
deliberate regarding the good life, I do not see how we can overlook the fundamental
needs of other people. It seems clear that we are, in fact, members of communities in
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which we live, work, play, suffer, rejoice, learn, and need together. Our narrative quests
are hopelessly intertwined. Even if we do not agree with something like Singer’s strong
view of our obligation toward those in need, it seems unreasonable to ignore the reality of
unmet fundamental needs all around us, and to hold tight to a belief that we are ‘entitled’
to our surpluses and relative opulence. And even if we wish to cling to some form of duty
(such as a duty to provide for the needs of others based on our own finitude and
vulnerability), we can place high value on the cultivation and habituation of virtuous
people who will shoulder the heavy civic duty of fighting for the good life for all people
– a good life that includes food and shelter and safety and satisfaction of the numerous
other fundamental needs required to preserve human agency. Distributive justice hinges
on our values. As Sandel states, “Justice is not only about the right way to distribute
things. It is also about the right way to value things.”153
For these reasons, I believe that we can adopt Finnis’s view of distributive justice,
while supporting it with views such as Immanuel Kant’s ascription of dignity to
humanity, the egalitarian notions of fairness and human rights, S.C. Miller’s duty to care
for the fundamental needs of others, Aristotle’s insistence on the importance of
cultivating virtue in individuals, and MacIntyre’s binding thread of our intersecting
narrative quests. Thus, we are finally left with a satisfying picture of what justice
abstractly requires of us in our dealings with other people.
V. What Boundaries Matter?
A. Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism
I have spent much time in this chapter arguing that all human beings are members
of multiple communities, and that justice requires such beings to seek after the common
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good of other individuals in those communities. But this brings up several other related
questions: “What are the relevant boundaries of our communities?” “To what extent does
the practically reasonable person orient herself to the boundaries of mankind, as opposed
to more narrow boundaries?” “Does our duty to distribute or redistribute resources, or to
aid those who have needs, have geographic or proximity-based limits?” “Are there some
circumstances in which national borders (or some other similar boundaries) might place
legitimate constraints on our obligations?” These are questions posed by the
contemporary debate between patriotism and cosmopolitanism, and they cannot be
ignored if we wish to determine the scope of our duty to favor and foster the common
good of our communities.
Those who argue on the side of patriotism (sometimes also referred to as
nationalism) place high value on the general idea that special obligations exist among
compatriots (i.e. fellow community members).154 Samuel Scheffler explains that this
view exhibits a “common-sense doctrine…that one has distinctive responsibilities (or
‘special obligations’) toward members of ones’ own family and others whom one stands
in certain significant sorts of relationships.”155
For purposes of our discussion, I do not wish to get bogged down with the terms
‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’. In general, I especially hesitate to use the term
‘nationalism’ because of its relation to the political notion of a nation-state.156
Consequently I will stick with using the term ‘patriotism’, and when I use it I intend to
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mean something more broad, something that could pertain to nation-states, but could also
pertain to other special relationships between groups of people such as families,
community groups, religious groups, educational or employment institutions, and various
other groupings of people that may or may not have anything to do with nationality or
with political sovereignty.
Cosmopolitanism is the view that it is our obligation to ensure that all persons
share in equality in light of our common humanity.157 Our primary allegiance should be
toward human beings qua human being. Diogenes the Cynic expressed this sentiment
when he stated, “I am a citizen of the world.”158 What Justice requires is universal and
applies to all people equally, not in virtue of their nationality (or other specific
affiliations), but in virtue of their humanity.159 Peter Singer and Peter Unger both argue
along these lines and claim that proximity should have no bearing on ethical decisions,
especially when people are needlessly dying.160
What is of central importance to our discussion hinges on a specific type of
patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Sarah Clark Miller points out that there are several
different varieties of cosmopolitanism (and we can extend these to patriotism) including
political, economic, cultural, and moral conceptions. Political conceptions focus on “the
nature of international political organization.” Economic conceptions focus on “the
development and proper regulation of global economic systems and features.” Cultural
conceptions focus on the prevalence of cultural change and the proper role of cultural
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diversity. But Miller believes these are not the central concerns of the debate. She argues
that what we are really concerned about when we question the nature and scope of our
obligations toward other human beings involves our moral commitments.161
B. Ethical Universalism and Ethical Particularism
In his book On Nationality, David Miller explains that the main difference
between cosmopolitans and patriots can be understood by distinguishing between two
competing ideals: ethical universalism and ethical particularism.162 Ethical universalism
uses universal, unbiased principles to determine what we are obligated to do for others
(and what others should do for us). Only general facts about others are morally relevant.
As D. Miller points out, a universalist principle might be “relieve the needy,” and
therefore if another individual is in need and I have resources that could provide relief, I
am obligated to do so. If I happen to have a special relationship with another individual
(i.e. as mother or sister or neighbor, etcetera), these “relational facts” cannot enter into
the picture when determining duties or obligations toward others.163
Ethical particularism asserts the opposite view. It advocates that our moral
deliberations must take into account our pre-existing ties and commitments to other
particular agents and groups. Human relationships are “part of the basic subject-matter of
ethics.” As such people are encumbered, connected, and morally committed to different
individuals in different ways. Appealing to these special relationships and the demands
they entail may give us morally satisfactory justification for attending first to the needs of
our “compatriots” (or more broadly those with which we have particular relationships).164
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Perhaps what is most intriguing about David Miller’s conception, however, is that
he believes the division between moral universalism and moral particularism is not rigid.
He states, “[I]t is possible to start from a universalist position and then move some
considerable distance to accommodate particularist concerns, and vice versa.”165 This is, I
believe, especially encouraging, because as Miller also points out both of these views
possess strong supportive arguments. It is not difficult for us to intuitively value human
beings qua human being. And it is also natural for us to feel strong allegiances toward
those with which we stand in various relations, and to take seriously the demands that
those relationships and memberships seemingly impose.166
So how might one go about converging these two views, or moving from one
toward another on a continuum? First let us consider beginning with universalist
convictions. How might we incorporate particularist concerns? One way is for us to
affirm that our ultimate allegiance is toward the whole of humanity, but the best way to
practically pursue this value is to start with those closest to us and work our way outward.
This helps us to better coordinate our efforts to meet the needs of others because we can
more easily see and understand how to meet the needs of those nearer to us, and it is
simply more feasible for us to transfer resources into our own families and
communities.167 For example, Miller explains,
I am likely to know in detail what members of my family need, and I can get
resources to them easily. So, we require conventions to decide who is to discharge
duties such as this in particular cases, and it is easy to see that the most effective
conventions will be ones that take account of relationships like those we find in
families. Let us call this the ‘useful convention’ method of getting from universal
duties to particular ones.168
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Another way of moving from universalist toward particularist commitments is to
recognize that human agents are capable of entering into contracts or making promises
with one another, and when we do so we take on special duties toward those others. All
of our relationships flow from voluntary associations – even our familial relationships. In
D. Miller’s words, “I am entitled freely to enter such associations, and once I have
become a member I am subject to the rules and obligations of membership.”169 D. Miller
calls this the ‘voluntary creation’ of particular duties ultimately rooted in universal
duties. People have the “moral power to bind themselves into special relationships with
ethical content.”170 One obvious weakness of this view is that it cannot account for
relationships that seem to have no voluntary content. Often times people do not choose
their governments. And while an argument could be made that by living in a certain
society you are implicitly agreeing (through social contract, perhaps) to the
responsibilities and privileges of that society, nevertheless children do not choose their
parents, so on this view how can one ground one of the most fundamentally recognized
special relationships – that of child to parent(s)?
Of course one answer to such criticism is to adopt the alternative view – that of
the particularist – and then to move toward explaining how a particularist might
accommodate universalist convictions. David Miller explains the particularist conception
in the following way:
The picture of ethical life favored by particularists tends to be pluralistic. This is,
we are tied in to many different relationships – families, work groups, voluntary
associations, religious and other such communities, nations – each of which
makes demands on us, and there is no single overarching perspective from which
we can order or rank these demands. In case of conflict – say, where I have to
decide whether to use my resources to help my brother or my colleague at work –
169
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I simply have to weigh their respective claims, reflecting both on the nature of my
relationship to the two individuals and on the benefits that each would get from
the help I can give. Given a picture of this kind, it is relatively straightforward to
include the claim that I owe something to my fellow human beings considered
merely as such. The relationships in which I stand vary considerably in their
complexity and closeness. There is nothing in particularism which prevents me
from recognizing that I stand in some relationship to all other human beings by
virtue of our common humanity and our sharing of a single world. The problem is
rather to decide on what ethical demands stem from this relationship, and to
weigh it against other more specific loyalties.171
In D. Miller’s opinion, the ethical universalist’s position is untenable because it
“draws a sharp line between moral agency and personal identity on the one hand, and
between moral agency and personal motivation on the other.”172 As we have already
explored earlier in our discussion of MacIntyre, he asserts that “I inherit from the past of
my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful
expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting
point.”173 This “moral starting point” is an inherited one – it is not one we specifically
choose. If we are forced to discount elements of our personal identity – who we are and
where we come from – we are forced to make ethical decisions in a contrived atmosphere
and we are expected to discredit what should be real, valid ethical considerations.
Gertrude Himmelfarb argues along these lines when she states:
Above all, what cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the givens of life:
parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition,
community – and nationality. These are not “accidental” attributes of the
individual. They are essential attributes. We do not come into the world as freefloating, autonomous individuals. We come into it complete with all the
particular, defining characteristics that go into a fully formed human being, a
being with an identity. Identity is neither an accident nor a matter of choice. It is
given, not willed…To pledge one’s “fundamental allegiance” to cosmopolitanism
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is to try to transcend…all the actualities, particularities, and realities of life that
constitute one’s natural identity.174
On the particularist view, special relationships are not morally arbitrary or irrelevant.
Rather, they are our ethical starting point. And even when we do not choose these special
relationships, they can make claims on us. Along these lines, Sandel argues that
“obligations of solidarity or membership may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice –
reasons bound up with the narratives by which we interpret our lives and the communities
we inhabit.”175
C. “Moderate Patriotism” and “Conditional Cosmopolitanism”
In an essay titled “In Defense of ‘Moderate Patriotism’,” Stephen Nathanson
argues that admitting to a universal morality does not necessitate disregarding special ties
to particular individuals. He asserts, “Commonsense morality certainly permits and
encourages local loyalties and even frowns on extreme detachment or total
impartiality.”176 He does not believe that universal morality is inconsistent with allowing
for special obligations and other particularist commitments.177 His view, which he calls
“moderate patriotism,” advocates that particularist commitments are “perfectly
permissible” and exhibit “important virtues” in people, so long as these are not exclusive
commitments, and so long as they do not violate the rights of members outside these
particular relationships.178 We should be committed to universal moral principles –
principles that protect the basic rights of all human beings – and these principles may
sanction our special obligations and may place constraints on the actions that are
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permissible for us to take on behalf of our particularist connections.179 When certain
actions are objectively morally wrong, we are not permitted to engage in them, even if
doing so would prove to benefit those with whom we have special relationships.180
Simply stated, “Moderate patriots distinguish between patriotism and morality and seek
to subject patriotism to moral constraints.”181
I personally find Nathanson’s stance to be attractive. It renders “the demands of
national loyalty” (and I would broaden this to include particularist special relationships of
all sorts) compatible with “the requirements of universal morality.” It is good for people
to be ‘patriotic’, but this is conditional depending on whether this patriotism conflicts
with the demands of universal morality.182
I would like, however, to propose a slight shift in focus from privileging
patriotism to a focus on privileging cosmopolitanism under certain circumstances. Let me
explain. By naming his view ‘moderate patriotism’, Nathanson places the focus on
patriotism as long as certain conditions are met. I think however, in some extreme
situations, we should become what I like to refer to as ‘conditional cosmopolitans’ first
and foremost. In instances where the demands of universal morality are gravely violated,
we should become ‘conditional cosmopolitans’, acting and reacting from a position of
privileging and valuing the fundamental rights and needs of global citizens above
particularist relationships. This may seem to be just a difference of semantics, but
sometimes the words we choose to privilege matter. And while being a citizen of the
world does not nullify my other citizenships, in some extreme situations my global
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citizenship should stand as my primary commitment. So perhaps what I’m advocating is
that in many situations (on a more regular basis) we can rightfully ascribe to ‘moderate
patriotism’. But in certain other extreme circumstances, we should become ‘conditional
cosmopolitans’, working tirelessly to see the demands of global justice recognized for all
people, while placing our particularist commitments on the back burner. But what types
of situations would warrant this shift? I have in mind the most egregious human rights
violations, such as those committed against the extremely poor in denying them food and
shelter and employment opportunities, or the withholding of autonomy and bodily
integrity from those who are physically enslaved.183 When it comes to addressing these
types of injustices and deprivations, perhaps the best view to take is one of ‘conditional
cosmopolitanism’ – i.e. when these conditions apply our allegiance is to humanity above
all. 184
VI. Conclusion
In this chapter I have advocated that practically reasonable people recognize that
they are members of communities, and that they should care about justice within their
communities. Furthermore, such people recognize that the narrative quests of their lives
intersect with the narrative quests of many others. Because life for human beings is life in
communities, it is fitting for us to concern ourselves with pursing justice for all those in
our shared communities and shared world.
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Of specific concern in this chapter regards what pursing distributive justice should
entail – when it comes to distributing common stock resources and the incidents of
communal enterprises, on what criteria should such distributions be made? We have
explored distributions according to welfare (utilitarianism), distributions according to
freedom and rights (Kant, libertarianism, and egalitarianism), distributions according to
needs, and distributions according to virtues and values. I have advocated that the most
compelling criteria for distribution includes considering together both the fundamental
needs of others and the development of good character in one another. If we consider
distributive justice with these ideals in mind, we can humbly admit that we are all weak,
vulnerable, finite, and needy, and we can work toward developing moral character in one
another that will place the meeting of our fundamental needs as the highest of priorities.
Furthermore, in this chapter I have admitted and recognized that we stand in
special relationships with some individuals and groups that we do not experience with all
people globally. I have admitted that I do believe that these special relationships can and
do hold moral value. But I have also advocated that under certain extreme circumstances,
when the needs of others are gravely endangered, or when their fundamental rights are
horribly denied, we should adopt a stance of ‘conditional cosmopolitanism’ in which we
privilege our allegiance to humanity above all, even if this means sacrificing some of our
more specific special relationships and obligations.
Ultimately, I have not yet made a case for any specific distributions of specific
resources. I will do this (in a roundabout way) in Chapter Six, although only specifically
as relates to modern slavery. But I do hope that this chapter has served to provide a
compelling argument that the lives of individual people, the meeting of their fundamental
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needs, and the development of virtue within a community is of chief concern when we
deliberate regarding distributive justice. When I ask myself, “To whom do I owe what
when it comes to distributive justice?” I believe my answer should be, “I owe quite a bit
to those in need if their fundamental needs are unmet and mine are met in abundance.”
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CHAPTER 4
COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE
I. Introduction
I began the previous chapter by arguing alongside Finnis that practically
reasonable people accept certain responsibilities and commitments to favor and foster the
common good of all people within a shared community. I then fleshed out this idea of
living in shared communities by appealing to MacIntyre’s concept of the narrative quest.
This concept paints a vivid picture of a world in which we all live out narrative stories,
and our stories touch and are touched by the stories of others. How I live my life has
implications for others, because I am a part of their stories, and they are a part of mine.
This interconnectedness of lives lived in communities is crucial to our understanding of
what justice should look like for human beings within those communities.
The topic of the previous chapter dealt with Finnis’s first broad class of problems
related to justice – distributive justice – which is concerned with determining how
‘common stock’ resources and incidents of communal enterprise should be allocated and
distributed throughout communities of people. This present chapter deals with the second
class of problems, which Finnis describes as problems of commutative justice. He
describes commutative justice as follows:
There is a vast range of relationships and dealings between persons (including
dealings between officials and individuals) in which neither the requirements or
incidents of communal enterprise nor the distribution (whether by public or
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private owners) of a common stock are directly at stake, but in which there can be
question of what is fitting, fair, or just as between the parties to the relationship.1
Commutative justice, then, deals not with distributing common resources and privileges
among individuals in communities, but rather with assuring that people treat those with
whom they have relationships in ways that are fitting and fair. This still hinges on our
foundation of favoring and fostering the common good of community members, and
recognizing that our narrative quests are intricately intertwined with one another. But as
we will soon see these ideals take on additional significance when applied to our more
specific human interactions and connections as opposed to our shared resources.
II. Commutative Justice Explained
A. ‘Corrective’ or ‘Commutative’?
In much of the literature dealing with justice, the counterpart to distributive
justice is identified as corrective justice2 (not commutative justice). Finnis explains that
this categorization can be traced back to Aristotle, who wished to divide the field of
problems related to justice into two broad classes. He categorized the first class,
distributive justice, in much the same way as has already been characterized in the
previous chapter. His second class, which he named corrective justice, deals with “justice
that rectifies or remedies inequalities which arise in dealings…between individuals.”3
Under this type of view, distributive justice can be seen as a type of ideal theory in which
fair shares and fair allocations of resources is the goal, and when a community falls short
of that goal then the need for compensation for injuries and remedies for damages arises.
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The gap between what should be the case in distributive justice and what actually is the
case in a given society sets up the need for corrective justice.4 Or as W.D. Lamont states,
“Corrective Justice comes into operation when the scheme created by distributive justice
has been infringed; and it may take the form either of Reparation or of Punishment.”5
In his book titled Corrective Justice, law professor Ernest J. Weinrib sets out to
discuss the relationships that people share with one another, and more specifically the
ways in which one person may be found to be liable to another.6 Weinrib appeals to
Aristotle to explain his thought of liability further. The idea is that in relationships, the
opposing parties can have active and passive roles in relation to the same injustice – one
is the doer of injustice, and the other is the sufferer of that same injustice. The question,
then, is what should be done in such situations to remedy or make restitution to those
who have suffered such injustices?7 What should the party liable for an injustice do to
remedy the situation for the sufferer of injustice?
But Finnis is not satisfied with granting that corrective justice is the sole
counterpart to distributive justice. While corrective justice rightly emphasizes correction
and restitution and remedy in situations when one person injures another, or when one
person fails to follow through with an agreement or contract, this still “leaves untouched
a wide range of problems.”8 Thomas Aquinas recognized this, and consequently took
Aristotle’s view of corrective justice and broadened it, inventing a new term:
commutative justice.9 In Aquinas’s usage, this new term “is limited neither to correction
4
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nor to voluntary or business transactions,” but rather it also incorporates the whole field
of human interactions, with the goal of determining “what dealings are proper between
persons (including groups).”10 So whereas corrective justice covers how to make things
right in retrospect (i.e. how to remedy or restore following an injustice), commutative
justice considers the whole of human interactions to determine what justice requires of us
as we live intersecting lives in a shared world. This does undoubtedly involve remedy
and restoration and restitution. But it also involves so much more, including determining
proper interactions between people in prospect (i.e. with the goal toward preventing
future injustices). Stated another way, commutative justice asks all of the following
questions: “What are the standards of conduct which individuals must live up to in
relation to their ‘neighbors’?” “What should be the extent of liability of one who fails to
live up to those standards of conduct?” and “How should those injured by the wrongs of
others be restored to their former condition?”11 These questions consider how we should
treat each other all the time, whether or not we have already acted unjustly toward others.
In my realm of the world, used car salesmen get a really bad rap. They are
generally assumed to be dishonest hustlers who will tell you anything to get you to buy
their cars. Maybe this it true, or perhaps it is an unfair overgeneralization. Regardless,
appealing to commutative justice can help us to understand a wide gamut of potential
interactions between the salesmen and their customers. Commutative justice governs
proper standards of conduct in sales interactions, for instance what kinds of things are
permissible to say, and what is impermissible to say in order to sell a car. What level of
transparency is required regarding the past history of a used car, and what monetary value
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constitutes a fair asking price? These questions are not concerned with remedying an
injustice already committed, but rather they are helpful questions to govern the buying
and selling of used cars at the outset. Of course, these transactions are not always
seamless. Sometimes a salesman crosses certain lines and gives false information about a
used car such that a buyer overpays, or ends up with a lemon when he was promised
reliable transportation, or when the terms of the financing contract are misconstrued, or
when a whole host of other conditions are not as they were promised to be. In such
situations commutative justice may require that remedy or restitution or restoration is
necessary. But as this example hopefully shows, commutative justice covers both the
setting up of just standards of conduct, and the providing for restitution or restoration
when those standards of conduct are broken.
B. Aspects of Commutative Justice
On Finnis’s view, there are at least five aspects of commutative justice. First,
commutative justice may concern relations between ascertained individuals. If one person
A makes a contract with another person B, then A is required in commutative justice to
uphold the contract with B, or to pay damages to B in the event that she fails to uphold
the contract. As Finnis states, “…adherence to these duties of commutative justice
between one individual and another is an integral and indispensable aspect of respect and
favour for the common good. How can a society be said to be well-off in which
individuals do not respect each other’s rights?”12 Of central importance to this first of
Finnis’s five aspects of commutative justice is the focus on the relationship between two
specific individuals.
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Second, “…an individual may have a duty in commutative justice to many more
or less ascertained individuals.”13 In such instances a subject A finds herself in some sort
of relevant relationship with multiple other subjects B, C, D…etcetera. These relevant
others are known to the subject – they are not some nebulous ‘other’.
Third, “…an individual may have duties in commutative justice to many more or
less unascertained individuals.”14 In other words, it is possible that person A has duties to
persons B, C, D…etcetera, but these other persons are not specifically known to A. Finnis
envisions here that an individual A might exploit or free-ride on some system in a way
that is advantageous to himself, all the while knowing that supporting such a system is
harmful to some (or perhaps even many) others who are not specifically known to A. It
may be the case that abandoning such a scheme and instead following another scheme, or
even returning to another previous scheme, might be better to many other unascertained
individuals. If A ignores this reality and continues to exploit such a system to his own
advantage and to the detriment of numerous unidentified others, this is seen as
commutatively unjust.15
Finnis’s fourth and fifth aspects are closely related, and deal with relations to
government. The fourth aspect of commutative justice establishes that “…one (any
individual) has duties in commutative justice to the governing authorities of one’s
community.”16 This includes the duty to conform to just (and sometimes unjust) laws.
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The fifth aspect of commutative justice establishes that “…persons holding public
authority…owe duties of commutative justice to those subject to their authority.”17 So
both of these aspects of commutative justice deal with the reciprocal nature of
membership in communities – community members are expected to uphold the rules and
laws of their communities, and public officials in such communities are accountable to
their subjects and are expected to work toward preserving justice for community
members. Finnis points out, for example, that a judge’s duty to faithfully apply the law is
what is required of her in her official dealings with others under her jurisdiction.18
C. Commutative Justice and Negative Duties
In the previous chapter I mentioned that distributive justice can be linked to
positive duties, which are duties to provide aid to those who are in need, and “require that
we render assistance to those in distress.”19 Similarly, commutative justice can be loosely
linked to another type of duties – negative duties – which “require that we refrain from
harming and injuring others.”20 One extremely simple explanation of these two types of
duties states, “A negative duty is a duty not to do something, a duty of omission. A
positive duty is a duty to do something, and cannot be fulfilled by inaction.”21
When I claim that commutative justice and negative duties are loosely related, this
is because it is not the case that commutative justice and negative duties provide a 1:1
mapping onto one another. For instance, while the demands of commutative justice
definitely include refraining from harming others, they also involve restoration when we
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have harmed others. Commutative justice involves more than mere duties of omission. It
also involves duties of active retribution, restitution, reparation, and restoration. The need
to make restitution after a failure of a negative duty serves as the grounds for a positive
obligation, and these are both components of the requirements of commutative justice.
However, pointing out the correlation between commutative justice and negative
duties is important, I believe, because we can draw from some of the literature dealing
with negative duties as we further explore questions surrounding commutative justice.
For instance, who are our ‘neighbors’, and are we responsible in commutative justice
toward other individuals only, or perhaps also to groups? Must we know the ‘others’ with
whom we share relevant relationships? And is it possible to be responsible for things that
happen to others without being guilty/culpable for wrongs committed against them?
Some theories of negative duties deal with these questions, and can be helpful as we also
deal with these questions in the sections that follow.
III. Comparing Responsibility, Fault/Blame, and Guilt/Culpability
A. Introductory Remarks
Philosopher Herbert Morris points out that a person may be held responsible for
contributing to an injustice, but still be absolved from guilt. Thus, contributing to
injustice does not necessarily result in guilt on the part of the actor. However, when a
person commits a wrongdoing and is at fault for such a wrongdoing, then that person is
also guilty.22
Finnis seems to agree with drawing distinctions between some of these concepts.
He points out that in some instances a person may fail to follow through on a contract,
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and should be required to pay damages (i.e. held responsible in some capacity), even
though her failure may not have been culpable (i.e. blameworthy).23 This is perhaps an
example of injustice without fault, which results in responsibility without
culpability/guilt.
Therefore, for us to fruitfully consider the nature and requirements of
commutative justice, we must determine when we may be guilty/culpable of certain
injustices, and when we may be responsible (but not guilty) for certain injustices or
responsible for certain responses (or lack of response). Furthermore, we must consider
if/when when are expected to make restitution or reparation or restoration due to our
actions or failures. Does such a requirement present only when we are guilty of injustice,
or do we also have restorative obligations when we are responsible in some capacity, but
fall short of being guilty of injustice?
B. Guilt and Fault
One common motivation for wanting to assign moral responsibility (as well as
criminal and civil responsibility) to an agent for an injustice is because we have a strong
desire to establish “who dunnit”.24 We want to know who caused a given harm, and
therefore who is to blame for that harm. Iris Marion Young explains that under standard
frameworks of moral and legal responsibility, “it is necessary to connect a person’s deed
linearly to the harm for which we seek to assign responsibility.”25 Under this standard
framework, which she names the liability model of responsibility, she points out that
ascribing guilt or blame necessitates that “there should be clear rules of evidence, not
only for demonstrating the causal connection between this agent and a harm, but also for
23
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evaluating the intentions, motives, and consequences of actions.”26 Whereas Morris
asserts that wrongdoing and fault are necessary to determine guilt, Young seems to
equate fault with blame. So the question remains, when is it appropriate to ascribe blame
or fault to someone for an unjust action? If we can rightly determine blame or fault, we
can ascribe guilt or culpability.
Political and legal philosopher Joel Feinberg points out that when considering the
legal test of wrongdoing, intention is vitally important.27 Whether or not an agent is
morally blameworthy may also depend upon the intentions, motives, and consequences of
his actions.28 According to Feinberg, someone may commit intentional wrongdoing if he
(a) “acts with a wrongful conscious objective” or (b) “knowingly produces a forbidden
result even incidentally as a kind of side-effect of his effort to achieve his objective.”29 In
the first instance, the wrongdoing is the intentional conscious objective of the actor in
question. In the second instance, the wrongdoing is not the intentional objective, but
rather a known, forbidden side effect. The actor knows that quite likely if she completes
the action, a forbidden side effect will occur. Feinberg labels this recklessness, and states
that recklessness is characterized by the existence of risk, and is present when the actor is
willing to unreasonably gamble her own interests or the interests of others.30 In the first
instance (a) it seems right to assign moral blame to an actor who consciously,
intentionally commits wrongdoing. Many would also assign moral blame in the second
instance (b) because in such instances, actors are fully aware that their actions will (or
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will very likely) bring about forbidden (blameworthy) consequences. In such instances,
the ascription of blame, or fault, results in guilt on behalf of the actor/agent.
C. Responsibility without Guilt
Sometimes we may act within our rights, or we may follow through with actions
which may not in themselves be wrong, but nevertheless cause some harm to befall
others. In such instances it may be said that we have participated in injustice, or that we
carry some level of responsibility for injustice, but fall short of being (morally)
blameworthy or guilty.31 As Herbert Morris explains,
…a person might admit that he was responsible for some harmful occurrence and
reject the appropriateness of his being blamed or held responsible, for he may
argue that he was without fault. That is, he may argue that his conduct met
standards for proper conduct in the circumstances.32
Suppose a baseball pitcher aspires to perfect his curve ball. He knows that he has a
tendency to throw just a hair too close to batters (occasionally hitting them), but he has
been practicing all season to master a curve ball that is close enough to batters to make it
difficult for them to hit, but far enough away to reduce the risk of hitting them. Suppose
the pitcher throws a curve ball that accidentally hits a batter and incapacitates him for the
remainder of the game. The pitcher has acted within his rights and the rules of the game
to throw a curve ball. It’s just a fact of baseball that sometimes batters get hit.
Nevertheless, responsibility for the batter’s injury lies with the pitcher, although we
would not likely go so far as to ascribe moral blame or culpability toward the pitcher. He
did not intend to hit the batter. He had been practicing relentlessly so that he would not
hit batters with his curve ball, and his curve ball had improved. He just wasn’t quite there
31
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yet. Some might object that we do not hold the batter responsible at all. However, even
though he lacks culpability, we might still expect him to apologize to the batter, or send a
heartfelt card as the batter recovers from his injury, or provide assistance to the batter’s
family if he is more seriously incapacitated. Lack of moral blameworthiness does not
necessarily negate other forms of responsibility, nor does it rule out the need perform
certain responsive actions when one is responsible for a harm.
This illustrates that sometimes people can be held responsible for actions they
commit, but assigning responsibility for such actions does not necessitate a judgment of
moral blameworthiness. People can be responsible for injustice without being guilty of
doing something wrong.
What would make someone responsible for injustice but not morally blameworthy
or guilty? Iris Marion Young puts forth a possible answer that hinges on the collective
actions of multiple people combining together to produce injustices for multiple other
people and groups. In her book Responsibility for Justice, Young is especially concerned
with structural injustice, which she claims is the result of social processes that
disadvantage some while simultaneously advantaging others. She states,
Structural injustice, then, exists when social processes put large groups of persons
under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and
exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to
dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising
capacities available to them. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct
from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a
state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and
institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part
within the limits of accepted rules and norms.33
Young appeals to political philosopher Hannah Arendt, who believes that guilt
and blame cannot be applied to entire groups or collectives, but rather only specific deeds
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can be assessed as guilt inducing.34 Arendt states, “Where all are guilty, nobody is. Guilt,
unlike responsibility, always singles out; it is strictly personal. It refers to an act, not to
intentions and potentialities.”35 Arendt uses the paradigm example of Nazi Germany to
argue her point, stating that it is inappropriate to label the whole German people as guilty
for Nazi crimes just because they lived in that society, passively allowing its crimes and
wrongs. But although a collective and its members cannot be guilty of wrongdoing,
Arendt does not deny that a collective and its members may be responsible in a different
sense.36 Those who supported the Nazi regime may not have been guilty of killing Jews,
but they still bear some responsibility for what happened in their country under their
noses, and often times with their tacit permission.37 Such people did things (or failed to
do things) that indirectly contributed to the enactment of crimes or wrongs, and thus bear
some responsibility for the consequences of those wrongs. On Arendt’s view, only a
relatively small number of people under the Nazi regime were both responsible and
guilty. But many people share responsibility without guilt.38
My ultimate goal here, which I believe Arendt helps us to see, is to show that the
concept of responsibility without fault or guilt is both coherent/viable and needed/helpful.
Arendt uses the historical example of Nazi Germany to argue that many people bore some
responsibility for the extermination of Jews even though they were not guilty of killing
Jews. A similar story could be told of many Americans during several centuries of
slavery and racial inequality. Many Northern Americans were not slaveholders, nor were
34
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they involved themselves in the slave trade. More surprisingly, a majority of Southerners
were also not slaveholders.39 Only a small percentage of Southerners – the most wealthy
– owned slaves. Arendt would likely ascribe guilt and blame for slavery to those who
devised and maintained the system, and who physically held slaves. But although that
only included a relatively small number of people, she would also ascribe responsibility
to many others. Many Northerners could arguably have done more to fight against
slavery. For instance, how many of them became a part of the Underground Railroad?
How many of them became active participants in the abolitionist movement? Many
Southerners could have done more as well. How many of them rallied against pro-slavery
legislation? How many of them left their ground-floor church pews to venture into the
‘colored’ balconies to converse and build friendships with their dark-skinned neighbors?
How many of them stepped in to prevent blatant physical abuse of slaves in public
places? During the Jim Crow era, how many whites drank from ‘colored’ fountains as
evidence that they were not dirty or diseased?
Just like many twentieth century Germans did nothing to oppose the Third Reich
and protect their Jewish neighbors, many eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century
Americans did little to oppose the wrongs committed against their black brothers and
sisters. And while we may be leery to label them as guilty for not risking their own lives
and families to harbor runaway slaves, we feel right in ascribing some level of
responsibility toward them for injustices that were allowed to continue for generations.
After all, if more individuals had acted with greater courage, or if a great majority of both
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Northerners and Southerners had risen up against the institution of slavery, perhaps
history would tell a different story than it now does.
I will offer one more example, this time a modern hypothetical, to further
illustrate both the viability and the necessity of ascribing responsibility without guilt.40
Consider an instance of school bullying, which unfortunately is an all-too-common
occurrence today amongst adolescents and teens. Suppose a ninth grade boy is being
teased and bullied relentlessly by two of the most popular football players. This abuse
happens in public, and numerous bystanders are aware of the bullying. We can easily
ascribe guilt and fault to the two bullying football players. Furthermore, it does not seem
right to ascribe guilt toward the bystanders (presuming they are actually just bystanders,
and not instigators or supporters of the bullying). But to the extent that each of the
bystanders could do certain things to help protect the bullied boy, they are responsible
when they fail to do these things. One student might be a teammate of the bullying jocks
and could step between the bullies and the victim. Another student might feel
comfortable informing a guidance counselor or an administrator. Still another student
could befriend the victim to provide emotional support. Another student could advocate
for awareness programs and tougher consequences for school bullies. To the extent that
these other students stand silently by and allow bullying to continue, they share in
responsibility for this injustice.
The above example also illustrates one other important component of
responsibility for injustice. Different people may bear different responsibilities, and may
consequently be obligated to act in multiple different ways as they respond to injustices
around them. For instance, a respected teammate of the bullies may be obligated to speak
40
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up and call them out. A friend of the victim who is seen as a social outcast may need to
inform a counselor or administrator rather than challenge the bullies. A student
government member may be best situated to bring up systemic inefficiencies and
inadequate bullying policies. How multiple students discharge (or execute) their
responsibilities may vary given their different abilities, opportunities, positions of
influence, side effects of interventions, and numerous other factors. Furthermore, certain
groups of students (say the entire student government association working together) may
also bear a collective responsibility to work towards changing the culture of bullying in
their school. As Winston Churchill once stated: “Where there is great power there is great
responsibility, where there is less power there is less responsibility, and where there is no
power there can, I think, be no responsibility.”41 A person’s position and power affects
the nature and scope of his or her responsibility. And similarly, the position and power of
certain groups of people may come to bear on the responsibilities of these collectives and
their members. (We will specifically discuss the responsibilities of collectives and their
members in greater detail shortly).
D. When to Make Reparations (The Proper Place of Corrective Justice)
While commutative justice does not deal solely with retribution, restitution, and
restoration, commutative justice includes these aspects of corrective justice. In light of
our discussion of guilt, blame, fault, and responsibility, it is extremely relevant and
important to consider when we may be obligated to take restorative steps when we have
participated in injustice. Are we only obligated to take restorative steps when we are
41
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guilty/culpable of wrongdoing? Or are we sometimes obligated to take restorative steps
even when we bear some responsibility for injustice but are not morally blameworthy?
Finnis believes that culpability is not necessary in order for restitution or
restoration to be required. He gives the example of a failure to perform on a contract. In
some instances, an individual A may fail to perform on a contract. Finnis claims that in
such situations, A is required in commutative justice to pay damages to B, even when the
failure is not culpable.42 Even when the reason for the breach of contract renders A
morally blameless, he may still be required to compensate B for her loss. Consider a
situation in which A wishes to sell his car. B expresses interest in the car. A and B agree
that once payment is received, then A will deliver the car to B. B pays A for the car. As A
is driving the car to deliver it to B, he is involved in an accident which, although not his
fault, totals the car. A can no longer fulfill his end of the contract by presenting the car to
B, but this is not his fault, and he cannot be blamed for the accident. Still, A is responsible
to compensate B for her loss, which should minimally include returning the money she
has already paid for the car.
Young brings in the concept of liability, which she understands to include
assigning responsibility under the law and in moral judgment in order to “identify liable
parties for the purposes of sanctioning, punishing, or exacting compensation or
redress.”43 On this understanding, the purpose of determining liability is to determine
what one party may owe to another, or what potential consequences may be required
because of one party’s actions. Young’s understanding is that when someone is liable,
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this means precisely that he or she is responsible in a way that demands a response. Often
times this includes a legal response, but this is not always necessary.44
The important point to make with liability is that actors/agents/parties may be
held liable for injustice or injury or harm, and subsequently expected to make some sort
of restitution or restoration or compensation, even if they did not intentionally act
wrongly and are not morally blameworthy. On the contrary, sometimes you can take
every foreseeable precaution and still be responsible for harm that befalls others.
Depending on the circumstances, this may then require a restorative response. Feinberg
gives the following example:
…even if a construction company, for example, takes every reasonable precaution
before dynamiting, it nevertheless can be found liable, if through some freakish
chance a person at a great distance is injured by a flying rock set in motion by the
blast, and can be forced to compensate the injured party for his losses. That the
company was faultlessly careful in its operations is no defense.45
On the other hand, it is not always the case that responsibility for harm carries
with it liability that necessitates a restorative response. Consider the example above of the
baseball pitcher with the rogue curve ball. In this instance, although the offending pitcher
is responsible for the harm that befalls the injured batter, the pitcher is not expected to
make any sort of compensation to the batter. The rules of the game of baseball allow the
batter a free pass to first base, but the inaccurate pitcher need not make any further steps
of reparation or restitution.
However, if I am driving a car and lose control after hitting an oddly placed
construction cone, my lack of moral blameworthiness does not negate my responsibility
to pay for the damages that I cause as I overcorrect and sideswipe another car. I am liable
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for the results of the incident, and I am responsible for providing compensation,
restoration, etcetera for the victim(s) of the accident. Despite the odd circumstances that
may present in cases such as the baseball case above, for the most part many instances of
responsibility, even when devoid of moral guilt or blame, carry with them some amount
of liability for those circumstances. Consequently they also carry some level of obligation
to make compensating efforts toward restitution, restoration, or retribution. But how far
do these obligations carry? How far do the arms of commutative justice reach, and with
whom do we stand in these sorts of obligating relationships?
IV. With Whom Do We Have Relationships in Commutative Justice?
A. Back to Narrative Quests
At the heart of commutative justice lies the reality of our membership in
communities. Commutative justice is about treating those with whom we have
relationships justly. And of course our multiple communities are comprised of numerous
people with whom we possess varying degrees of interconnections and relationships. As
we already discussed in Chapter Three, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that our membership
in communities means that our own individual narrative stories intersect with the stories
of countless others. As such others play a part in my story, and I play a part in theirs.
But MacIntyre goes further than merely noticing that we play parts in one
another’s stories. He also asserts that we are accountable for the ways we impact one
another, and that our actions should be intelligible to other human beings. He states that
we should “understand an action as something for which someone is accountable, about
which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible account.”46 When we act
in certain ways (especially in ways that impact those around us), others have the right to
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question our actions, to ask us why we say or do certain things, and to hold us
accountable in instances where our actions are unintelligible. Our actions must stand up
to scrutiny. And the main way that we are able to make our actions and others’ actions
intelligible is by placing them in the context of narrative histories, “histories both of the
individuals concerned and of the settings in which they act and suffer.47
MacIntyre also points out that our stories (both our personal stories and the stories
we intersect and impact) possess somewhat pre-determined structures. We don’t enter
onto a blank set that is just waiting for us to build our own narratives from scratch.
Rather, our stories are constrained by the decisions and actions of others as well as the
structures that govern our shared lives. As MacIntyre explains,
I spoke earlier of the agent as not only an actor, but an author. Now I must
emphasize that what the agent is able to do and say intelligibly as an actor is
deeply affected by the fact that we are never more (and sometimes less) than the
co-authors of our own narratives. Only in fantasy do we live what story we please.
In life…we are always under constraints. We enter upon a stage which we did not
design and we find ourselves part of an action that was not of our making. Each of
us being a main character in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas
of others, and each drama constrains the others…48
…Of course just as they do not begin where they please, they cannot go on
exactly as they please either; each character is constrained by the actions of others
and by the social settings presupposed in his and their actions…49
…But it is not just that different individuals live in different social
circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of
a particular social identity….Hence what is good for me has to be the good for
one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my
city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations
and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.50
We ALL enter the world in specific places, at specific times, into certain families,
inhabiting certain regions and countries, inheriting existing social practices, and subject
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to established political structures. These are our communities, and they are most
definitely not blank slates or empty manuscripts. They come with histories and structures
and baggage and expectations and obligations that their members must navigate and
shoulder.51
B. Who Are My ‘Neighbors’?
1. General remarks. We have established that we are members of communities
with pre-existing structures and histories. Within these communities, we are constrained
by the narrative stories of others, and they are constrained by our stories as well. But
before we can move further we need to ask who exactly are the members in our
communities with whom we are so intertwined? If we are going to consider what
standards of conduct commutative justice requires of us in relation to our ‘neighbors’, we
need to know who our ‘neighbors’ are. Who should we consider to be our fellow
community members? How narrow or wide should we construe these communities?
Perhaps we can appeal back to our discussion of patriotism and cosmopolitanism
from Chapter Three. This discussion, because it was couched in a conversation regarding
distributive justice, was especially focused on who has certain resources, and whose
needs should take precedence when one is determining when/where/how to use available
resources to meet certain fundamental needs. My conclusion was that, especially in
extreme cases involving grave violations of fundamental human rights, we should ascribe
to ‘conditional cosmopolitanism’, privileging the needs of human beings qua human
being over and above closer special relationships.
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But considering patriotism and cosmopolitanism in relation to commutative
justice changes the discussion a bit, because now we are only considering duties and
obligations we have toward people with whom we possess relationships. These could be
close, tight relationships like those of nuclear family members. Or they could be distant,
loose ties between consumers and assembly line workers. Nevertheless, duties of
commutative justice always hinge on relationships we have with fellow community
members – regardless of whether these represent tight bonds or loose connections, the
point is that they represent real, existing relationships.
2. Individuals or groups? Persons known or unknown? Minimally, we can
draw from the negative duty to refrain from harming others. And we can appeal to the
focus of corrective justice, which requires restoration when we have come to harm
others. But as I pointed out earlier, Finnis’s concept of commutative justice involves
much more than correction, restitution, and restoration. It incorporates the whole field of
human interactions, with the goal of determining “what dealings are proper between
persons…”52 Commutative justice considers how we should treat each other all the time.
But does this apply only to people we know? And does it govern only how we treat other
individuals, or does it also apply to how we treat groups or aggregates of people? And
does it matter if I am acting alone, or in concert with other individuals or groups?
Let us now further consider Finnis’s first three (of five) aspects of commutative
justice. These were briefly mentioned in Section II above. The first aspect concerns
relationships between ascertained individuals.53 This is the most straightforward aspect
of commutative justice, as it deals with relationships between two specific individuals
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who know each other. It is not controversial to assert that if I am interacting directly with
another individual, we share some type of relationship. A person with whom I am
actively communicating is clearly my ‘neighbor’, a person who possesses certain rights,54
and a person with whom I possess corresponding duties of commutative justice.
Finnis’s second aspect of commutative justice concerns relationships between
multiple (or many) ascertained individuals.55 As a teacher I have duties toward many
different students, each of whom is (more or less) known to me. Again, this seems pretty
straightforward and uncontroversial. It is not difficult for me to identify these students as
my ‘neighbors’, even if I don’t know each individual especially well. We share a fairly
close bond as teacher and students, and it seems obvious that we possess duties and
responsibilities toward one another in commutative justice. I possess certain duties
because I have agreed to teach them, and they possess certain duties because they have
signed up for my course. Furthermore, we all possess duties to respect and treat one
another in ways befitting of our dignity as human beings.
Finnis’s third aspect of commutative justice asserts, “…an individual may have
duties in commutative justice to many more or less unascertained individuals.”56 As I
explained in Section II above, this means that a person may have duties to multiple others
who are not known to her. Finnis believes this especially applies to situations in which
an individual A might exploit a system that advantages herself, all-the-while knowing that
such a system simultaneously disadvantages or harms others. It is irrelevant that such an
individual does not personally know those who are disadvantaged or harmed by such a
system. It is also irrelevant that such an individual may not control the exploitative
54
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system, or intend to disadvantage or harm these others. If A ignores this reality and
continues to exploit such a system to her own advantage and to the detriment of
numerous unidentified others, this is seen as commutatively unjust.57
Young agrees with this assessment of our duties and responsibilities to others who
are unknown to us, but who are systematically disadvantaged by structures that
simultaneously work toward our advantage. I already introduced Young’s concept of
structural injustice above, but it is beneficial now to revisit her view. By way of reminder,
I will again quote her explanation of structural injustice:
Structural injustice, then, exists when social processes put large groups of persons
under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and
exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to
dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising
capacities available to them. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct
from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a
state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and
institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part
within the limits of accepted rules and norms.58
Young clearly believes that in many instances of structural injustice, the
individuals and institutions who sustain these structures are themselves generally acting
“within the limits of accepted rules and norms.” Nevertheless, they are still involved in
supporting and upholding a kind of injustice distinct from direct, wrongful action.
Furthermore, it is often impossible to develop a causal connection between a particular
agent and direct harms to other individuals. Young articulates the problem, and her
proposed solution, as follows:
The problem with structural injustice is that we cannot trace this kind of [causal]
connection. It is not difficult to identify persons who contribute to structural
processes. On the whole, however, it is not possible to identify how the actions of
one particular individual, or even one particular collective agent, such as a firm,
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has directly produced harm to other specific individuals…If we want to say that
some people nevertheless bear responsibility for structural injustice, then we need
a conception of responsibility different from the standard conception, which
focuses on individual action and its unique relations to a harm. I propose such an
alternative conception…which I call a social connection model of responsibility.
The social connection model finds that all those who contribute by their actions to
structural processes with some unjust outcomes share responsibility for the
injustice. This responsibility is not primarily backward-looking, as the attribution
of guilt or fault is, but rather primarily forward-looking. Being responsible in
relation to structural injustice means that one has an obligation to join with others
who share that responsibility in order to transform the structural processes to
make their outcomes less unjust.59
Young’s social connection model of responsibility understands that we commonly
use the term ‘responsible’ in different ways. On one understanding, being responsible is
understood as being guilty or at fault. But the sense of ‘responsible’ that Young is most
concerned with is summed up with the understanding that “people have certain
responsibilities by virtue of their social roles and positions, as when we say that a teacher
has specific responsibilities, or we appeal to our responsibilities as citizens.”60 Therefore,
determining responsibility in this sense does not involve finding fault or liability for a
past wrong, but rather “it refers to agents’ carrying out activities in a morally appropriate
way and seeing to it that certain outcomes obtain.”61
This reminds me of MacIntyre’s belief in the interconnectedness of our narrative
stories - that we are accountable for the ways we impact one another, and that our actions
should be intelligible to other human beings.62 The distinction between these views is that
MacIntyre focuses primarily on the responsibility of individuals to act in certain ways.
Young focuses specifically on shared responsibility, which on her social connection
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model can only be discharged through collective action.63 Still, though, Young’s focus on
responsibility deriving from “belonging together with others in a system of
interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek benefits
and aim to realize projects”64 seems extremely MacIntyrean.
Moral philosopher Elizabeth Ashford also agrees with Young’s assessment that
being ‘responsible’ concerns fulfilling social roles and positions. Ashford points out that
the traditional conception of duties and responsibilities specifically related to human
rights65 is inadequate in our current era. On this traditional conception, responsibility for
a human rights violation is assigned by identifying the perpetrator(s) of the violation, and
attaching blame “for a specific harm suffered by a particular victim” to that agent or
agents.66 But Ashford further claims that the current climate renders this traditional
conception lacking, because the harms inflicted on many global people “increasingly
result from extremely complex causal chains involving the behaviour of a huge number
of agents, few or none of whom can be singled out as responsible for a serious harm to
any specific victim.”67
Samuel Scheffler points out that we naturally give primacy to individual effects
over group effects, and that “when an outcome is the joint result of the actions of a
number of people, including ourselves, we tend to see our own agency as implicated to a
much lesser extent than we do when we take an effect to have resulted solely from our
63
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own actions.”68 This is an empirical observation, explaining how we psychologically
attempt to lessen our own feelings of responsibility when others act alongside us. But as
Scheffler further explains, a variety of developments in the modern world (e.g. advances
in science, technology, travel, communications, information processing, economic and
political interdependence, and population growth) have “made it more difficult than ever
to sustain the conception of human social relations as consisting primarily in small-scale
interactions among single individuals.”69
Additionally, Ashford addresses the concept of indirect responsibility for human
rights violations. She points out that sometimes individuals contribute non-voluntarily to
complex causal chains that lead to harms, and their contributions are neither foreseeable
nor avoidable.70 Generally, in such cases the offending agents find that their greatest
causal impact is “via their participation in social institutions.”71 Ashford admits that it
may be difficult or impossible for agents to predict just how their individual actions will
affect others. Furthermore, Ashford recognizes that it is not feasible for most agents to
withdraw from the social institutions in which they participate, and it is “not plausible to
hold agents directly morally responsible for their individual causal contribution to the
harms resulting form the operation of social institutions.”72 However, Ashford does
believe it is appropriate to attribute to such individuals a shared responsibility for the
shaping of the social institutions in which they participate.73
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It is possible that we participate in institutions that contribute to human rights
violations (e.g. political structures that allow torture), and it is possible that we participate
in social institutions that themselves constitute human rights violations (e.g. legal
structures that allow slavery).74 Ashford believes that responsibility for laws such as
those that condoned and sustained antebellum slavery “lay with the citizens who
sustained them.”75
This leaves the question, then, regarding how much responsibility individuals
actually carry for wrongs produced in concert with numerous others. Young points out,
though, that her social connection model does not assign liability to some in ways that
absolve others. Shared responsibility for actions that contribute to structural processes
producing structural injustices “is a responsibility I personally bear, but I do not bear it
alone.”76 It is not possible in such circumstances to mathematically divide out which
person is responsible for which bits of harm inflicted on others, and so while
responsibility is shared, it is not divided and distributed. Young explains:
In thinking about shared responsibility, I am indebted to Larry May’s theory.
According to May, the concept of shared responsibility is distinct from the
concept of collective responsibility in that the former is a distributed
responsibility, whereas the latter is not. A collective of persons, such as a
corporation, might be said to be responsible for a state of affairs without any of its
constituent individuals being determinately responsible for it. Shared
responsibility, on the other hand, is a personal responsibility for outcomes or the
risks of harmful outcomes, produced by a group of persons. Each is personally
responsible for the outcome in a partial way, since he or she alone does not
produce the outcomes; the specific part that each plays in producing the outcome
cannot be isolated and identified, however, and thus the responsibility is
essentially shared.77
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The takeaway here is that when a group of people is responsible for together inflicting
harm on another person or group of people, even when those harms are unintentional or
merely the result of participation in structural injustice, the individuals involved bear
responsibility as individuals.
I have now argued that individuals have duties/responsibilities in commutative
justice both to other individuals and groups, and both to ascertained and unascertained
peoples. As such, our ‘neighbors’ are not only those people whom we find proximally
close to us, and with whom we share close relational ties, but also many others with
whom we share social structures and global ties. When we participate in actions or
structures that produce injustices for our ‘neighbors’, whether near or far, known or
unknown to us, we share responsibility for these injustices. We may not be guilty or
morally blameworthy, but we are still responsible by virtue of our social roles and
relationships, and the interconnectedness of our narrative quests. So then, when we find
ourselves responsible for injustices near and far, what does commutative justice demand
we do in response? To this question we now turn.
V. What Does Commutative Justice Demand of Us?
A. Taking Responsibility, Regardless of Guilt
In the initial description of commutative justice in Section II above, I pointed to
the following three questions from Finnis: (1) “What are the standards of conduct which
individuals must live up to in relation to their ‘neighbors’?” (2) “What should be the
extent of liability of one who fails to live up to those standards or conduct?” and (3)
“How should those injured by the wrongs of others be restored to their former
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condition?”78 We have addressed and discussed the first two questions. In relation to
question (1), we must minimally refrain from harming our ‘neighbors’, and we should
consider how all of our relational interactions affect the narrative stories of those around
us, both near and far. In relation to question (2), we are responsible for numerous
instances of harm in relation to numerous individuals and groups of people, even though
in many of these instances we may not be morally blameworthy or guilty or culpable for
these injustices. However, even when we are not guilty of wrongdoing, we often times
may be liable for taking restorative steps on behalf of those who have been affected or
harmed by our participation in injustices against them.
So now we need to attend to question (3), “How should those injured by the
wrongs of others be restored to their former condition?”79 Or we may want to rephrase
this question to read something like, “When we are responsible for injustice, what should
we do in order to restore or compensate or rehabilitate or pay restitution to those who
have been victimized or harmed by our individual actions or our actions in concert with
other individuals, groups, structures, and institutions?”
When we can connect an agent’s “intentions, motives, and consequences of
actions”80 to a specific harm, and when we can “connect a person’s deed linearly to the
harm for which we seek to assign responsibility,”81 then there is clearer picture of both a
violation of negative duties and of the requirements of commutative justice. Furthermore,
in such instances the responsible offending party is likely obligated to make specific
restorative steps toward the victim(s). For instance, if an agent C knowingly and willfully
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parks on his neighbor D’s yard leaving muddy tire tracks and ruining D’s newly laid sod,
then C should minimally expend whatever funds are necessary to restore D’s yard to its
former state.
But when we cannot draw such easy, linear connections between responsible (or
even guilty) agents and the victim(s) of their actions, where does this leave us? What
should we do when we share responsibility with others for structural injustice(s)? What
should we do when we bear some responsibility for injustices done to people we may not
even know, in places far from where we live?
As Hannah Arendt states, we can still be responsible and liable for things we have
not specifically done, even though we cannot be considered guilty for things in which we
have not actively participated.82 We have already established that our lack of guilt does
not necessarily result in a lack of responsibility. But what is the nature of the
responsibility we have toward people we have not individually or intentionally harmed?
When the responsibility we have toward others is a collective responsibility – meaning a
responsibility due to membership in a group with which we cannot voluntarily dissolve83
- the relevant question involves whether a person’s conduct is good for the world and
those in it (rather than good for ourselves).84 This type of responsibility – the primary
consideration of what is good for “the world” - Arendt labels “political responsibility.”85
Young further explains Arendt’s conception of political responsibility as follows:
Political responsibility…concerns how things stand in the world. Whatever the
cause of sufferings, they are our responsibility to notice and address. Or, the sins
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of our fathers have continuing effect, and inasmuch as we belong to a political
community continuous with theirs, we have responsibility for them.86
Arendt also points out that the only way to escape this political and collective
responsibility is to remove ourselves from our communities. However, we cannot live
without belonging to some community, so all we can hope to do is “exchange one
community for another and hence one kind of responsibility for another.”87 Young goes
further to also remind us that as we participate in communities, we likely benefit from the
operation of institutions within those communities. She states,
This [political] responsibility falls on members of a society by virtue of the fact
that they are aware moral agents who ought not to be indifferent to the fate of
others and the danger that states and other organized institutions often pose to
some people. This responsibility is largely unavoidable in the modern world,
because we participate in and usually benefit from the operation of these
institutions…88
Where these institutions exhibit structural injustices, we are obligated to work toward
transforming them. Those who are harmed by these systems are our neighbors. They are
people with whom our narrative quests intersect. They are others with whom we are
“joined together.”89
B. The Broad, Indeterminate Obligations of Commutative Justice
If we are hoping for specific, concrete actions we are obligated to take to fulfill
our duties in commutative justice, we are likely to be disappointed. As Judith Lichtenberg
points out, believing our duties “can be parsed into simple and determinate duties is
highly misleading at best.” She goes on to say that no plausible moral theory has ever
shown a credible way of determining precisely what people should and should not be
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obligated to do or refrain from doing.90 Ashford agrees, and in writing specifically
regarding compensating for violations of negative duties, she does not find it problematic
that we do not know exactly what we must do to discharge such duties. She thus states:
Fulfillment of the negative duty not to collaborate in unjust institutions requires us
to take actions to support reform of these institutions or so as to minimize the
extent of our collaboration in them, or to provide recompense for the harms they
cause. The nature of this action is no more specified than is the action we should
take to carry out a positive duty of aid. The way in which we support institutional
reform is open, and it is also open which particular harms we should seek to
oppose or compensate for…The duty of individual members is therefore not a
perfect duty with a specific content that can be fully discharged…it is largely
indeterminate how to prevent the right not to be deprived of access to basic
necessities from being violated. The onus is on individual agents to decide how to
implement their share of the corresponding negative duty.91
If anything, then, this indeterminacy of our responsibilities in commutative justice leaves
room for us to choose not if, but how we will go about discharging our obligations. And
while not laying out a specific required path, at least one general demand that victims
have toward agents who harm them through participation in unjust institutions is that
those agents seek to reform such institutions.92
Young agrees with this general call to work toward transforming the processes
that currently produce unjust outcomes for our neighbors. She points out that her social
connection model is “forward-looking” and “seeks to assign responsibility for structural
injustice that has existed recently, is ongoing, and is likely to persist unless social
processes change.”93 Furthermore, her social connection model is not interested in
determining causal relationships between actors and victims in order to attribute blame
and seek redress. She states, “The injustices produced through structures have not
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reached a terminus, but rather are ongoing. The point is not to compensate for the past,
but for all who contribute to processes producing unjust outcomes to work to transform
those processes.”94 Young’s goal is not to determine blame, but rather to motivate
change.
Young’s appeal to political responsibility also provides us with some guidelines
regarding how we should act in response to structural injustice. Political responsibly is
not a responsibility to do certain things on our own, in isolation from others. Young
argues, “Political responsibility is not about doing something by myself, however, but
about exhorting others to join me in collective action.”95 Such collective action should
include “…watching these institutions, monitoring their effects to make sure that they are
not grossly harmful, and maintaining organized public spaces where such watching and
monitoring can occur and citizens can speak publicly and support one another in their
efforts to prevent suffering.”96
When faced with the question of what we are obligated to do to combat
commutative injustice, it is again helpful to appeal to MacIntyre’s conception of the
narrative quests of many people intersecting with and informing one another’s pursuits.
As MacIntyre asserts, “I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer
the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’”97 Again, the broad,
indeterminate nature of our obligations and responsibilities in commutative justice make
it difficult to know precisely what we should do – both as individuals and members of
communities – when we are faced with relational injustices of many varieties. But what

94

Young, 109.
Ibid., 93.
96
Ibid., 88.
97
MacIntyre, 215-216.
95

126

we can know for sure is that because we live in relational communities, we are
responsible for favoring and fostering the common good of our neighbors in those
communities.98 Perhaps a good place to start is with opening our eyes and ears and
making a real effort to see, hear, and understand the lives of these ‘others’ with whom our
lives intersect in numerous and various ways. When these ‘others’ become known to us,
the ways we should care about their lives as well as our own will likely become much
more obvious.
VI. Conclusion
In his book on corrective justice, Ernest Weinrib asserts that corrective justice is
about remedying the past, not about looking toward the future and making things better.
It’s about undoing the past, not improving the future.99 Perhaps this is precisely what
corrective justice is meant to pursue. But we are concerned with something much more
comprehensive than this. Commutative justice involves both looking to the past to seek
restitution for victims of numerous injustices, and looking forward to the future in order
to address systems and institutions and even ideologies that continue to oppress and
disadvantage and harm our ‘neighbors’. Commutative justice involves all the multiple
ways that we live relationally in our shared world, and governs all of our actions and
interactions with those around us.
There are numerous ways that we may be involved, both directly and indirectly,
in failing to execute our duties and responsibilities in commutative justice toward our
fellow human beings. But perhaps the words of Herbert Morris can provide some
encouragement of where we can go from here. According to Morris, injustice cannot
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exist unless we also have a conception of joining together and righting those injustices.
He explains the following:
Wrongdoing is failing to reach a level of attainment that individuals generally are
seen as able to satisfy. When we possess the concept of wrongdoing, I want to
suggest that it is connected for us with the concept of “being joined together” with
another or others, the idea of union, the idea, too, that in this union one is
complete, one is whole, in a way that one would not be without it…Next,
wrongdoing arises in a world in which there is a conception of righting the wrong.
It arises in a world in which persons possess a conception not just of separation
from others but of coming together again with them, a conception of mending
what has been torn, repairing what has been damaged – restoration.”100
And I would add that in this sense, ‘restoration’ can include both backward-looking
restitution and forward-looking change. We can assess historical injustices and determine
when we may be obligated to take actions to repay or restore what was once taken. And
we can come together to fight for long-term structural changes that will ensure that these
types of damages and harms vanish from our shared world. Oh that we would always
look to treat each other with the dignity and respect due one another as fellow travelers
on the road to pursing our narrative quests with one another. And oh that our interactions
with one another along these quests would always serve to encourage and never serve to
degrade or disadvantage them.
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CHAPTER 5
CONNECTING VIOLATIONS OF JUSTICE TO
MODERN SLAVERY
I. Introduction: Bringing Things Together
I began this project by laying out the current status of slavery in our contemporary
world. I defined slavery in our modern context, and I explained ways in which today’s
slavery is similar to and also different from historical forms of slavery. I then spent two
chapters discussing the general demands of justice. I appealed to John Finnis’s two major
categories of justice - distributive justice and commutative justice. Distributive justice
deals with the proper ways of distributing and allocating common stock resources and the
incidents of communal enterprise amongst people. Commutative justice deals with proper
interactions between people, including but not limited to the responsibility to restore or
pay restitution to a victim when he or she has been unjustly harmed.
You may be wondering how these discussions fit together. You are in luck! The
purpose of the present chapter is to explain how the existence of modern slavery violates
the requirements of both distributive and commutative justice. It answers the question
“How is modern slavery our problem?” Once this case is made, it will propel us toward
our concluding chapter, in which I will make suggestions regarding what we can and
should do to fight for justice on behalf of today’s slaves, ultimately answering the
question, “What are we obligated to do to help modern slaves?”
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II. Slavery and Distributive Justice
A. The Relationship Between Poverty and Slavery
In order to understand one of the primary ways that injustice in distribution leads
to slavery, we must first explore the reality of world poverty and its effects on global
citizens who are impoverished. According to Kevin Bales, those who are working around
the world to free slaves have learned that poverty and vulnerability play a major role in
driving people to slavery, and that slavery “always reflects differences in economic and
social power.”1 He also asserts that those who become enslaved “lack both the personal
and financial resources and the social and governmental protections to prevent their
enslavement.”2 David Batstone states, “…denying the central role of poverty in modernday slavery is like denying the central role of gravity in rainfall.”3
So what exactly is the current status of world poverty? According to a 2014 report
from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
Globally, 1.2 billion people (22 percent) live on less that $1.25 a day. Increasing
the income poverty line to $2.50 a day raises the global income poverty rate to
about 50 percent, or 2.7 billion people. Moving the poverty line in this way draws
in a large number of people who are potentially vulnerable to poverty and reduced
circumstances. In South Asia 44.4 percent of the population, around 730 million
people, live on $1.25-$2.50 a day. Many who recently joined the middle class
could easily fall back into poverty with a sudden change in circumstances…
Sizeable portions of the population are close to the poverty threshold (the “near
poor”), and such a clustering implies that idiosyncratic or generalized shocks
could easily push a large number of people back into poverty.4
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Also in 2014, 805 million global citizens (1 in 9) suffered from hunger.5 Children are
disproportionately impacted by poverty. UNICEF reports that in 2013, nearly “385
million children were living in extremely poor households…with 19.5 percent of children
in developing countries estimated to live on less than $1.90 a day, compared to 9.2 per
cent of adults.”6
The UNDP also goes beyond merely assessing the reality of economic poverty,
but also points out other factors that may make certain people or groups of people
generally more vulnerable than others. Such factors may include a history of unequal
treatment within some societies especially in regards to gender, ethnicity, geographic
location, and other similar qualities.7 Furthermore, “Many of the most vulnerable people
and groups face numerous and overlapping constraints on their ability to cope with
setbacks. For example, those who are poor and also from a minority group, or are female
and have disabilities, face multiple barriers which can negatively reinforce each other.”8
Given these staggering numbers regarding global poverty, along with factors that
increase the vulnerability of underprivileged individuals and groups, we now can
consider the ways in which many global people are especially vulnerable to exploitation
(including slavery) due to these factors. In order to do this, we should first understand
implications of the immense population explosion following World War II.9 In
approximately a fifty-year period the world population expanded astronomically, from
5
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two billion to over six billion people. Several factors led to this boom, including better
control of infectious diseases, better healthcare for children, and an overall increase in
prosperity. However, most of this population boom occurred in the developing world, and
the overall increase in global prosperity has not transferred to the poorest of the poor.
While simply having lots of people does not guarantee that they are susceptible to
slavery, when the regions most impacted by this massive population boom have
insufficient resources and structures to sustain these numbers, the resulting
impoverishment does breed a large population of people whose most basic needs are
unmet and who are thus more susceptible to slavery out of desperation.10
This explosion of impoverished people has resulted in another modern
phenomenon regarding slavery – the sharp decrease in the monetary value of slaves. For
4,000 years in the historical past, prior to the recent population explosion, the price of a
slave fluctuated between $10,000-$40,000 in today’s currency. Since about 1950, the
average price for a slave has dropped to less than $100,11 and in some places slaves can
be bought (for life) for as little as $10.12 As Bales, Trodd, and Williamson explain, “The
supply of possible slaves is especially plentiful among the 1 billion people who live on
about a dollar a day, a population concentrated in the developing world.”13 So the current
situation is this – there exists today a massive population of people who are impoverished
and desperate to have their most basic needs met. They are willing to take risks in hopes
of a better life for themselves and their children. There are individuals and networks of
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people poised to take advantage of this fact,14 and consequently some of these desperate
people end up enslaved. The sharp increase in world population since World War II,
especially in the developing world, has made it such that buying slaves is extremely
cheap. And because slaves are so cheap and plentiful, they are seen as disposable and
easily replaceable.15
Consider the reasons why someone might voluntarily enter into an agreement
with a recruiter who promises good wages or educational opportunities, or why a parent
might agree to sell their children to strangers who promise them a better life. The most
obvious reason is that these people are impoverished and desperate, seeing few other
options for a better life for themselves or their children, and are therefore willing to take
risks in hopes that the promises being made are actually legitimate. Remember back to
our discussions of debt bondage and contract slavery from Chapter Two, and the stories
of Ajay and Vi. These are two examples of impoverished individuals who became
enslaved because they saw no other viable options for survival. Bales, Trodd, and
Williamson state that “[s]ome parents sell their children, or agree to take an ‘advance’ on
the wages they will supposedly earn, not just for the money, but also in hope that their
children will escape a situation of poverty.”16 And as modern abolitionist David Batstone
explains,
Widespread poverty and social inequality ensure a pool of recruits as deep as the
ocean. Parents in desperate straits may sell their children or at least be susceptible
to scams that will allow the slave trader to take control of the lives of their sons
and daughters. Young women in vulnerable communities are more likely to take a
risk on a job offer in a faraway location. The poor are apt to accept a loan that the
slave trader can later manipulate to steal their freedom. All of these paths carry
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unsuspecting recruits into the supply chains of slavery. “The supply side of the
equation is particularly bleak,” says Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas. “Fifty
million refugees and displaced persons exist worldwide today. This ready
reservoir of the stateless presents an opportunity rife for exploitation by human
traffickers.”17
If you are still left with doubts, I encourage you to check out the photo project
“Dollar Street,”18 in which Anna Rosling Rönnlund uses photography to compare the
living conditions of people at different income levels around the world. This project
showcases 30,000 pictures of 264 families from 50 different countries, and compares
their homes, toilets, cooking facilities, children’s toys, and numerous other categories.
When you see visual images of the living conditions of the poorest of these families, one
does not have to marvel at why these families may be utterly desperate, and why some
are willing to take risks in the hopes that their quality of life and their children’s futures
might be made better. I personally cannot look at these photographs without tears in my
eyes. When a family’s most prized possession in the world is their children’s birth
documents, this is the reality of poverty.19
B. Poverty (and slavery) as an Indication of Distributive Injustice
The startling reality is that it is not a general lack of money that keeps people
impoverished. According to a July 2017 Oxfam International report, “Eight men own the
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same wealth as the 3.6 billion people who make up the poorest half of humanity.”20 The
report claims that inequalities between the rich and the poor continue to grow, and that
70% of the world’s citizens live in countries where inequality has increased over the past
30 years. According to the report,
Oxfam interviewed women working in a garment factory in Vietnam who work
12 hours a day, 6 days a week and still struggle to get by on the $1 an hour they
earn producing clothes for some of the world’s biggest fashion brands. The CEOs
of these companies are some of the highest paid people in the world. Corporate
tax dodging costs poor countries at least $100 billion every year. This is enough
money to provide an education for the 124 million children who aren’t in school
and fund healthcare interventions that could prevent the deaths of at least six
million children every year.21
In Southeast Asia, although industrialization could serve to stimulate growth in
the overall economy, this is not the reality. Accumulated wealth is unevenly distributed.
The concentration of land and capital is relegated to a small, elite group, while the needs
of the poor masses are ignored.22 Furthermore, distributive inequality is not only a
problem when it comes to monetary wealth and property ownership. As we discussed in
Chapter Three, distributive justice also concerns the distribution of things like
opportunities and advantages.23 So when David Batstone reports, “At least one in every
three of Cambodia’s 15 million people live below the poverty line today. Cambodian
women, above all, do not get the chance to study formally or learn vocational skills,”24
this exemplifies an unjust distribution of the opportunities and advantages offered by
receiving an education or vocational training. These realities seem to lend credence to the
declaration of Pope Francis I, who states, “Human rights are violated not only by
20
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terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that create
huge inequalities.”25
Still, it may be easy for many of us “average” folks to criticize the world’s
billionaires, and yet to feel like we have not reaped any special benefits from our position
of relative affluence in the global economy. But Peter Singer points out that while 1.4
billion people (in 2009) live in extreme poverty, about a billion people live at a level of
affluence never before experienced outside of kings and nobles. And in some ways, these
1 billion people are better off than historical kings when we consider our access to things
like air conditioning, balanced diets including fruits and vegetables, and good medical
care.26 Singer points out that another indicator of our wealth is the small amount of time
we work in order to provide the food we need. He states, “Today Americans spend, on
average, only 6 percent of their income on buying food. If they work a forty-hour week, it
takes them barely two hours to earn enough to feed themselves for the week. That leaves
far more to spend on consumer goods, entertainment, and vacations.”27
Now I suppose many who read this do in fact spend more than 6 percent of their
income on food. Still, many of us have more expendable income than we might
recognize. Consider that we waste $100 billion of food in the United States annually.28
Consider that in 2014, people around the world spent $10 billion on beverages at
Starbucks! If everyone gave up drinking Starbucks for a year and diverted that money
toward feeding the poor, 1/3 of the world’s hungry people would be fed.29 Or consider
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that a 2004 press release from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) divulged the following
information regarding luxury consumption: “Americans spend an estimated $20 billion
on ice cream, while Europeans spend $11 billion. The global population spends: $18
billion worldwide on facial cosmetics, $15 billion on perfumes and $14 billion on ocean
cruises.”30 These are products that many if not most people in the developed world enjoy,
even among those of lower socioeconomic standing. And while we spend billions upon
billions of dollars on wasted food, coffee, ice cream, cosmetics, perfumes, cruises, and
numerous other consumer products, the world’s poorest citizens are short food for all or
part of each year, cannot afford to keep their children in school, live in unstable housing,
and have no clean source of drinking water.31
My intention here is not to embark on a detailed analysis of global economics,
partly because I am definitely no economist, and partly because that would distract us
from the more general argument that seems pertinent here. My concern is not with the
specifics of how global economic structures bring about such stark inequalities. Rather,
my intention is make an empirical observation – half of the people in the world live off of
$2.50 a day or less, while others of us spend so much money on coffee and ice cream that
we could put a massive dent in poverty, if not completely eradiate it. Regardless of how
this inequality exists, the fact is that it does exist.
And just as it is not a lack of money that keeps people impoverished, money is
even less of an issue when it comes to freeing the enslaved. Freeing slaves in the
developing world often does not cost much money. Bales mentions an organization in
30
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northern India called the Sankalp organization which can help an entire family move
from slavery into freedom for around $35 USD.32 In Bales’ words, “Freedom may be
precious, but it doesn’t have to be expensive.”33 Bales goes on to imagine how financially
possible it might actually be to free the world’s slaves. Conjecturing that the figure of $35
for freedom and a new life applies to all slaves, and supposing there are 27 million slaves,
it would cost $945 million to end slavery on our planet.34 And even if we double or triple
or quadruple this amount to account for more slaves or higher amounts of money to
achieve their freedom, we could end slavery altogether in exchange for our global
Starbucks habit.
What does this tell us about the distribution of the world’s wealth if one portion
spends $31 billion on ice cream and $10 billion on coffee, while a massive portion (50
percent) lives on less than $2.50 a day and struggles to feed, clothe, shelter, and educate
their families? This level of distributive injustice leaves millions of men, women, and
children vulnerable to slavery. Perhaps becoming a ‘conditional cosmopolitan’ means
that instead of taking my daughter to get ice cream as a reward for good grades, I should
divert that money toward alleviating hunger for other children. Or better yet, I could take
my daughter with me and we could together engage in some activity to alleviate the
suffering of some of the world’s most vulnerable people.
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C. The Demands of Distributive Justice on Behalf of Slaves
You may ask, “So what if I have an expensive coffee habit? I am entitled to spend
my hard-earned money however I see fit.” But this may not actually be the case. In
Chapter Three we compared the libertarian “entitlement theory” championed by Robert
Nozick with John Finnis’s view of distributive justice. By way of reminder, Nozick
believes that redistribution according to certain patterned principles (such as merit, effort,
or need) is unjust. Taking from some people things for which they hold justly either
through acquisition or transfer, and redistributing them to others, is tantamount to
stealing.35 However, we also explored the sticky territory of justice in holdings. Nozick
himself admits that some holdings are acquired through theft, fraud, or enslavement, and
that justice in holdings depends on what has actually happened historically.36 Consider
the land that my husband and I own. How can we even know that the original acquisition
of the land was just, or that every transfer of the land from one owner to the next was
just?
Furthermore, even presuming that a plot of land (or numerous other similar
resources) was justly acquired and has been justly transferred throughout history, this
does not entitle the owner to do whatever she wants with the land if this includes
privileging her own desires to the extent that she neglects the fundamental needs of
others. This is precisely Finnis’s point when he argues that common stock resources and
incidents of communal enterprise, although rightly allocated to certain individuals
because otherwise they are not useful, are ultimately meant to benefit the common good
of the community.
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As was explained in Chapter Three, acquisitions are made, and private holdings
are encouraged, not for the purpose of hoarding for oneself, but for the purpose of
increasing value and productivity for the benefit of the common good of the members of
one’s communities.37 If one person or group is hoarding resources that should be put to
use benefiting the greater community, then those resources should be reallocated to
someone who can and will use them for greater benefit. Finnis explains this the following
way:
Those arguments [for the permissibility of private ownership] in no way suggest
that private ownership, thus understood, is unconditionally just. On the contrary,
by starting from the general notion of the common good, and by emphasizing that
natural resources are essentially common stock (though apt for distribution,
including distribution as private property), the arguments themselves suggest the
conditions which private owners must conform to if their ownership is to be
distributively just. As private owner of a natural resource or capital good, one has
a duty in justice to put it to productive use or, if one lacks the further resources
required to do so, to dispose of it to someone willing and able to do
so…speculative acquisition and disposition of property, for the purposes of
merely financial gain uncorrelated with any economically productive
development or use, is contrary to distributive justice.38
We should also appeal back Sarah Clark Miller’s discussion of our “duty to care”
for the fundamental needs of others, and her observation that we all find ourselves
weakly vulnerable and dependent on one another at various points. If we assume that
others have a duty to care for us in our times of need, we must also recognize that we
have a duty to care for them in the midst of their needs.39 Additionally, when we consider
Miller’s list of fundamental needs, it is clear that the practice of slavery violates all
eleven of these needs in some way. For easy reference, her fundamental needs include:
(1) nutrition and water, (2) rest, (3) shelter (including clothing), (4) healthy environment
37
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(hygienic, non-toxic, etc.), (5) bodily integrity (freedom from physical and sexual abuse,
freedom to control matters affecting their bodies, etc.), (6) healing (access to some
medical attention), (7) education, (8) attachments (positive emotional attachments), (9)
social inclusion, participation, and recognition, (10) play (pleasurable recreational
experiences which foster humor and creativity), and (11) security (freedom from
coercive, threatening environments).40
I argue in Chapter Three that distributive justice hinges, at least in part, on
meeting the fundamental needs of those who are in dire situations. I also argue that we
should be concerned with developing the type of character in ourselves and our fellow
community members that results in a desire to cultivate virtuous citizens who recognize
that they are part of a larger story,41 and who fight for a good quality of life for their
fellow community members.42
Seeing as how modern slaves are subject to horrific deprivations and experience
profuse needs, virtuous global citizens should recognize that the plight of slaves is a
paradigm case of a reality that demands we become ‘conditional cosmopolitans’. Because
the abuses perpetuated against slaves include the worst crimes against humanity
imaginable, we should respond by privileging and valuing the fundamental rights and
needs of slaves above other particular relationships, and we should work tirelessly to see
the demands of global justice recognized for all people.
IF world resources are distributed such that some have way more than we need
for basic subsistence while millions of others have had everything taken from them,
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including their freedom, we cannot deny that we have benefited from more than our fair
share of the available common stock resources and incidents of communal enterprise. If
slave children in India are forced to weave the rug I buy for my den,43 they have mixed
their labor into something for which they have failed to reap any benefit, and I have
reaped a major benefit in a low-cost rug, although I have done nothing specifically to
deserve this benefit. I was born in the right place at the right time to be the beneficiary of
a system that provides me low-cost goods at the expense of enslaved others. This is an
unjust distribution on many levels – physical goods, money, physical freedom, autonomy,
educational opportunities, safety, and the list goes on. If Finnis is right, and those who
have been given a greater allocation of the common stock have been given those
resources in order to work toward the common good and to benefit more than just
themselves, then we can rightly question a world in which some live in opulence while
many live in abject poverty and slavery, while nevertheless the resources exist to
adequately feed and clothe and heal and free those who have been deprived of such
provisions.
III. Slavery and Commutative Justice
A. The Relationship Between Consumerism and Slavery44
I have made a case above as to how the existence of slavery in our modern world
violates the demands of distributive justice. It is now time we consider how slavery is
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also a violation of commutative justice. Let us first remember how Finnis explains
commutative justice by appealing to the following:
There is a vast range of relationships and dealings between persons…in which
neither the requirements or incidents of communal enterprise nor the distribution
(whether by public or private owners) of a common stock are directly at stake,
but in which there can be question of what is fitting, fair, or just as between
the parties to the relationship.45
So whereas distributive justice deals with distributing common resources and privileges
among individuals in communities, commutative justice is concerned with assuring that
people treat those with whom they have relationships in ways that are fitting and fair.
This still hinges on our foundation of favoring and fostering the common good of
community members, and recognizing that our narrative quests are intricately intertwined
with one another.
Our chief concern in considering the demands of commutative justice is to
ascertain the nature of our relationships with numerous others, and to determine if these
relationships serve to treat these others justly, or if these relationships exhibit a failure to
pursue the good of our neighbors. Furthermore, commutative justice may require that if
and when we fail our neighbors, we are obligated to take steps toward restoration or
correction. We must consider, then, how the existence of modern slavery might implicate
us as failing to uphold the demands of commutative justice in our relationships, both
local and global. A first step in this process is to examine the links between consumerism
and slavery.
For those of us living in the developed West, most of us go about our daily lives
giving little or no thought to how our lifestyles – specifically our consumer habits –
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might be linked to the slavery of others. But the reality is becoming increasingly clear
that those of us who consume are linked in multiple ways to those who produce, and
often times a portion of those producers are slaves. Numerous organizations are now
dedicated to making consumers aware of how their consumer practices contribute to
slavery worldwide. One such agency explains,
Slavery flows into our homes, offices, and schools through many of the products
we buy. Slaves harvest cocoa in West Africa, and it ends up in our chocolate.
Slaves make charcoal in Brazil, which is used to run smelters that make steel for
our cars. Many food products and raw materials are tainted by slavery—such as
tomatoes, tuna, shrimp, cotton, diamonds, iron, sugar, and gold.”46
That same agency also claims, “Many everyday products are made by slaves, or with
slavery-tainted parts or raw materials -- such as cars, computers, chocolate, cell phones
and clothing.”47
In Chapter Two we discussed different types of modern slavery, including bonded
labor. Siddharth Kara points out that many of the products we use or consume regularly
are made by bonded laborers (i.e. slaves) in South Asia. He explains,
…the products of present-day bonded labor touch almost every aspect of the
global economy, including frozen shrimp and fish, tea, coffee, rice, wheat,
diamonds, gems, cubic zirconia, glassware, brassware, carpets, limestone, marble,
slate, salt, matches, cigarettes, bidis (Indian cigarettes), apparel, fireworks, knives,
sporting goods, and many other products. Virtually everyone’s life, everywhere in
the world, is touched by bonded labor in South Asia.48
Another organization has developed an online test that consumers can take to
determine approximately how many slaves it takes to sustain each consumer’s own
lifestyle. This test determines an individual’s “Slavery footprint.”
46

“Slavery Today,” Free the Slaves. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.freetheslaves.net/aboutslavery/slavery-today/.
47
“Trafficking and Slavery Fact Sheet,” Free the Slaves, accessed May 4, 2015,
https://www.freetheslaves.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/FTS_factsheet-Nov17.21.pdf.
48
Siddharth Kara, Bonded Labor: Tackling the System of Slavery in South Asia (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2012), 3.

144

Your TOTAL SLAVERY FOOTPRINT represents the number of forced laborers
that were likely to be involved in creating and manufacturing the products you
buy. This is determined based on information regarding the processes used to
create these products as well as investigations of the countries in which these
stages of production take place for known slave labor (within these specific
processes.) This number is compiled from multiple individual product scores…In
order to create individual scores, we first chose to investigate slave labor usage in
the supply chains of more than 400 of the most popular consumer products.49
When I took this test initially, I was informed that my lifestyle supports forty-seven
slaves. I took the test again after having a child, and my score jumped up to seventy-four
slaves. This is an appalling number, especially since I like to think that I am a fairly
informed and responsible consumer. However, by virtue of simply being a consumer in
an affluent Western society, my contribution to slavery is seemingly undeniable.
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The U.S. Department of Labor’s “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or
Forced Labor” identifies 134 goods produced by 74 countries that have strong evidences
of child labor, forced labor, or both.50 Among these goods are bricks, flowers, various
fruits and vegetables, accessories, textiles, garments, coffee, sugar, cotton, footwear, fish,
shrimp, salt, various minerals (such as zinc), various metals (such as gold and silver),
various gemstones (such as diamonds, emeralds, jade, rubies, etc.), rice, rubber, coal,
electronics, nails…and the list goes on and on.51 Kevin Bales reiterates and adds to this
list when he points out the following:
One of the most shocking facts about slavery for people in the United States and
Europe is that we are using slave-made products every day. Cotton, chocolate,
sugar, steel, even some of the metal in cell phones, may be tainted by slavery. The
total volume of these slave-made ingredients is actually very small. A tiny
fraction of the world’s cotton or cocoa or steel has slave input. The problem is
that it is almost impossible to know which shirt or candy bar or chair carries
slavery into your home. The criminals using slaves sell their produce into the
market like everybody else, and it flows into the global commodities market and
mixes with goods from free workers.52
Thus it is often difficult or nearly impossible for consumers to know if and when they
consume products such as these that are actually sourced by slave labor somewhere in
their supply chains. The blood, sweat, and tears of slaves is mixed into the global
economy and we are the unwitting purchasers. But what we can know with confidence is
that we are undeniably linked to those who make the products we consume, and at least
some portion of those products is made for us by slaves.
You may wonder how this is even possible. How can we unknowingly purchase
products made by slaves? Bales, Trodd, and Williamson explain that the globalization of
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the world economy is the primary culprit. For most of history, individual countries
controlled the flow of money across their own borders. However, in the mid-1980’s most
of these border restrictions ended and money began flying freely around the globe.
Businesses could move at will when they could make things more cheaply elsewhere, and
as money and businesses moved freely, governments lost control over their operations.53
The most unfortunate side effect of globalization is the resulting ease with which slavery
thrives and its profits proliferate. “With the financial systems of globalization, without
labor market regulation, slave profits flow smoothly across national borders and
governments find it very difficult, if not impossible, to stop the flow of this money.”54
This tangled web of modern slavery across borders is illustrated in the following passage:
Slavery’s flows are merging and crossing. In Brazil, slaves are “recruited” in
densely populated, economically depressed regions and then shipped over 1000
miles to the forests where they make charcoal. The charcoal, in turn, is shipped
another 1000 miles for use in steel mills. The resulting steel is sold to Canada and
the US. The European Union imports nearly a million tonnes of Brazilian steel
each year to produce everything from cars to buildings to toys. Women are
trafficked from Burma or Laos for use in brothels in Thailand, Japan, or Europe.
Capital from Hong Kong funds the brothels of Thailand and investment from
Europe supports the charcoal operations of Brazil…The phenomenon of
globalization means that the goods we buy are increasingly assembled in different
parts of the world, using components from all over the world. There are numerous
steps and parts that go into making a product and slavery can creep into any one
of them.55
Close scrutiny of the entire supply chain of a product, from the growth and harvesting of
raw materials, through multiple steps of production and manufacture and shipping, until it
reaches a consumer hundreds or thousands of miles away, is imperative in order to be
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assured that consumer products are not tainted by slavery.56 Unfortunately, this level of
transparency is often not available, and even if it is we often do not take the time and
effort to research such processes. As policy professor and transnational crime expert
Louise Shelley explains,
Many of the world’s citizens would never buy illegal drugs or smuggled weapons,
but consumers will use the products produced by trafficking victims without
thinking about why they are available at such an affordable price. Instead, they
are satisfied to have found a well-priced good in a global competitive economy.
They will unknowingly buy clothes produced by the sweatshops where trafficked
workers are employed, any buy the fruits and vegetables harvested by trafficked
agricultural workers. Increasingly accustomed to the benefits of a consumer
society, they will eat in restaurants where trafficked laborers are employed.57
B. Sex Consumerism and Slavery
1. The demand for sex. Thus far, my focus has been on the links between the
demand for cheap consumer goods and slavery, especially focusing on the convoluted
steps of supply chains and the likelihood that slave labor is mixed into many products we
routinely buy and use. But physical goods are not the only things routinely consumed at
the expense of slaves. Throughout the globe, the consumption of sex and sexual services
plays a major role in the enslavement of millions.58
Forcing women and children (and sometimes men) into slavery for the purpose of
sexual exploitation only happens because there is a demand for such services, the
fulfillment of which proves to be very lucrative for those willing to engage in such
exploitation.59 While it is true that trafficking (the movement of people) only accounts
56
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for a relatively small percentage of people who are enslaved, a majority of the people
who are trafficked are done so for use in the sex industry.60 The trafficking of people, and
their subsequent enslavement, “…is an economic activity in which organizations try to
make profits...Traffickers will only sell persons for sexual exploitation when market
conditions make it profitable.”61 This highlights the point that sexual slavery would not
exist were there not a demand for such services, and were their fulfillment not profitable.
Shelley points out that traffickers choose to trade in human beings “because there are low
start-up costs, minimal risks, high profits, and large demand.”62
We have already discussed why the supply of potential slaves is so great by
pointing out the links between population, poverty, vulnerability, and slavery. We have
also discussed the reasons that many women and children especially are either coerced or
sent into slavery, and why they remain trapped there. Phony contracts, fraudulent and
fabricated debts, broken promises of jobs or educational opportunities, withheld
documents, and physical and mental violence are just some of the factors contributing to
the sexual enslavement of these vulnerable individuals.63 But again, having a large pool
of potential victims does not ensure enslavement if there is no demand for their services.
We must examine why there is such a demand for available sex slaves.
First, the availability of so many slaves is an obvious advantage for brothelbusinesses. When the owners of brothels are able to pay their “workers” relatively
nothing, this drastically increases their own profit potentials. As Kara states, “…it did not
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take long for those in the sex industry to deduce that they could vastly increase profits by
capitalizing on the desperation and vulnerability of dislocated women and children.”64
Second, the general drop in the price of slaves does not only apply to those used
for labor. Because slaves are cheap and plentiful, the price for a paid sexual experience
has also dropped in the past decades, resulting in an increased demand for such services.
Brothel owners learned that they could “expand the potential market for their product –
sex with a human female or child – by lowering the retail price of that product.”65 The
result is that as the price of sex drops, more men can afford to buy it, or to buy it more
often.66 As Kara further states,
In most red-light districts I visited, I procured tangible evidence that the average
price of a sex act was decreasing over time as a direct result of the increased use
of slaves. These decreasing prices opened the market to low-wage consumers,
such as day laborers and tuk-tuk (rickshaw) drivers. Such men could not
previously afford sex with a prostitute, but as prices in some parts of Asia and
Europe dropped by half, new consumers entered the market, and traditional
consumers returned more often.67
Kara also points out that there has always been a demand from a small percentage
of the male population for paid sex services which in turn supports a commercial sex
industry. The current reality, though, is that the commercial sex industry today is
increasingly comprised of slaves, and consequently is also available for exploitation by a
larger portion of the population.68 Shelley sums up Kara’s sentiments in the following
way:
Men who purchase sexual services rarely think about the prostitutes with whom
they have sexual relations. Instead, they happily hire the services of a younger
woman who is compliant and affordable without thinking of why these services
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are so accessible. Sex slavery today, according to one financial analyst, has made
sex services more available than a decade ago and thereby has increased the
demand.69
2. Sex tourism. One indication of the insatiable demand for commercial sex is the
existence of an entire industry centered around sex tourism. According to one article,
tourism (in general) is the world’s largest industry. Furthermore, in some places such as
Thailand, the main purpose that many people have for traveling there is to patronize the
commercial sex industry. In fact, 70 percent of the tourists to Thailand are men traveling
alone, and this figure rises as high as 90 percent in areas specifically known for their sex
tourism opportunities.70 Most of these travelers are from developed regions such as North
America, Western Europe, Australia, Japan, and wealthy Arab countries, and they have
enough vacation time and disposable income to fund such trips and to pay for the
fulfillment of their wildest sexual fantasies, including those involving children.71
One can easily find a plethora of information about how to partake of such
activities from the ever-so-generous patrons who have traveled to partake and returned to
recount their adventures. Numerous internet sex diaries and websites targeted at
dispensing advice to fellow sex tourists are just one Google search away.72 Bishop and
Robinson record the recommendations of one patron as written in a 1994 entry in the
Internet’s World Sex Guide:
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If you want the best blow job in the world, say so . . . [The manager]’ll tell you
which girls specialize in the field. If you want anal, say so. If you want to watch
two or three girls making love to each other and then join in, say so. Be specific
and graphic: they've heard it all before, and will direct you toward the right girl(s)
. . . [In the room, after the bath and body massage,] you'll dry off, move to the
bed, and do whatever it was you paid to do. It's all very leisurely; you've got two
hours to play. On occasion . . . a girl might possess some extremely powerful Thai
stick, and will ask you to join her in a smoke. It's up to you, but if you don’t you
can be sure she'll have had a better time than you (and have blotted you
completely out in the process). Whatever, almost without exception in my
experience, these girls are very, very good at what they do. That said, it would be
well to remember that what these girls "do " . . . is not what they "are." Often,
they are quite funny and bright. Even if not, if you never cease to remember that
they are, before anything else, human beings with human feelings, chances are
good you'll truly enjoy yourself, and you will have made her life, for a moment, at
least, not as completely horrible as it might have been.73
While the focus of all sex tourism is not the sexual exploitation of children, one
cannot deny that for some such consumers the prospect of sex with children is an
especially enticing lure. The United States Department of Justice refers to this as the
“extraterritorial sexual exploitation of children,”74 and defines it the following way:
The extraterritorial sexual exploitation of children is the act of traveling to a
foreign country and engaging in sexual activity with a child in that country.
Federal law prohibits an American citizen or resident to travel to a foreign
country with intent to engage in any form of sexual conduct with a minor (defined
as persons under 18 years of age). It is also illegal to help organize or assist
another person to travel for these purposes. This crime is a form of human
trafficking, also referred to as child sex tourism. Convicted offenders face fines
and up to 30 years of imprisonment.75
Despite such risks that may be associated with engaging in sex tourism, specifically with
children, some men still choose to engage in these activities. One reason is because they
enjoy the anonymity they experience in a foreign land.76 They feel safe and uninhibited,
and unless they get caught, they can operate under the mantra, “What happens in
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Thailand (or the Philippines, or Eastern Europe, or India, etcetera) stays there.” This draw
of sex tourism, of course, is not to the exclusion of the demand for sex with children
among the locals as well.77 As Batstone points out, “…the sex trade has raised the
demand for slave children, and the impoverished masses generate the supply.”78
2. Considering prostitution – is it free or coerced? One proposed solution to the
problem of forced sexual exploitation, including human trafficking for the purpose of
sexual exploitation, is the move by some to decriminalize (i.e. legalize) prostitution.79 In
fact, there are essentially three options when it comes to the legal status of prostitution.
Option one includes the complete and total criminalization of prostitution. On this model,
both the buying and selling of sex is illegal. This is the current model adopted by the
United States of America under the belief that an especially effective way to fight sex
trafficking and forced sexual exploitation is to make prostitution illegal.80
Option two includes the criminalization of buying sex, and the decriminalization
of selling sex. This means that it is illegal to buy sex, but not to sell it; the buyers can be
prosecuted, but the sellers cannot. This is the current model in Sweden and Norway.81
The idea is that this shifts the balance of power away from the buyers (who act illegally
when buying sex) and toward the sex workers (who act legally in selling sex, and can
therefore speak out if they are mistreated or hurt).82 It attempts to protect the victims of
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the commercial sex industry instead of criminalizing them, while working to sway the
balance of power in their direction.
Option three includes the total decriminalization of prostitution, making it
completely legal to both buy and sell sex. Neither party is breaking the law by engaging
in sex-for-pay. This is the current Dutch and German model, as well as the model used in
New Zealand and parts of Australia, among other countries.83 For instance, prostitution in
Amsterdam (Netherlands) is legal, and those who work as prostitutes are viewed as
“independent entrepreneurs.” Legal prostitution is regulated and taxed in an attempt to
combat forced prostitution and human trafficking for sexual exploitation.84 The general
argument for fully legalizing prostitution is summed up in a 2004 article from The
Economist, which claims, “Criminalisation forces prostitution into the underworld.
Legalisation would bring it into the open, where abuses such as trafficking and under-age
prostitution can be more easily tackled. Brothels would develop reputations worth
protecting.”85
The question looming large is whether or not decriminalizing prostitution actually
does have this ameliorating effect on human trafficking for sexual exploitation. Is it really
the case that human trafficking and forced sexual exploitation diminish when prostitution
is legalized? Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer assert the existence of two competing effects
that must be examined in order to answer this question - the substitution effect and the
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scale effect - and they analyze which effect dominates the other.86 The substitution effect
exists when legal sex workers are favored over illegal workers, empowering local women
(and men) who wish to engage in legal sex work, but who are not interested in
participating in an illegal industry. This should supposedly lead to a decrease in
illegal/trafficked/forced sex workers, and is what we hope will happen if we legalize
prostitution. The second effect, the scale effect, explains that when prostitution is
legalized, the market for commercial sex services expands, requiring a greater number of
sex workers to meet the demand.87 The question, then, is which effect is greater? Are
there enough workers supplied by the substitution effect to meet the demands of the scale
effect?
What Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer conclude is that the expansion of the market
(i.e. the increased demand for commercial sex in places where it is legalized) makes it
such that so many sex workers are needed that there is, in fact, no decrease in illegal sex
workers. To the contrary, often times there is an increase in both legal (free) sex workers
and illegal (slave) sex workers, and the illegal sex workers (i.e. trafficked people) are
necessary to keep up with the demands of the market. The ugly truth is that the scale
effect dominates the substitution effect, and that “countries with legalized prostitution
have a statistically significantly larger reported incidence of human trafficking
inflows.”88
One study concludes: “…we find that the trafficking of women for commercial
sexual exploitation is least prevalent in countries where prostitution is illegal, most
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prevalent in countries where prostitution is legalized, and in between in those countries
where prostitution is legal but procuring illegal.”89 Another study commissioned by the
European Parliament investigated 11 significant member states of the European Union,
including the Netherlands, in an attempt to identify links between the level of legality of
prostitution in those states and the prevalence of human trafficking for sexual
exploitation. While this is a complicated and multi-faceted study that does not claim
concrete results, the study does note increases in human trafficking statistics following
the Dutch legalization of prostitution in 2000, and also notes that an extremely high
percentage of Dutch prostitutes are not Dutch at all, but rather come (against their will)
from numerous other countries, most notably Eastern European and African countries.90
In further support of this conclusion, Farley states the following:
Evidence supports the theory that legal prostitution is associated with increased
trafficking. Traffickers and pimps can easily operate with impunity when
prostitution is legal…Wherever prostitution is legalized, trafficking to sex
industry marketplaces in that region increases…After prostitution was legalized in
Germany and the Netherlands, the numbers of trafficked women increased
dramatically. Today, 80% of all women in German and Dutch prostitution are
trafficked.91
Prostitution was legalized in New Zealand in 2003.92 In 2008, Debbie Baker, who
runs an organization which provides support services for people in prostitution who wish
to leave, noted the negative effects of New Zealand's decriminalization of prostitution.
We have also seen a marked increase in men cruising the streets trying to buy sex.
Although the numbers vary from day to day, it appears to us that overall, the
number of men buyers has doubled since decriminalization. We as a team have
been solicited by men while working with our clients on the street. Before
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decriminalisation this had not happened. These solicitations of the Streetreach
staff occurred both in the street and also in massage parlours. The staff at
Streetreach believe that the clients of prostitutes who are trying to pick up women
have generally become more open and forthright.93
It is also important to consider the impact that prostitution in general (and
legalizing prostitution specifically) has on children. Sex with children is always coerced
and illegal. Yet, the scale effect dominating the decriminalization of the commercial sex
industry extends to the demand for and sexual exploitation of children. Only three years
after prostitution was legalized in New Zealand, Aukland lawyer David Garrett “declared
decriminalization a ‘disaster’ that had resulted in an ‘explosion’ of children trafficked for
prostitution in Auckland and Christchurch,” and he reported that the overall trafficking of
children in New Zealand increased following decriminalization, “especially the
trafficking of ethnic minority Maori children.”94
Former child victim Rachel Lloyd, who “worked” while underage in Germany’s
legal sex industry, reports that most of the girls who worked with her were underage
immigrants with histories of trauma and abuse prior to their exploitation in the
commercial sex industry.95 She affirms that legalizing prostitution has adverse effects on
marginalized populations, including children. She states,
The presence of an adult sex industry increases both the rates of child sexual
exploitation and trafficking. It may be true that some women in commercial sex
exercised some level of informed choice, had other options to entering and have
no histories of familial trauma, neglect or sexual abuse. But, these women are the
minority and don’t represent the overwhelming majority of women, girls, boys
and transgender youth, for whom the sex industry isn’t about choice but lack of
choice. The argument that legalizing prostitution makes it safer for women just
hasn’t been borne out in countries implementing full legalization. In fact,
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legalization has spurred traffickers to recruit children and marginalized women to
meet demand. Amsterdam, long touted as the model, recently started recognizing
rates of trafficking into the country have increased and is beginning to address the
enormous hub of trafficking and exploitation that it's created.96
Some estimates claim that there are nearly two million children exploited in the
global commercial sex trade,97 while others fear that the actual situation is much worse.98
Additionally, there are specific and extremely lucrative markets selling the services of
virgins and young girls.99 The following story from Shahnara exhibits many of the
characteristics mentioned thus far (poverty and vulnerability), as well as several of the
modern components of slavery (coercion, fraud, human trafficking, and sex tourism,
maintained through debt bondage), leading to the sexual enslavement of children.
I was twelve when my mother died. My father and my uncle had been using drugs
for many years. Soon my father was imprisoned; I do not know for what offense.
My uncle sold everything in our house to buy drugs. When I was thirteen he
forced me out on the street. I was living in the streets, sleeping under benches in
the park. He told me to sell myself if I was not able to find money any other way.
I went to the police and they sent me to Vartashen orphanage. Once my classmate
told me that there was a woman in her neighborhood helping pretty young girls to
go to Germany to work for a fashion magazine. I could not believe it. I was so
happy. Later the woman told me that after she had arranged documents for me
and the other persons we would travel together to Germany…There were fourteen
of us, girls of different ages between thirteen and twenty-three. We went by taxi
to Tbilisi. From there we traveled to Moscow and from Moscow to Dubai, as we
found out later. The woman who had recruited me had twenty-seven children
employed, mostly from orphanages or from the streets. She deals in this business
for twelve years already. The hell I lived through at home continued in Dubai.
They placed us in a hotel. They had special interest in young virgins. They were
selling them at enormous prices to rich Arab sheikhs for one night, after which
they were working with clients like other ordinary girls…My friend who was
thirteen was taken to a wealthy man…Two days later they took us to a night club
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and explained the nature of our work and the amount that we should pay them
every day. They explained that they had paid a lot of money for our passports and
travel, in total $6,000 for permission to fly and tickets. They were also paying for
our room and food. Almost all the children were crying. They could not
understand what was expected from them and how they were going to do it. The
Arab partner of our pimp was getting angry when he was not getting the amount
of money they were expecting us to provide. He was beating children with a belt
and was very violent. I was also crying at the very beginning, but what could I
do? Sometimes there were rich businessmen who hired us every time they came
to Dubai…After nights of work we were getting so tired that we could not do
anything else but sleep…When our visas expired we traveled with our pimp to
Iran to extend visas. We stayed there for no more than two hours. Our passports
were usually given to us at the airport and taken away after passport control. We
could not run away or complain to the police since they assured us that they were
bribed…100
The general point here is that the mere existence of prostitution promotes
commercial sexual exploitation, and the outright acceptance of prostitution increases
even more the demand for sex services and the presence of a commercial sex industry,
which in turn increases the numbers of slaves (both adults and children) who are
exploited in that industry. The reality is that the existence of legalized prostitution
actually increases the overall demand and the need for trafficked victims. In the
commercial sex industry, some workers are free, many more are coerced or forced, and it
is often difficult or impossible for the consumer to tell the difference.
3. The problem of pornography. One obvious means of consuming sex, which
implicates a much larger portion of the general population than does buying sex in a
brothel or engaging in sex tourism, includes the consumption of pornography. The
American Psychological Association puts porn consumption rates at 50 percent to 99
percent among [U.S.] men, and 30 percent to 86 percent among [U.S.] women.101

100

Bales and Trodd, Plead Our Own Cause, 127-128.
Kristen Weir, “Is Pornography Addictive?” Monitor on Psychology 45, no. 4 (2014), accessed April 5,
2018, http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/04/pornography.aspx.
101

159

Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest direct links between pornography and sex
slavery. One author suggests:
In some parts of the world, centers of trafficking are also centers for the
production of pornography. An example is St. Petersburg, where representatives
from NGOs report that they have heard of many cases of women being forced to
make pornography. Many of the women in prostitution in St. Petersburg have also
been used to make pornography. They say the police will take complaints about
the production of pornography only if children are used. Budapest, Hungary is a
destination and transit city for women trafficked from central and eastern Europe.
Budapest has also become the pornography production capital of Europe.
American and European pornography producers moved to Budapest because of
the cheap, available victims.102
And even if the pornography consumed by some individuals does not directly support
slavery (for instance, the actors are not themselves slaves), the pornography industry
itself may directly and indirectly encourage practices that have been known to lead to sex
trafficking and sex slavery.
One organization that seeks to help people break addictions to pornography points
out that society at large sees sex trafficking as a problem that we should fight, while
simultaneously overlooking pornography “as simply another genre of entertainment. This
dichotomy between sex trafficking and the realities of pornography is a serious
misconception that needs to be addressed.”103 Such a claim leads us to ask an obvious
question – What are some potential ways that commercial sexual exploitation (including
human trafficking) and pornography are linked?
One potential link between pornography and sex slavery is that pornography
drives up the demand for bought sex, and is the “primary gateway to the purchase of

102

Hughes, 26.
Ana Stutler, “The Connections Between Pornography and Sex Trafficking,” Covenant Eyes, September
7, 2011, accessed April 12, 2018, http://www.covenanteyes.com/2011/09/07/the-connections-betweenpornography-and-sex-trafficking/#_edn4.
103

160

humans for commercial sex.”104 Pornography and sex slavery are both part of the
commercial sex industry. As such, they easily become intertwined. Harvard Law
professor Catharine MacKinnon argues that “[c]onsuming pornography is an experience
of bought sex,”105 and claims “that the sexually used are transported on paper or celluloid
or digitally may make the transaction seem more distanced, but it is no less real a
commercial act of sex for any of the people involved.”106 Pornography stimulates the
demand for purchasing future sex acts.107 Furthermore, viewing pornography “creates a
drug-like addiction which distorts the individual’s view on sexuality,” which sometimes
results in seeking more explicit and violent content.108 As MacKinnon reports,
“Pornography is documented to create demand for specific acts, including dangerous and
demeaning ones inflicted on prostituted people, as well as for bought sex in general…the
more men use pornography, the more they use prostitutes.”109 And I would add here, as
we have previously established, that many prostitutes in the commercial sex industry are
slaves. So pornography fuels the demand for sex consumption, which fuels the demand
for sex slaves.
A second potential link between pornography and sex slavery, which is mentioned
above in the quote from Donna M. Hughes, is that many of the people exploited in the
actual production of pornography are trafficked victims, or slaves.110 This, of course,
includes children as well as adults.
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Child pornography is, by most accounts, a multi-billion-dollar global enterprise.
In Germany alone, estimated sales of child porn exceed $250 million, with the
number of consumers ranging from 30,000 to 40,000. The biggest market for
child pornography is in the United States, where an estimated $6 billion is
generated annually. Eighty-five percent of the worldwide sales of child
pornography comes from America. Each year, an estimated 30,000 children are
sexually exploited by child pornographers in Los Angeles alone.111
One brave survivor, Christine Stark, was born into sexual slavery in Minnesota (USA).
She was born into a family of pimps, pornographers, and prostitutes. As Christine recalls,
“The men pimped the women and girls and sometimes the boys. They made
pornography. They sold us in whorehouses and at live sex shows. The men used me in
pornography in basements, barns, houses, warehouses, isolated wooded areas, and public
buildings.”112
The tangled truth is that pornography and prostitution (both of which rely on
slaves to meet their demands) are inextricably woven together. Pornography is supplydriven, meaning that “[m]en do not want it until they see it. The more they see it, the
more they want it.” Furthermore, prostitution is demand-driven, meaning that “[w]omen
[and children] are in prostitution because men want to use them that way…”113 And as
we can now see, often times the pornography consumed by many is made by slaves, and
it encourages the continued exploitation – both through consuming more pornography
and through buying actual sex from prostituted people – of many victims who are
exploited in the multi-billion dollar commercial sex industry.
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C. The Demands on Commutative Justice on Behalf of Slaves
1. Recapping the scope of commutative justice. By way of a quick reminder,
commutative justice concerns assuring that people treat those with whom they have
relationships in ways that are fitting and fair, and considers the whole of human
interactions to determine what justice requires of us as we live intersecting lives in a
shared world.114 This includes, but is not limited to, taking corrective/restorative actions
when we have participated in the harming of others.
We have also already discussed that of central importance in our understanding of
commutative justice is our understanding of whom to count when we evaluate our duties
and obligations in justice toward our ‘neighbors’. I argued in Chapter Four that
individuals have duties/responsibilities in commutative justice both to other individuals
and groups, and both to ascertained and unascertained peoples. Thus, our ‘neighbors’ are
not only those people whom we find proximally close to us, and with whom we share
close relational ties, but also many others with whom we share social structures and
global ties. It is not necessary for us to know each of our ‘neighbors’ specifically in order
for us to bear certain responsibilities in commutative justice toward them. This leads us to
the main purpose of our discussion, which includes exploring how many (if not most or
all) of us fail in our duties of commutative justice in relation to the millions of enslaved
people both in our own neighborhoods and around the world.
2. When we find guilt and fault. In Chapter Four, I drew a distinction between
instances in which individuals are at fault or guilty for injustices, and instances in which
they may be responsible in some sense but are not guilty of wrongdoing. It is often times
fairly easy to point out instances in which this category of guilt and fault applies to
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modern slavery. The most clear-cut case of this would be a slave-owner/slaveholder/human trafficker/pimp/etcetera who holds the power of ownership over another
person or group of people. The individuals and criminal networks that sustain, perpetuate,
and reap the benefits of the modern slave trade are most definitely in violation of the
requirements of commutative justice, and are plainly guilty of injustice. Furthermore,
when these people are caught, they should be obligated to take steps toward restoration,
retribution, and reconciliation for those they have enslaved.
In Chapter Four I also pointed out that whether or not an agent is morally
blameworthy may depend upon the intentions, motives, and consequences of his
actions.115 I appealed to Joel Feinberg, who asserts that someone may commit intentional
wrongdoing if he (a) “acts with a wrongful conscious objective” or (b) “knowingly
produces a forbidden result even incidentally as a kind of side-effect of his effort to
achieve his objective.”116 Those who enslave or trade in human beings commit
intentional wrongdoing. They either act in full knowledge of their conscious objectives
(i.e. they specifically enslave others, perhaps in order to assert their power or dominance
or to attain a position of prestige), or they knowingly and willingly engage in some
activity or enterprise with the full understanding that it will require or produce the
enslavement of human beings (i.e. they willingly enslave in order to accomplish their
objectives, such as the ability to produce cheap goods in a competitive market, or the
ability to make easy money through the forced sexual exploitation of others). In such
instances, the ascription of blame or fault results in guilt on behalf of the actor/agent(s).
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Another somewhat straight-forward case of guilt and moral responsibility for
violations of commutative justice involves the willing consumption of services offered
through the commercial sex industry. In the previous section I explained the reality that
the commercial sex industry, including the prostitution and pornography industries,
drives the demand for commercial sex services, which results in a great deal of forced
sexual exploitation (i.e. slavery) within these industries to meet this demand.
If Farley’s numbers are correct and 80% of German and Dutch prostitutes are
trafficking victims, then it follows that anyone who pays for commercial sex acts from
prostitutes in these countries is very likely paying for sex with slaves. And this truth can
be expanded to apply to the commercial sex industry outside of Germany and the
Netherlands as well. While the people utilizing these services may not be specifically
aware if and when they are having sex with slaves, engaging in the services offered by
the commercial sex industry inevitably includes accepting the risk that when you pay for
sex, or when you view pornography, you are actively participating in the forced sexual
slavery of innocent victims. In such instances, you are guilty of violating your duties and
obligations in commutative justice toward these ‘neighbors’ whom you exploit for your
own sexual gratification. And even if the bought sex consumed by some individuals does
not directly support slavery (i.e. the prostitutes or pornography actors are not themselves
slaves), the industry itself may directly and indirectly encourage practices that have been
known to lead to sex trafficking and sex slavery. Thus, by extension if you support the
commercial sex industry, you are likely both guilty and morally responsible for
supporting modern slavery.
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As regards the link between consumerism and slavery that was mentioned above,
it becomes much more difficult to ascribe guilt and fault, especially to individuals, for
injustices that are largely the result of social and economic structures. Of course in
instances where a consumer has very strong evidence that she is directly purchasing
slave-made goods, it might be possible to ascribe such blame and guilt. For instance if a
consumer were to visit a rug factory where children are forced to work the looms, and
then purchase a rug from that factory, then we could more easily ascribe guilt for her
action. But this is hardly ever the case when it comes to the relationships between
consumers and the slaves who make their goods. Consumers are rarely aware of the
histories of the products they buy, and even if they want to trace the supply chains of
their purchases this is often difficult or impossible. However, as we discussed in Chapter
Four, the absence of guilt and fault and moral blameworthiness does not necessarily mean
that an individual or a group of people carries no responsibility for pursuing commutative
justice, or no obligation to take steps toward reconciliation for the victims who suffer
such injustices.
3. Responsibility without guilt or fault. In Chapter Four, we discussed the
possibility that sometimes people can be held responsible for harmful actions they
perform, but assigning responsibility for such actions does not necessitate a judgment of
moral blameworthiness. People can be responsible for contributing to injustice without
being guilty of engaging in morally wrong actions. The paradigm case of this involves
what Iris Marion Young deems “structural injustice.” I will again recount her view as
follows:
Structural injustice, then, exists when social processes put large groups of persons
under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and
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exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to
dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising
capacities available to them. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct
from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a
state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and
institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part
within the limits of accepted rules and norms.117
Unfortunately, our modern consumer system often produces a perfect example of
structural injustice. One group of people is grossly deprived and desperate to meet their
own fundamental needs, while another group of people economically benefits from this
state of affairs through the existence of accepted social, economic, and legal norms. Or to
make things more concrete, desperate people become trapped in slavery through force,
fraud, or coercion, and other more privileged people benefit from a world in which these
desperate people are used as free labor to produce cheap goods for consumers like many
of us, myself included.
The question then remains – to what extent am I (or are many of us) implicated by
this structural injustice? Speaking for myself, I do not own or control slaves, I do not visit
brothels or view pornography, and I have no desire to support a system of slavery through
my consumer habits. Nevertheless, I cannot escape the reality that when I purchase
consumer products, some of them are inevitably made in part or whole by slaves.
It is perhaps helpful to remind ourselves here of Hannah Arendt’s belief that guilt
and blame cannot be applied to entire groups or collectives, but rather only specific deeds
can be assessed as guilt inducing.118 Consequently, she does not believe that all German
citizens were “guilty by association” of Nazi crimes. However, she does believe that
many average German citizens, although not guilty of killing Jews and others,
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nevertheless bore some responsibility for the atrocities committed all around them by the
Nazi regime.119 As I explained in Chapter Four, these people often did things (e.g. blindly
followed orders), or failed to do things (e.g. failed to investigate suspicions activities, or
failed to stand up to evil leaders, etcetera), that indirectly contributed to the enactment of
crimes or wrongs, and thus these people bore some responsibility for the consequences of
those wrongs. But according to Arendt’s view, only a relatively small number of people
under the Nazi regime were both responsible and guilty. Nevertheless, many people
shared responsibility without guilt.120
This provides a helpful lens for us to look at cases of structural injustice which
result in the slavery of some for the benefit of others (many who are unwitting or
unwilling participants). Perhaps it is the case that many of us are like those average
German citizens. Often times we are not fully or even partially aware of the slavesustaining structures operating around us. Furthermore, if we do know about these
structures, we may feel completely powerless to do anything to change these systems.
After all, I conjecture that only a minute portion of the population really understands the
intricacies of global trade structures, or the inter-workings of supply chain economics, or
the political maneuvers of corrupt governments and law enforcement agencies. Yet these
are some of the big-picture contributors to the unjust structures that support slavery.
Furthermore, we often have no idea how to go about opposing such systems, and we
question whether or not we possess any power at all to be agents of change.
But remember, even though the average German citizens during Nazi occupation
were not actively involved in the injustices committed against millions of people, and
119
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therefore under Arendt’s view they were not guilty of wrongdoing, they still bore
responsibility in some sense for the injustices committed on their watch and in their
name. And when it comes to the present-day global economic system, many of us are
similarly implicated. Most of us are not guilty of committing injustice, but we bear some
responsibility for injustice, because it is our consumer activity in conjunction with the
consumer activities of numerous others that drives the demand for cheap, plentiful goods.
In order to meet this demand, millions of people are enslaved. As David Batstone
explains,
Like any other commercial market, the slave trade is driven by the dynamics of
supply and demand…slaveholders can compete successfully in almost any
market. The profit margins will rise as high as the demand will bear. We may not
even realize how each of us drives the demand during the course of a normal day.
Kevin Bales expresses well those commercial connections: “Slaves in Pakistan
may have made the shoes you are wearing and the carpet you stand on. Slaves in
the Caribbean may have put sugar in your kitchen and toys in the hands of your
children. In India they may have sewn the shirt on your back and polished the ring
on your finger.”121
This being the case, and since the most basic aspect of commutative justice
involves determining what is “fitting, fair, or just as between the parties”122 in numerous
relationships, we can see how acting as a consumer in a global economic system that
bolsters and supports slavery constitutes a failure of commutative justice. Even though
we often do not know the people at the other end of the supply chain harvesting and
crafting and assembling and transporting the goods we consume, we are still connected to
these people. When our actions harm them, even when we do not intend to harm them,
we bear responsibility for the results of our actions and our failure to fully achieve
commutative justice on their behalf, even though we may not be guilty of wrongdoing or
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of specifically violating the demands of commutative justice. And as MacIntyre explains,
before we determine what we should do in certain circumstances, we must consider in
what stories we find ourselves participants. I appealed to this in Chapter Three, but I will
include it here again as a reminder:
We live out our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other,
in the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future…I can only answer
the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story
or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, with one or
more imputed characters – roles into which we have been drafted – and we have
to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us
and how our responses to them are apt to be construed.123
Whether I like it or not, I play a role in the lives of the slaves who make the
products I consume. I did not ask for the world to be set up this way, but it is a reality I
inherited. And unless I withdraw completely from society, I will inevitably continue to
and participate in the structural injustice of slavery unless and until something is done to
bring about changes. Although I may not be guilty of wrongdoing when my contribution
to slavery is through my participation in inherited structurally unjust systems, I am still
responsible for the role I play. When my actions, even when only in concert with others,
contribute to the harming of my neighbors who are slaves both near and far, I act in ways
that are not fitting, fair, or just, and I thus fail to uphold the demands of commutative
justice.
4. What about correction? Finally, as we discussed in Chapter Four, while
commutative justice is not limited to ensuring that restoration or compensation or
retribution or correction is made when failures occur, this corrective component is a
vitally important piece of commutative justice. In circumstances where a person is at fault
or guilty of committing an injustice, then restitution or restoration is required in most (if
123
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not all) such cases. If someone buys sex from a slave, then he should take steps to restore
that victim (to the extent that restoration of the sexually exploited is even possible). But
in circumstances where a person is responsible in some sense for an injustice but is not
deemed guilty, is correction required?
In Chapter Four, I argued that in such cases, often times there is still an
expectation or a requirement that those responsible for injustice take restorative steps. If I
learn that my consumer habits contribute to the enslavement of others, I should do
something other than just continue on as usual with no thought or care to my neighbors
whose narrative quests intersect with my own, and who’s lives my life impacts. Part of
favoring and fostering the common good includes caring for those with whom I have
relationships. Those who produce the goods I consume are others with whom I have
relationships. If I know that my life and decisions and habits harm them, but I make no
attempts to mitigate that harm or to restore their lives, then I can be said to violate
commutative justice and to be not only responsible, but guilty of injustice. Consider the
example from Chapter Four in which I lose control of my car after hitting an oddly placed
construction cone, subsequently side-swiping another car. While I am responsible for the
consequences of this unfortunate event, I am not initially guilty of committing an
injustice against the other car owner. However, I am responsible to compensate the owner
of the car I sideswiped, and if I fail to provide this restitution then I am considered guilty
of violating the demands of commutative justice. The initial accident was not guilt
inducing (although it was responsibility inducing), but my failure to restore the victim is
guilt inducing.
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Given the importance of our actions and responses in relation to the demands of
both distributive and commutative justice, we should rightly be concerned with the
question, “But what must I do?” What practical steps can and should I take to work
toward restoration for these oppressed neighbors? Practically working toward fighting the
unjust distributions and structural injustices that lead to slavery, and providing healing
and restoration for victims of modern slavery will be the topic of our next and final
chapter.
IV. Conclusion
The goal of this chapter has been to bring together what was explained in Chapter
Two regarding the reality of modern slavery with the ideas of distributive justice from
Chapter Three and commutative justice from Chapter Four. I have argued that the
existence of modern slavery exemplifies failures of both forms of justice. Unjust
distributions of resources and opportunities leads to poverty, which is a major contributor
to the desperation and vulnerability that results in millions of people becoming enslaved.
Unjust relational arrangements result in the exploitation of numerous ‘neighbors’. These
unjust relationships can be direct, such as between a pimp and a sex slave, or they can be
indirect, such as between consumers and the slaves producing certain goods.
The bottom line is that the existence of slavery represents grave failures of both
distributive and commutative justice. Our responsibility to favor and foster the common
good of others, and to consider those with whom our lives intersect and impact, pushes us
forward in the hope that we can bring about positive changes and greater justice for the
millions of enslaved people around the world. The reality of their lives is not okay. We
should not be okay with their slavery. And we should not be okay with the ways in which
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we contribute to their slavery. David Batstone sums these ideas up beautifully in the
following way: “Powerful forces aim to turn human beings into commodities that can be
bought and sold like any other piece of property. To declare ‘Not for sale’ affirms that
every person has the inalienable right to be free, to pursue a God-given destiny.”124
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: A PRACTICAL RESPONSE TO
MODERN SLAVERY – APPLICATION AND ACTION
I. What are We to Do?
A. Discharging “Wide Duties”
I have promised at several points throughout the preceding chapters that I would
ultimately answer the practical question, “What are we obligated to do to help modern
slaves?” As a person who cares deeply about the plight of slaves in our world, and who
also hopes and wishes to fulfill the demands that justice (both distributive and
commutative) place upon my own life, I would never commit to undertake a project such
as this one without culminating in a discussion of what justice requires we actually do on
behalf of the world’s modern slaves.
The realization that there are likely 45 million (or more) slaves in the world
today,1 coupled with an understanding that the distribution of common resources and the
varied relationships we share with multiple ‘neighbors’ serve to unfairly advantage many
of us while unfairly disadvantaging millions of others, should rightly cause us to question
what changes we may be required to make in the name of justice for the benefit of slaves.
We have continued to come back again and again to Alasdair MacIntyre’s picture of
numerous people pursuing their own narrative quests while also intersecting and
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impacting the quests of each other.2 We cannot deny that the decisions we make in our
own lives impact the lives of countless others, both near and far. Justice requires
practically reasonable people to favor and foster the common good of those in our various
communities, and to always act with consideration of how our decisions affect those
around us. However, while we may wish for a list of definitive “dos and don’ts” when it
comes to satisfying the demands justice places on us in regards to our neighbors who are
slaves, things are not usually that straightforward.
But this lack of prescriptive instruction does not have to be crippling and
overwhelming. On the contrary it may actually be freeing. In Chapter Three, I mentioned
Sarah Clark Miller’s view that the duty to provide care for those whose fundamental
needs are unmet is a “wide duty,” allowing for variety in the caring responses of moral
agents who assume the caregiver role. The general duty of care involves responding to
the fundamental needs of others, but it does not prescribe specific ways in which agents
are to respond in order to fulfill their obligations.3 Caregivers can have freedom to
respond to needs in a plethora of ways, as long as they are careful to preserve the dignity
and agency of those in need.4
John Finnis, in his discussion of the reasons it is right and good to allocate
common stock resources to individuals, explains that the purpose of such allocations is to
ultimately benefit the common good. However, the way that the “owner” of such
allocated resources chooses to put those resources to work is open, and could include a
multitude of different activities or strategies. Finnis explains this as follows:
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But beyond a reasonable measure and degree of such use for them and their
dependants’ or co-owners’ needs, they each hold the remainder of their property
and its fruits as part (in justice if not in law) of the common stock. In other words,
beyond a certain point, what was commonly available but was justly made
private, for the common good, becomes again, in justice, part of the common
stock; although appropriated to management and control by an owner or owners,
items of private property (‘things’) are now not for the owners’ private benefit but
are held by them immediately for common benefit…From this point, owners
have, in justice, duties not altogether unlike those of a trustee in English law.
They may fulfill them in various ways – by investing their surpluses in
production of more goods for later distribution and consumption; by
providing gainful employment to people looking for work; by grants or loans
for hospitals, schools, cultural centres, orphanages, etc., or directly for the
relief of the poor. Where owners will not perform these duties, or cannot
effectively co-ordinate their respective efforts to perform them, then public
authority may rightly help them to perform their duties by devising and
implementing schemes of distribution, e.g. by ‘redistributive’ taxation for
purposes of ‘social welfare’, or by a measure of expropriation.5
In writing about negative duties (i.e. duties to refrain from harming others, which
we linked loosely in Chapter Four with duties of commutative justice), Elizabeth Ashford
believes that when our actions harm others, even when the harm done to them is a result
of our collaborative or cumulative actions, or due to our participation in unjust
institutions, we often cannot know exactly what we must do in response to our own
actions. She thus states:
Fulfillment of the negative duty not to collaborate in unjust institutions requires us
to take actions to support reform of these institutions or so as to minimize the
extent of our collaboration in them, or to provide recompense for the harms they
cause. The nature of this action is no more specified than is the action we should
take to carry out a positive duty of aid. The way in which we support institutional
reform is open, and it is also open which particular harms we should seek to
oppose or compensate for…The duty of individual members is therefore not a
perfect duty with a specific content that can be fully discharged…it is largely
indeterminate how to prevent the right not to be deprived of access to basic
necessities from being violated. The onus is on individual agents to decide how
to implement their share of the corresponding negative duty.6
5

John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 173.
(emphasis added).
6
Elizabeth Ashford, “The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception of the Duties Imposed by Human
Rights,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 19, no.2 (July 2006), 232. (emphasis added).

176

And so, while a few extreme zealots may implore those of us with any surplus to
give until it hurts to those with needs,7 the more prevalent (and perhaps more pragmatic)
approach is to maintain the view just described that holds our duties in distributive justice
and our duties in commutative justice to be wide, imperfect duties, with multiple and
varied ways of addressing and answering their demands. However, this lack of
prescriptive demands does not leave us without numerous suggestions of possible ways
we can go about fighting against slavery and making strides to fulfill our duties and
obligations in both distributive and commutative justice for those in our world who are
slaves.
B. Practical Suggestions – The Multiple Ways to Discharge Our Duties and Fulfill
Our Obligations
1. Collective efforts and institutional reforms. It has likely become clear that
the primary way in which many of us are implicated in modern slavery is through our
participation in certain established systems, and through the combined effects of our
actions in concert with the actions of hundreds, thousand, and perhaps millions of others.
Many of us have not ourselves organized the world in these ways, nor do we like the fact
that we are inevitably connected to the slavery of others. Nevertheless we have inherited
and benefited from structures and systems that favor some privileged global citizens at
the expense of many other marginalized global citizens. When unjust systems and
institutions produce distributive and commutative injustices that result in the slavery of
millions, what should we do about this?
7
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One answer is that we can rally together with others to advocate for changes in
the systems and institutions that support slavery. A collaborative problem can be met
with collaborative solutions. As philosopher Lisa Tessman suggests, “It’s imperative that
we work to eliminate the sources of moral conflicts whenever the conflicts are due to
unjust social, political, or economic structures – that is, whenever they’re due to
something that is within our collective control to change.”8 Thomas Pogge argues that
many of us belong to certain subsets of people who, if we join our collective voices,
could wield our collective power to demand changes in unjust social, political, and
economic structures. He argues that if enough of us make demands of our elected
government officials, for example, they will have no choice but to listen to us.9 For
instance, if we join together to advocate for trade policies that are protective of the most
vulnerable and not merely advantageous for the powerful, our collective voices just might
be heard.10 As Bales and Trodd assert, “…trade policies should reflect the idea that slavemade goods are taboo on the world market. Trade financing can be linked to
demonstrable efforts to remove slavery from local as well as international markets. From
8
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local police to the UN, all can play a part in ending slavery.”11 Many of us have the
ability to advocate for such trade policies.
An example of such a policy is the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act.
Beginning in January 2012, California law required “that certain large companies
disclose to the public the extent of their efforts, if any, to ensure that the goods they sell
are not produced by workers who are enslaved, coerced, or otherwise forced into service
or who have been the victims of human trafficking.”12 This is not a regulatory act, but
rather a law that requires that large companies “disclose their practices in five discrete
areas so that interested consumers can make better informed purchasing decisions.”13
This is obviously a great step toward providing citizens with tools to aid them in
becoming more responsible and ethical consumers. However, it is not enough. The law
only applies to companies that “do business in California, [h]ave annual worldwide gross
receipts exceeding $100 million, and [a]re identified as manufactures or retail sellers on
their California state tax returns.”14 By admission, this law only deals with large
companies doing business in California, leaving unchecked numerous smaller businesses,
as well as numerous businesses operating outside of California. Consumers, therefore,
can advocate for laws similar to this which would apply to smaller companies and
companies that operate in other places. Similarly, in September 2017, the European
Parliament voted in favor of a resolution concerning “the impact of international trade
and the EU policies on global value chains…calling for accountability, responsibility and
11
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transparency in the supply chains of businesses operating in Europe and globally.”15
These examples can pave the way for increased demand on the part of consumers for
supply chain transparency, and we can advocate for more and better laws, resolutions,
and policies like these. This act is an example of a top-down approach to combatting
modern slavery.16
Iris Marion Young points out that the members of a given society have a specific
political responsibility to speak out against injustices and crimes present in the
communities and institutions in which they find themselves. She explains,
This responsibility falls on members of a society by virtue of the fact that they are
aware moral agents who ought not to be indifferent to the fate of others and the
danger that states and other organized institutions often pose to some people. This
responsibility is largely unavoidable in the modern world, because we participate
in and usually benefit from the operation of these institutions. The meaning of
political responsibility is forward-looking. One has the responsibility always now,
in relation to current events and in relations to their future consequences. We are
in a condition of having such political responsibility, and the fact of having it
implies an imperative to take political responsibility. If we see injustices or crimes
being committed by the institutions of which we are a part, or believe that such
crimes are being committed, then we have the responsibility to try to speak out
against them with the intention of mobilizing others to oppose them, and to act
together to transform the institutions to promote better ends…Political
responsibility is not about doing something by myself, however, but about
exhorting others to join me in collective action. When this occurs, and it occurs
relatively infrequently, movement participants are often the most surprised at the
transformative power they turn out to have.17
Furthermore, even when large-scale institutional reforms move at a snails pace,
collaborating together with other groups and private organizations is often the best
chance we have of rescuing slaves in a timely manner. Organizing rescue missions to free
people from slavery is not an activity that most average citizens have the know-how or
15
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even the abilities and resources to do. If I determine this coming weekend to travel to
India and organize and execute my own rescue mission of slaves in Delhi’s red light
district, I will likely be unsuccessful, I quite possibly might make things much worse for
those who are enslaved, and I could end up injured or even dead. Fighting for the
freedom of slaves is not something that can be accomplished on a whim apart from much
time spent strategizing and planning and organizing and imagining multiple possible
scenarios and numerous potential responses.
Kevin Bales points out that since World War II, movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged that deal with issues often neglected
by nation-states and political parties. Universal human rights is one such issue, and of
course slavery stands as a gross violation of established universal human rights.18
Furthermore, the process of globalization has resulted in many NGOs surpassing the
importance and effectiveness of governmental, political, and nation-state structures. As
Bales explains,
The process of globalization has created a fertile context for non-governmental
organizations concerned with human rights. They are not restricted to nation-state
boundaries (except by choice), and most important, their organizing intellectual
paradigms center on moral concepts generalizable to all people. The object of
their work is normally the alteration of a human activity that transcends cultural
boundaries, and their potential market is the world population. Their challenge is
to bring about a public redefinition of their issue as a moral issue, not locally but
globally.19
These organizations are important for several reasons. First, many NGOs are
“grassroots organizations that directly liberate and rehabilitate slaves.”20 They physically
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free slaves, and they are much more effective than governments at “creating
circumstances to ensure that reenslavement is less likely to occur.”21 The rehabilitation
component of rescue is vital. We spoke at length in Chapter Five regarding the social and
economic vulnerability that results in some people becoming enslaved. Those
vulnerability factors do not disappear once a slave is liberated. David Batstone
understands this importance when he points out the following:
Rescuing slaves does not end the moment they are freed from captivity. To
abandon the rescued and expect them to fend for themselves leaves them
vulnerable to falling back into a forced labor relationship with a different owner.
Abolitionists, therefore, must answer the question ‘What next?’ before they rush
into a rescue plan…For the period immediately following a rescue, IJM
[International Justice Mission, a leading anti-slavery NGO] collaborates with a
network of relief partners to provide ex-slaves with shelter, food, emotional
counseling, and protection from vindictive owners…the agency will delay
executing a rescue plan until it has a long-term support structure in place.22
This is part of the reason my rushing off to India to rescue slaves from the red-light
district on my own is foolish. The expertise of grassroots organizations on the ground is
much more effective than my well intentioned yet poorly contemplated zeal. As Bales
states, “Around the world, liberation without rehabilitation has been shown to be
ineffectual and often temporary,”23 and as Batstone points out, “Programs that encourage
girls to escape the sex trade but leave them poor and jobless do not yield long term
success stories.”24
On the other hand, rescue operations that do take into account multiple factors
contributing to enslavement, and which plan for long-term solutions can be extremely
effective. Lake Volta in Ghana is one of the largest lakes in the world. Due to dwindling
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fish stocks and related economic pressures, child slaves were used in virtually all aspects
of the Lake Volta fishing industry. The use of children was seen as an economic necessity
for the struggling industry. The children often suffered severe physical, mental,
emotional, and sexual abuse, and many of them died working. Many of the children
became enslaved when their desperate parents were tricked into sending them away with
promises of future wages (in addition to the advances already paid to their families).
After an NGO sent a researcher to gather data about the problem, its causes, and potential
solutions, a number of local and international agencies became involved. One local
organization began working with the children, and an international organization
associated with the United Nations provided resources and expertise. These
organizations, empowered by a large grant from the U.S. government, began freeing
children, reuniting them with their families, and helping those families to increase their
incomes, thus decreasing their vulnerability and desperation. The organizations also
worked with the fisherman to help them find alternative sources of income in exchange
for promises that they would no longer enslave children. Bales affirms that the rescue of
these children and the transformation of the Lake Volta fishing industry shows that
slavery can be stopped given comprehensive understanding of the problem, collaborative
and comprehensive solutions led by organizations with appropriate skills and knowledge,
and adequate funding. Furthermore, this shows what can happen when local,
international, and government organizations band together. Bales states, “The rescue of
the fishing children shows that real progress can be made when economic alternatives are
developed for both those who would enslave and those who are vulnerable to
enslavement.”25
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In addition to the importance of NGOs in the physical liberation of slaves, they
are also often used to teach, train, research, and help implement laws and policies. While
government officials have to be generalists, caring about multiple issues and voter bases,
NGOs can be specialists, providing expertise on specific human rights issues that
governments and government officials simply do not possess. Moreover, NGOs usually
operate outside political systems, meaning that they are not disrupted by party politics,
elections, and changes in leadership. They can remain stable in the face of political
changes, and they can remain focused on a singular issue of importance, such as
eradicating slavery, even when politicians are juggling a plethora of issues and constantly
evaluating their approval ratings.26 And when it comes to the political processes in the
developed world, Bales finds it encouraging that these are of less importance than the
work that grassroots organizations have the ability to accomplish in these places.27
2. Individual efforts.28 To some extent, a section regarding “individual efforts” to
eradicate slavery is a little misleading, especially in light of our discussion above
involving the importance of working together in concert or collaboration with other
people, organizations, and even governments. With such a massive issue, how can
individuals actually effect any change? But this is not a second, isolated category. Many
of the things mentioned in the previous section involving collective efforts have
corollaries for individuals. The purpose of discussing “individual efforts” is to point out
specific things that individuals can do to help fight against slavery. Some of these
activities may only be possible because certain larger structures exist (such as NGOs), but
on pages 10-12).
26
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the activities mentioned here are activities that one person (or two or three) can engage in
and be assured that their actions matter. As modern abolitionist David Batstone states, “I
believe in the power of individuals to save the world. Social movements take root and
blossom when enough individuals take personal action. When you tell yourself that there
is nothing you can do to arrest the global slave trade, you underestimate your own
potential and abandon hope for those trapped in captivity.”29 So in order to fight against
the tendency toward apathy or hopeless, instead ask yourself, “What can I do to become a
‘conditional cosmopolitan’ in the fight against modern slavery?”
One person can raise the alarm to let all those in her sphere of influence know that
slavery still exists in our modern world. Bales points out that the biggest obstacle facing
the abolitionist is that most people in the world are ignorant of the problem. He questions
how we can hope to bring about large-scale change “when the problem is not apathy or
indifference to the continued presence of slavery, but ignorance of it.”30 One chief goal of
the very first NGO, which was established in the late 1700s in order to abolish the slave
trade and bring about emancipation for slaves, was “to bring about a shift in values by
raising public awareness.”31
Several semesters ago I taught a class to undergraduate students on modern
slavery. I had one wonderful student who was completely engaged in the class and who
was determined to become a modern abolitionist. After the semester ended, he planned to
take a world tour with several of his friends. His friends were planning to engage in sex
tourism in Southeast Asia. After explaining to his friends that many of the “workers” in
the commercial sex industry are slaves, and that sex tourism increases the demand for sex
29
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slaves, his friends no longer wished to become sex tourists. In this instance, education
and awareness from a peer was all it took to keep several college guys from potentially
exploiting slaves in the commercial sex industry.
Perhaps we have jumped ahead though. Before we can become educators, we
must ourselves be educated regarding the reality of modern slavery, its multiple
manifestations, and effective tools for fighting slavery in our modern context. One
important component of educating ourselves involves being aware of common places and
occupations where slaves are often discovered so that we can be vigilant and look for
signs of slavery in the world around us. David Batstone remembers discovering that his
favorite San Francisco Bay Indian restaurant, unbeknownst to him, used slave labor. The
operation thrived until a tragedy revealed the truth. This helped Batstone to understand
that while slaves themselves are not invisible – meaning that we may see them all around
us – the existence of slavery in our modern world is a largely invisible reality for many of
us. He states,
Just as I never suspected that my favorite restaurant had become a hub for a
trafficking ring, slavery likely crosses our path on a regular basis without our
awareness. We may pass a construction site and never think twice about whether
the laborers there work of their own volition. Or we might drive along city streets
at night, see young girls on a street corner peddling their bodies, and wonder how
they could ever “choose” such a life…slavery is in reality not invisible…slaves
toil in the public eye.32
So if slavery is all around us, how can we train ourselves to see and know when
slavery is likely present? Anna Rodriguez, the founder of the Florida Coalition Against
Human Trafficking, teaches workshops to citizens wishing to become better equipped to
recognize slavery in their own communities. In her presentations she points out that
slaves are often found in the following industries/occupations/situations:
32
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Housecleaning services, Landscape and gardening businesses, Households in
which domestic (home) workers are present, Large-scale agricultural labor,
Construction sites, Casinos, Garment factories, Hotels (housekeeping), Nail
salons, Migrant or transitional communities, Zones known for prostitution, Strip
clubs/ massage parlors, and Domestic violence cases.33
Bales, Trodd, and Williamson point out some key warning signs that a person may be
enslaved. We can all watch for these signs. A person may be enslaved if he or she:
…is not free to change employers; has been assaulted or threatened for refusing to
work; has been cheated and forced to pay off “debts” upon arrival in the US or the
UK; has had his or her passport or other documents taken away; lacks proper
identification; is unable to move freely or is being watched or followed; is under
the control or constant supervision of another; is rarely allowed to speak freely;
has an “interpreter” with them; lacks the means to support him/herself or control
money, in spite of long hours at work; lacks contact with or is isolated from
family and friends; lacks permanency in the community; has a constant
appearance of fear, nervousness, and/or apprehension; is afraid to talk in the
presence of others; has unexplained injuries or is malnourished.34
In February of 2017, an Alaska Airlines flight attendant noticed some of these signs in a
young disheveled girl traveling with an older well-dressed man. The flight attendant, who
had received training regarding human trafficking, wrote a note for the girl and left it in
the bathroom. The girl wrote back on the note that she needed help. When the plane
landed, law enforcement was ready to assess the situation and rescued the girl.35 A person
was rescued from slavery because of education, an astute individual, and a swift
collaborative response.
Bales, Trodd, and Williamson offer multiple suggestions for individuals wishing
to take steps toward eradicating slavery. One such suggestion is to “refuse to retire on the
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backs of slaves.”36 They further explain that retirement and pension funds may include
investments in companies that “refuse to take responsibility for the slavery in their supply
chains.”37 When possible, we can instruct our financial advisors to exclude such
companies from our portfolios. This may take some research on the part of those who
invest in such funds, and it may not always be possible to know each company’s human
rights track record, but in at least some instances this information is not impossible to
find.38
Other suggestions include writing to members of Parliament or Congress; writing
letters in newspapers, magazines, or blogs; organizing neighborhood watch groups that
include slavery issues as part of their agendas; and arranging for anti-slavery speakers at
schools, colleges, and religious and community centers. More generally, individuals can
assess their own passions, talents, abilities, and spheres of influence and get creative!39
David Batstone advocates for “open-source activism,” which mandates “that individual
abolitionists develop their own creative solutions wherever they live.”40 For instance, I
am a resident of the state of South Carolina. When Donald Trump was elected president,
he chose our (now) former governor Nikki Haley as his ambassador to the United
Nations. Before she began this new post, I wrote a letter as a fellow South Carolinian
imploring her to use her new position of global influence to fight for freedom for the
world’s enslaved. I do not know if she read my letter, but I hope that she did, and I hope
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that it caused her to pause for a moment and to consider the role she could play in the
modern abolition movement.
When it comes to slavery in the supply chains of the products we use, there are
many ways we can begin to live more responsible lives as consumers. First and foremost,
we can make ourselves aware of how our consumer lifestyles support slavery. I
mentioned in Chapter Five that consumers can complete a “Slavery Footprint” survey,
which calculates an estimation of how many slaves are required to sustain each
individual’s lifestyle.41 Completing this survey is an invaluable first step on the journey
to making more informed anti-slavery consumer choices. Once we are more aware of
how our slavery footprints are impacted by our consumer habits, we can begin to make
better informed purchasing decisions. One possibility is to buy Fair Trade products
whenever they are available. “Once farms have been certified as having no slavery and
child labor…farmers can sell their crops to Fair Trade buyers,” who then distribute the
products to wholesalers and retailers who make the products available to consumer in
more than forty countries.42 These products can be easily identified because they are
stamped with one of several “Fair Trade Certified” (or equivalent) logos. The more
consumers support and demand Fair Trade products, the more the supply and availability
of such products will increase.43
One industry that is especially implicated for its use of slave labor, and often child
slave labor, is the carpet and rug-making industry. Hundreds of thousands of children are
trapped in this industry in India and Pakistan alone. In India, most carpets are woven in
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the state of Uttar Pradesh, “where the majority of workers are low-caste Hindu
boys…The boys are forced to work for no pay, for ten to eighteen hours a day, seven
days a week. They are beaten, tortured, branded, kept half-fed and half-clad, and are
usually made to sleep in the loom shed.”44 For this reason, when I see advertisements for
“hand-made” or “hand-woven” rugs, I cannot help but wonder who wove them, under
what conditions, and how young the weavers might have been. Bales and Trodd have
compiled numerous stories from slave-children who were forced to work in looms
weaving carpets and rugs. In one such story from a twelve-year-old boy named Ravi, he
recalls that when he was hurt he was still made to weave. “Very often, because the wound
was in raw condition, the blood would start oozing out of my finger. But then we could
not stop. With the blood running down my finger I was made to weave.”45 When Ravi’s
father attempted to rescue him, the loom owner stated that Ravi could not leave because
he was the only one who knew the pattern of the rug he was weaving.46
If the thought of purchasing a rug woven by the bloody fingers of children
horrifies you, then you are in luck! A process now exists in which rugs (and some other
woven products) can receive a “GoodWeave label,” certifying that “no child, forced or
bonded labor was used in the making of a certified product, and that your purchase
supports programs that educate children and ensure decent work for adults.”47 You can
search the GoodWeave website to discover certain companies and brands that carry
GoodWeave certified rugs, or you can look on the backs of rugs for the GoodWeave
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label. “Each GoodWeave label has a unique code that can be traced back to the licensed
producer.”48 One mainstream retailer that has made major strides to incorporate
GoodWeave certified rugs into its brand is the Target Corporation.49 For many consumers
this means that buying a GoodWeave certified rug is not only easy, it is also relatively
inexpensive. Several years ago after learning of Target’s involvement with the
GoodWeave label, I went to my local retailer. The first rug I turned over had a
GoodWeave certification label on the back. A surge of adrenaline rushed through my
veins at the sight of competitively priced, good quality, slavery-free rugs being sold five
minutes from my house. For me, this made purchasing a slave-free rug a real, viable
option rather than a distant, romanticized dream.
Closely related to purchasing Fair Trade products, we can “use our consumer
power to ask companies to examine their supply chains.”50 The goal with such endeavors
is to “take the slavery out of the products without hurting the free farmers and workers at
the same time.”51 For this reason, boycotts are strongly discouraged, because a majority
of the farmers who supply materials used in production do not use slaves. When we
boycott industries, we may cripple some of the criminals who use slaves, but we also risk
hurting numerous free workers, and we are likely to push those workers into desperate
situations that then leave them vulnerable to enslavement. Simply stated, “The boycott
may hurt the slaveholder, but it will hurt the free farmer much more.”52 The better option
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is to fight slavery at its source – the farm, the mine, and the workshop; and as Bales,
Trodd, and Williamson explain, “To do that, everyone along the supply chain, from the
farmer to the consumer, takes responsibility.”53
Virtually all of our modern technological devices, as well as numerous other
consumer products, possess certain minerals known as “conflict minerals.” These include
tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold, and are largely mined by slaves is the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. This a perfect example of slavery found at the source of
extraction of raw materials used in consumer products. In our global technology age, it is
nearly impossible to eliminate these products from our lives. Doing so would include
throwing out our phones, computers, tablets, and SIM cards. It would exclude car and
train travel.54 And unfortunately, there is no stamp or label that we can look for when we
go to purchase a laptop like we can when we wish to purchase coffee, tea, textiles, or
rugs. But because such a label does not exist today does not mean that it could not exist
in the future. The Intel Corporation is leading the way in the effort to exclude conflict
minerals from its supply chain. Intel is also encouraging other technology companies to
join this pursuit.55 Intel encourages students to join with the Enough Project’s “Conflict
Free Campus Initiative” in an effort to make demands of electronics companies that they
move toward using conflict-free minerals in their products.56 The vision is that in five or
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ten years, when I walk into a retailer to buy a cell phone or a laptop, I can look for
products with a “Conflict Free” label and choose to purchase these products instead of
uncertified ones.
When it comes to our contributions in the commercial sex industry, the most
comprehensive solution is simple in prescription, but perhaps extremely difficult in
execution. The best, and often times only, way to definitively ensure that bought sex
services are not performed by slaves is to never buy them in the first place. I recognize
that many may laugh at this though and claim that this is an impossible hope, but in all
seriousness, feeding your sex drive is insignificant when slaves pay the price for your
sexual satisfaction.
We have now spent quite some time discussing the importance of educating
ourselves and others, and then acting on our knowledge. But there is at least one other
major obstacle to eradicating slavery, and this is a lack of resources.57 As Bales, Trodd,
and Williamson point out, “Anti-slavery groups must be reliable in everything they do
with the communities they support; they can’t run out of money in the middle of a
liberation.”58 We already discussed in Chapter Five that if those of us with excess
resources would make small sacrifices, such as curtailing our coffee and ice cream
expenditures and instead funneling those funds into anti-slavery initiatives, then we could
at least put at major dent in the existence of slavery, and at best actually achieve its
eradication. In many instances, organizations and structures already exist with the skills
and passion to fight modern slavery, but they cannot work to their fullest potential when
they are underfunded. As Bales points out, most of the organizations working tirelessly to

57
58

Bales, Trodd, and Williamson, Modern Slavery: Beginner’s Guide, 146.
Ibid., 154.

193

free slaves and to provide them with supportive services so that they do not remain
vulnerable to reenslavement “have scant local resources and little or no support from the
developed world.”59 It may seem like sending money is too little a thing given the
circumstances, but often times sending money is both the most feasible and practical way
for us to help, and is also the most needed and effective way we can join the fight against
slavery.
Of course, not all NGOs or other human rights organizations are maximally
effective. In fact, some of them are rather ineffective.60 Therefore blindly supporting
NGOs may or may not be an effective way to fight against slavery. For this reason, Leif
Wenar believes that while supporting NGOs and other aid organizations is important, we
should not do so blindly.61 Wenar questions the validity of the assertion: “…small
sacrifice from the rich can bring great benefit to the poor…”62 This assertion is used
liberally in appeals for charitable contributions. However, Wenar believes that confidence
in this statement is “seriously misplaced,” as empirical evidence to support the truth of
this statement is often difficult to find.63 Even in the age of globalization, it is often not as
simple as rich people giving generously, and their contributions easily finding their way
to their global neighbors who need assistance the most.64 We should assess how each
dollar we give will affect the long-term well being of the slaves we hope to help.65
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Because this question often can only be answered by “informed, reasonable guesses,”
part of our responsibility may be to advocate for greater transparency from organizations
that redistribute aid. However, despite some of the implicit problems with NGOs and
other similar organizations, there is evidence to support the idea that some of them are
rather effective, and that some of them do accomplish quite a bit of good in the realm of
fighting to alleviate numerous social injustices.66
Additionally, there are ways of giving aid that might make things worse in the
long run for those we are attempting to help. For instance, the methods of some NGOs
may perpetuate practices that will increase injustice over time instead of decreasing it.
Some types of aid may not actually work. For instance, practicing “redemption,” or the
buying back of slaves from their oppressors, may actually make matters worse by
profiting those who would enslave and giving them a reason to acquire more slaves…so
these new slaves can also be redeemed.67 More needs to be done to figure out which
methods of aid will actually help people, and then to promote such methods.68 We must
walk in the tension of realizing we have an obligation to help these exploited neighbors in
the developing world while also realizing that we must justify our actions to future
generations.69 This represents a crossroads between the two main responsibilities we have
discussed – educating ourselves and others, and giving money and resources. We can be
maximally effective in the fight to eradicate modern slavery when we are armed with
knowledge, and when we use that knowledge to contribute toward organizations,
66

Alan Fowler, “Demonstrating NGO performance: problems and possibilities,” Development in Practice
6, no.1 (February 1996): 58-65, accessed March 13, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4029356; Rana
Lehr-Lehnardt, "NGO Legitimacy: Reassessing Democracy, Accountability and Transparency," Cornell
Law School InterUniversity Graduate Student Conference Papers (2005), accessed March 13, 2019,
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/6.
67
Bales, Unerstanding Global Slavery, 115-122.
68
Wenar, 405-406.
69
Ibid., 408.

195

agencies, and programs which are doing the best job of fighting slavery everywhere, from
our local to our global communities.70
I will close this section with one final thought. It is an observation made by
Thomas Pogge specifically concerning our isolation from severe poverty. But I believe
his observation speaks a great deal toward the situation in which most of us find
ourselves in relation to the world’s slaves. He states,
We live in extreme isolation from severe poverty. We do not know anyone
earning less than $30 for a 72-hour week of hard, monotonous labor. The onethird of human beings who die from poverty-related causes includes no one we
have ever spent time with. Nor do we know anyone who knows and cares about
these deceased – someone scarred by the experience of losing a child to hunger,
diarrhea, or measles, for example. If we had such people as friends or neighbors,
we would think harder about world poverty and work harder to help end this
ongoing catastrophe.71
Most of us can likely say the same thing regarding our isolation from the millions of
modern slaves in our world. We do not know them. We have not met them. We do not
know their family members who have been left scarred and broken. We do not personally
know the children who weave our rugs or the men and women who mine the minerals in
our phones. But we can get to know some of these people. Many of their stories are
available. I have recounted several of them throughout this project. Books containing
modern slave narratives, video documentaries, news stories, and even numerous
YouTube videos bring their experiences into our lives and homes. Tools exist to help us
trace our connections to these neighbors. If we truly make attempts to know these people
– our neighbors – their stories will likely change our lives.
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II. Concluding Remarks
As much as we may loathe the idea, the existence of slavery in our modern world
is a heartbreaking reality. These millions upon millions of enslaved people are our
neighbors. Some of them live in our immediate communities. Some of them live around
the world. Some of them harvest, mine, sew, manufacture, and produce items that we
consume daily. Others are sexually abused in the commercial sex industry, being forced
to practice prostitution and film pornographic videos. Some of them work in our service
industries cooking food and cleaning our hotel rooms. They are right in front of us. And
they are invisible to us.
My first goal in this project has been to bring to light the reality of modern
slavery. In Chapter Two, I worked to rigorously define modern slavery and to explain the
various forms it takes in our world today.
My second goal in this project has been to generally explore the demands that
justice – both distributive and commutative – place on individuals. The demands of
justice are rooted in our responsibility to favor and foster the common good of those with
whom we share resources and with whom we share varying relationships. The story of
our lives intersects and impacts the lives and narrative quests of countless others, both
proximally close and proximally distant from us.
Distributive justice requires that when we have more than we need, we use those
surplus resources for the benefit of others. We must understand that when we hit the
“distribution jackpot” so to speak, and find ourselves trustees over more than our share,
we are responsible for using our excesses for the common good of those who were
allocated less.
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Commutative justice requires that we treat those with whom we share
relationships – our neighbors widely construed – in ways that are fitting and fair. In some
instances we are at fault or guilty for harming our neighbors. In others instances we may
not be guilty of harming them, but we still carry some responsibility for their oppression.
Additionally, when our actions do harm them, we may be especially obligated to take
restorative steps for their benefit.
My third goal in this project has been to link our duties in distributive and
commutative justice to the plight of modern slaves. Distributive injustice is a chief factor
in rendering millions of people vulnerable to slavery because of their severe poverty.
Greater justice in distribution would serve to decrease the number of people who find
themselves hopeless, powerless, and especially vulnerable to slavery. Commutative
injustice demands that we consider our varied relationships to the world’s slaves, and that
we understand both when we may be guilty for the enslavement of others, as is the case
when one views child pornography, and when we may bear some responsibility without
guilt for their slavery, as is the case when slave labor is mixed into the global
commodities market and finds its way into consumer product. Our multiple and varied
relationships to slaves mean that we share some responsibility for their abuse, regardless
of guilt, when we both have the ability to help them and especially when we have
contributed to harming them.
My fourth and final goal in this project has been to empower us to action. I have
not wanted to paint a hopeless picture regarding slavery, nor to level an intense guilt
burden on global citizens who genuinely wish we lived in a slavery-free world. I hope
that we all feel the freedom to discharge our obligations toward the world’s slaves in a

198

wide variety of ways. We can fight for modern abolition in multiple, creative ways that
utilize our own spheres influence, talents, passions, resources, and convictions to
mobilize us to action. We can become ‘conditional cosmopolitans’ in relation to modern
slavery, truly evaluating when we should sacrifice particularist commitments for the sake
of our globally enslaved brothers and sisters. We stand at a crossroads, and what we
decide to do (or not do) will have historical ramifications. As David Batstone explains,
My students at the University of San Francisco often remark that they feel as if
they were born in the wrong era, after the important issues of history have been
decided…They could not be more wrong…There are times to read history, and
there are times to make history. We live right now at one of those epic moments
in the fight for human freedom. We no longer have to wonder how we might
respond to our moment of truth. It is we who are on the stage, and we can change
the winds of history with our actions. Future generations will look back to judge
our choices and be inspired or disappointed.72
Batstone also pleads with all of us to take up the cause, however we can, in whatever
ways we are led.
It takes all of us. The original abolitionists were a varied lot, and their successes
were due in part to their varied battle plans. From John Brown’s carbines and
pikes [weapons] to Charles Sumner’s verbs and nouns [words], the antislavery
vanguard used widely differing tools, but united in a common cause. Now, as
then, all personalities are welcome.73
And now, I will end where I began. In the words of the fierce British abolitionist William
Wilberforce, I will raise my own voice to remind us all: "You may choose to look the
other way but you can never say again that you did not know."74 I will not, I cannot, look
the other way. The world’s slaves deserve my attention. They deserve our attention. And
we are obligated to give it to them.
ABOLITION!
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APPENDIX A
ORGANIZATIONS, TOOLS, AND RESOURCES
TO HELP FIGHT SLAVERY
This is by no means an exhaustive list. However, it should give those who are interested
plenty of resources to better educate yourselves and your neighbors, and to begin making
small changes toward fighting for the abolition of modern slavery.
I. Anti-slavery Organizations
- EndIt Movement: www.enditmovement.com
A giant hub for fighting modern slavery; links to many other agencies and
organizations
- International Justice Mission (IJM): www.ijm.org
Operates throughout the world fighting slavery; Focuses especially on
prosecuting traffickers and slave-owners; Operates a gift catalog where you
can give gifts of freedom in honor and memory of loved ones: gifts.ijm.org
- Polaris Project: www.polarisproject.org
Operates a national (USA) human trafficking hotline
- A21: www.a21.org
“Together, we are eradicating human trafficking through awareness,
intervention, and aftercare.”
- Not For Sale Campaign: www.notforsalecampaign.org
“A network to grow self-sustaining social projects with purpose-driven
business to end exploitation and forced labor.”
- Women At Risk Intl.: www.warinternational.org
“…established to create circles of protection around at-risk women and
children.”
- Operation Underground Railroad: www.ourrescue.org
“We exist to rescue children from sex trafficking.”
- As Our Own: www.asourown.org
Provides rescue, aftercare, and prevention for vulnerable children in India.
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- Made in a Free World: www.madeinafreeworld.com
“Software that turns supply chain risks into rewards.”
- Free the Slaves: www.freetheslaves.net
Focuses on labor slavery and consumerism
- Stop the Traffik: www.stopthetraffik.org
UK based, comprehensive anti-trafficking organization
- ECPAT: www.ecpat.org
Focuses on eliminating the sexual exploitation of children
- Love 146: www.love146.org
Works to eliminate child trafficking and exploitation
- Project Rescue: www.projectrescue.com
Operates in eight countries with various anti-slavery programs and initiatives. I
have personally worked with this organization in Delhi, India, where they have
safe homes for girls and boys rescued from the Red Light District.
- Bombay Teen Challenge: www.bombayteenchallenge.org
“With over a million children enslaved in the red light districts of India, BTC
was created with a vision to break the cycle of trafficking through impactdriven initiatives that help those rescued become productive and empowered
members of society.”
- The Exodus Road: www.theexodusroad.com
Rescues sex slaves in Southeast Asia and India
- Hope for Justice: www.hopeforjustice.org
A comprehensive rescue and restoration agency operating in eight countries
- Free to Run: www.freetorun.org
“[O]perates on the basic principle that sport is a human right and not a luxury.”
- Transparency International: www.transparency.org
“The global coalition against corruption”
- Lighthouse For Life: www.lighthouseforlife.org
Agency local to Columbia, South Carolina
- Out of Darkness: www.outofdarkness.org
Agency local to Atlanta, Georgia
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- Florida Coalition Against Human Trafficking: www.stophumantrafficking.org
Works to collaborate with and train law enforcement, federal officials, service
providers, community members, and others
- Amazonsmile (gives donations to a charity of your choice): smile.amazon.com
II. Tools and Resources
A. Websites and Articles
Consumerism and Product Supply Chains
- Slavery Footprint: www.slaveryfootprint.org
Online survey you can take to discover “how many slaves work for you”
- Done Good: www.donegood.co
“Shop hundreds of brands that make the world better.”
- Assessing Atrocity: http://assessingatrocity.com/the-high-cost-of-cheap-laborhow-to-buy-clothing-without-supporting-slave-labor-2/
A few of these links are outdated, but there are still plenty of good suggestions
of ethically responsible companies in this article.
- The Good Trade: www.thegoodtrade.com
Suggestions for ethical clothing, travel, skincare, and other sustainable
products
- Fair Trade USA: www.fairtradeusa.org/products-partners
The go-to place for information on Fair Trade in the USA, including
suggestions of Fair Trade Certified products
- PACT Organic Clothing: www.wearpact.com
Ethically sourced, Fair Trade, organic cotton clothing. (Half of my casual
wardrobe is from this company).
- Inkkas Shoes: www.inkkas.com
Sells Fair Trade sneakers and casual shoes
(my husband and I both own several pairs)
- Senda Athletics: www.sendaathletics.com
Offers fair trade sporting equipment, especially soccer balls
- Theo Chocolate: www.theochocolate.com
Fair Trade chocolate, ethically sourced “from bean to bar”
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- Know the Chain: www.knowthechain.org
“…a resource for companies and investors to understand and address forced
labor risks within their global supply chains.”
- The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act
Requires large companies in California to disclose efforts to ensure their
products are not produced by slaves.
https://oag.ca.gov/SB657
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/resource-guide.pdf
- Ann Taylor Loft: www.responsiblyann.com/ourExpectations.asp
This is an example of a transparency statement as required by the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act.
The Carpet and Rug Industry
- GoodWeave: www.goodweave.org
“GoodWeave works to end child labor in global supply chains, from the
producer’s hands to the consumer’s.”
- GoodWeave at Target - https://goodweave.org/brand/target/
“The Eco-Friendly Evolution,” by Andrea Lillo:
www.hfndigital.com/news/eco-friendly-evolution/
- Rugmark Foundation: www.rugmarkindia.org/Rugmark/index.htm
Conflict Free Minerals and Stones
- Responsible Minerals Initiative: http://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org
Helping companies make informed choices about responsibly sourced minerals
in their supply chains.
- Intel, “In Pursuit of a Conflict Free Supply Chain”: https://www.intel.com/
content/www/us/en/corporate-responsibility/conflict-free-minerals.html
- Intel, “What are conflict minerals and why does conflict-free matter?” by Joyce
Riha Linki: http://iq.intel.com/why-conflict-free-matters-in-your-everyday-life/
- The Kimberly Process: https://www.kimberleyprocess.com
Process set up to certify conflict-free diamonds, although many are skeptical of
its proposed success
- Brilliant Earth: www.brilliantearth.com
Source for conflict free jewelry and precious stones, although its
trustworthiness is in question per the two articles immediately following
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- Questioning conflict-free diamonds:
- “Here’s Why Conflict Free Diamonds are a Hoax,” by Elizabeth Harper:
https://www.dealnews.com/features/Heres-WhyConflict-Free-Diamonds-Are-a-Hoax/2030261.html
- “Inside the ‘conflict-free’ diamond scam costing online buyers millions [Updated]”
by Bryan Clark, https://thenextweb.com/insider/2017/06/17/shady-online-diamonddealer-proves-conflict-free-is-no-guarantee/
- Canadamark: https://www.canadamark.com
Assures diamonds are responsibly mined in Canada; May be safest way to
ensure diamonds are conflict-free
Human Trafficking Initiatives
- “This Girl's Senior Project Became a Law Enforcement Tool to Stop Sex
Trafficking,” by Kate Dwyer: http://www.teenvogue.com/story/senior-projectstops-human-trafficking?mbid=social_facebook
Details Emily Kennedy’s (Carnegie Mellon University) senior project that “has
evolved into a world-class database that provides law enforcement officials
with the tools to combat human trafficking.”
- Fight the New Drug: www.fightthenewdrug.org
Details links between Human trafficking and pornography
- Safe Place: http://www.nationalsafeplace.org
“Safe Place designates businesses and organizations as Safe Place locations,
making help readily available to youth in communities across the country.”
- QuikTrip partners with Safe Place: “This “Safe Place” Sign Saves Lives By
Giving Them Refuge In Emergency Situations,” by Emerald Pellot,
www.littlethings.com/quik-trip-safe-place/
- “Super Bowl Is Single Largest Human Trafficking Incident In U.S.: Attorney
General,” by Eleanor Goldberg: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/03/
super-bowl-sex-trafficking_n_2607871.html
Explains the prevalence of human trafficking at major sporting events
B. Videos
- EndIt Movement
* Awareness and action among students:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iokqGOQmt1U
* Slavery at major sporting events:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qMyExi2q-ZI
- Kevin Bales defines slavery: www.youtube.com/watch?v=qfCiQJE_sBg
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- Fields of Mudan, The Florida State University College of Motion Picture Arts,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=IO204wuT9mc
“A young Asian girl forced into modern day child sex slavery, dreams of a
better life with her mother in America.”
- The Abolitionists, a documentary film, must purchase to view:
www.abolitionistsmovement.com
- I Am Jane Doe, a documentary film about backpage.com, which has since been
shut down: www.youtube.com/watch?v=xshDkqB1rYc
- “Is Consumerism Fueling Modern-Day Slavery?”
An interview with David Batstone of the “Not For Sale Campaign”
www.youtube.com/watch?v=4QrmOtuAZjY
- “Modern day slavery – Supply Chains”
www.youtube.com/watch?v=YRu6CaXTAxA
- “Human Trafficking: Modern-day Slavery in America”
www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tQDYvPrE6k
Slaves are forced to braid hair in Newark, New Jersey
- “What's Porn Got To Do With Sex Trafficking?: A survivor explains.”
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnPp0DPnb9o
- “The Dutch Sex Industry’s Terrifying Underbelly”
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ht8wxROENdE
- “Look Inside: Carolyn Duran and the Pursuit of Conflict-free”
www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZDsNXtM-rk
- “Mystery Unboxing”
www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZkFdS8_Wfw
- “Conflict Minerals 101”
www.youtube.com/watch?v=aF-sJgcoY20
- “Conflict Minerals in Your Daily Life”
www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8Bq5R2RB6s
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APPENDIX B
TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TO
FIGHTING MODERN SLAVERY:
CASE EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MISSION (IJM)
A helpful distinction we could make when it comes to determining how we might act
toward alleviating modern slavery, both close to home and around the globe, is the
distinction between top-down and bottom-up solutions.1 Top-down solutions include
actions that governments and other larger institutional groups should undertake to fight
modern slavery. Bottom-up solutions include actions that independently organized
grassroots organizations and groups (as well as individuals) might undertake to bring
freedom to modern slaves. Both of these approaches are necessary in the modern fight for
abolition. This case study showcases how one global abolitionist organization,
International Justice Mission (IJM) undertakes the fight against modern slavery using
both top-down and bottom-up approaches.
International Justice Mission (IJM)
According to their website, IJM ranks as “the largest anti-slavery organization in
the world.” Their claim is simple: “We know where slaves are. Your help is needed to
rescue them.”2 The model which IJM uses contains three main components: setting slaves
free, throwing oppressors in jail, and advocating for changes in the systems that make the
slave trade profitable (with the ultimate goal of eliminating the slave trade forever).3 In
explaining how these components have proven effective, IJM states:
International Justice Mission is an organized group of advocates, donors,
investigators, social workers, lawyers, and government leaders who are executing
a proven plan that will stop the modern slave trade in its tracks.
We rescue slaves by disrupting the slave trade. At IJM, we work with local
governments to rescue slaves and throw their oppressors in jail. Once the
immediate crisis is managed, we disrupt the business model that fostered the
slavery in the first place. Disrupting the model involves prosecuting slave owners
1

I am indebted to Sheetal Shah, Ph.D. for pointing out this helpful distinction.
http://www.webster.edu/arts-and-sciences/faculty/shah.html.
2
https://www.ijm.org/
3
Ibid.
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and dramatically increasing the legal, financial and opportunity costs slave
owners must pay to sustain a slave-labor model.
If we don’t disrupt the model, slave owners will expand their power and steal
more lives. But the world is changing. Modern slavery can end in our lifetime.
Our proven model works. Our only limitations are financial. With your help, we
can throw slave owners and traffickers in jail, rescue those whose lives have been
stolen and prove to the world every human life matters.4
This is a helpful description of the work in which IJM is involved. I will use this to
extrapolate how IJM employs both top-down and bottom-up approaches to eliminating
modern slavery. We will begin with the bigger, global picture (top-down), and work
toward establishing smaller-scale, more localized, and even individual approaches
(bottom-up).
Top-down approaches used by IJM
One of IJM’s the three major components of fighting against slavery includes
disrupting the business model that renders slavery profitable for those willing to enslave
and exploit human beings. In order to do this, IJM works alongside governments to help
them enforce existing laws, and to create new laws and policies that will eliminate the
financial benefits of engaging in the slave trade. For this to be successful, IJM recognizes
that governments must be willing and able to enforce their own existing anti-slavery
laws.
Furthermore, IJM recognizes that future agreements and legislation must
undermine the profitability of the slave trade. Trade agreements between nations must
discourage slavery. Governments that would be (and currently are) tempted to turn a
blind eye to the slave trade must be pressured to end this inhumane practice. IJM
understands this, and works alongside governments to encourage far-reaching, large-scale
changes in policies to the detriment of slave traders and for the benefit of modern slaves.
They do this by partnering with government officials who are sympathetic to the antislavery movement. They also employ numerous lawyers and other advocates, who in turn
use their influence and expertise to pressure non-compliant governments and corrupt
officials to govern with the goal of protecting the vulnerable people under their
jurisdiction instead of tolerating, protecting, and participating in their exploitation.
These are some examples of how IJM employs a top-down approach in
addressing modern slavery. IJM engages governments and systems in an attempt to
systematically eliminate the structures that maintain slavery as a feasible and profitable
industry.5 IJM engages with legal systems to ensure that those who enslave others are
held accountable for their crimes, and that they are prohibited from enslaving others in
the future.

4

https://www.ijm.org/slavery
For example, IJM works closely with the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Office (TIP Office);
https://freedomcommons.ijm.org/
5
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Bottom-up approaches used by IJM
There are at least four ways that IJM employs a bottom-up approach when
fighting against modern slavery. First, IJM works on the ground to free slaves. They do
this by working with local officials in communities across the globe to organize and
execute rescue missions. IJM explains, “…we find the children and adults who are
victims of violence, forced labor, or sex trafficking. We then support local police in
rescue operations and help meet the victims’ urgent needs, like safe housing, food,
medical care, counseling, and education. We create a plan for every individual to
succeed.”6 Organizing raids and providing direct care resources for survivors most
definitely exemplifies a bottom-up approach to fighting slavery.
Second, after rescue operations are performed and slaves are set free and cared
for, IJM uses its involvement and influence to “…make sure criminals cannot continue to
harm their victims. We support the police in investigating, arresting, and charging slave
owners with crimes. We continue to fight until slave owners are behind bars.”7 Because
these efforts are focused at the level of local law enforcement and criminal justice, this is
an example of a bottom-up approach.
Third, IJM encourages small pockets of abolition-advocates to organize
themselves in their local communities wherever they are.8 IJM specifically focuses on
encouraging such pockets of locally organized, grassroots chapters on college campuses.9
For instance, the University of South Carolina has a student chapter of IJM.10 This
campus organization supports the work of IJM by meeting regularly, organizing events
aimed at educating other students about the reality of modern slavery, raising money for
IJM initiatives, and engaging in local community service projects aimed at fighting
slavery in the communities surrounding the university. This provides a perfect example
of a bottom-up approach to fighting against slavery.
Fourth, the primary way that IJM encourages support from smaller grassroots
groups and individuals is through donating financially to the organization. IJM has
proven that its comprehensive model works, but the numerous ambitious projects and
initiatives that the organization has planned can only proceed if they are properly funded.
Thus, the easiest, most straightforward, and most needed source of support for IJM comes
from large and small donations, and from various individuals and groups.
IJM maintains a gift catalog, detailing monetary values needed to accomplish
specific anti-slavery initiatives around the globe. Giving the gift of freedom in honor or
memory of loved ones, or as a fundraising initiative for a group of modern abolitionists
such as a campus IJM chapter, is made easy by this catalog that details a plethora of
projects along with the monetary gifts needed to actualize them. From giving $7 to
6

https://www.ijm.org/our-work
Ibid.
8
https://freedomcommons.ijm.org/
9
https://www.ijm.org/students
10
https://ijmatusc.weebly.com/
7
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provide a hot meal to a survivor or $9 for a new blanket, to donating $35 for traumafocused therapy for a child sex trafficking survivor, to contributing $300 to rent boats for
rescue operations, and on up to raising $6,850 to fund a rescue mission and provide
restorative services to victims of sex trafficking, there is truly something for everyone or
every group in the IJM gift catalog.11
IJM also asks that individuals or groups consider becoming a “freedom partner.”
This involves making a commitment to donate $24 (or more) on a monthly basis to
support the various rescue operations, aftercare needs, legal fees, and other expenses
incurred in the fight for modern abolition. This consistent support helps IJM to plan and
execute properly funded rescue missions throughout the globe.12
Giving financially to an organization such as IJM is another perfect example of a
bottom-up approach to fighting against slavery. IJM could not continue its global or local
initiatives without this financial support. And while individuals and smaller groups may
feel as if donating money doesn’t seem like enough, IJM clearly points out that they have
the knowledge and manpower to execute numerous life-changing anti-slavery operations
if only they have proper financial support.13 In this instance, this bottom-up approach
helps to actualize other bottom-up approaches (such as rescue operations), as well as
numerous top-down approaches (such as advocating to governments and engaging in
justice systems) in the fight against the injustice of modern slavery.

11

https://gifts.ijm.org/
https://www.ijm.org/partnerships
13
https://www.ijm.org/slavery
12
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